The DR Congo’s Cobalt Power Move

When the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lifted its cobalt export ban on October 16 and imposed strict quotas instead, it was betting that controlling 70 percent of global supply would force Western powers and China to negotiate on African terms. Two weeks later, President Trump’s trade truce with Beijing tested that bet. China suspended export controls on rare earths, graphite, gallium, and other critical minerals, securing Washington’s mineral access through bilateral accommodation, rather than African diversification. The message to mineral-rich African nations: When push comes to shove, Washington and Beijing will prioritize deals with each other over cutting in the Global South on the action.

In February 2025, cobalt prices had hit a nine-year low. The DRC—which dominates global cobalt production and, according to S&P Global, holds 71 percent of proven reserves—decided to halt all exports of the mineral essential to AI, weaponry, and electric vehicles. Prices surged.

Kinshasa kept the tap closed for eight months. When exports resumed in mid-October, they came with quotas: 18,125 metric tons for the rest of 2025, then 96,600 metric tons annually for 2026 and 2027—less than half the DRC’s 2024 output. Under the new restrictions, violators could face permanent bans.

The DRC’s new cobalt trade regulations represent the continent’s most ambitious assertion of mineral sovereignty in decades, part of a broader pattern that includes lithium export restrictions in Zimbabwe and Namibia, as well as raw mineral bans in Malawi. Yet it remains to be seen whether rich nations that are poor in critical minerals, like the United States, will pursue the complex task of diversifying supply chains through Africa with the same urgency as they are with China.

Mining firms working in the DRC were divided on the risks and benefits. China Molybdenum (CMOC), the world’s largest cobalt supplier, opposed the restrictions, stating that the limits could accelerate the shift to cobalt-free batteries —a position some saw as a thinly veiled threat in the context of China’s larger critical minerals strategy. Swiss-headquartered Glencore broadly accepted the new limits as a step toward long-term market stability. The February export ban forced both companies to declare force majeure on supply contracts, but their divergent responses to the October quota system—Glencore’s acceptance versus CMOC’s opposition—reveal a deeper split: Western miners increasingly view African sovereignty assertions as inevitable, while Chinese operators accustomed to more compliant relationships resist constraints on their dominance.

Beneath these reactions lies a more profound shift. The DRC is no longer acting as a passive participant in global markets and is now asserting control.

The cobalt export pause was never just about prices. It was about seizing on a window of opportunity—one that, for the moment at least, could be narrowed by the Beijing–Washington trade détente. By controlling flows, Kinshasa aims to dismantle a structure where refiners capture profits while Congolese miners bear the risk. Guy-Robert Lukama, head of state-owned mining company Gécamines, argued in a speech at the 2024 Cobalt Congress that overproduction has crushed prices, leaving refiners—not producers—to set terms. His prescription: Align export rights with demand and push for local processing to keep more value in the country. The Congolese government is following through.

In a bid to bring more cohesion to the market and attract foreign investment, Kinshasa is also tightening domestic controls. The government banned the mixing of unregulated artisanal ore with industrial output and launched E-Trace, a digital platform that traces minerals from the mine to the export phase. These measures signal a strategic shift—the DRC recognizes that in order to attract Western capital, it is essential to meet environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, a priority Chinese investors have traditionally downplayed. Kinshasa is now actively working to satisfy those requirements as a matter of strategy.

The DRC is not the only African country asserting greater control over its mineral wealth through export bans. Zimbabwe banned exports of unprocessed lithium ore in December 2022 and plans to reinstate the ban in 2027. Namibia also implemented a ban on lithium in June 2023. Both countries are seeking to move up the processing value chain and capture more economic benefits domestically. Most recently, in October 2025, Malawi’s President Peter Mutharika announced a ban on all raw mineral exports, arguing that local processing of rare earth minerals could generate up to $500 million annually for the country. These parallel efforts reflect a broader shift across Africa, where resource-rich nations are using export restrictions as tools of economic sovereignty.

China’s dominance in the DRC, like in much of sub-Saharan Africa, is the product of a long-term strategy. Over two decades, Beijing employed minerals-for-infrastructure deals, some predating the Belt and Road Initiative, to embed itself in the Congolese mining sector. Chinese actors also dominate cobalt refining and midstream processing, primarily because Chinese firms, backed by the Chinese state, are willing to take on long-term risks. Government guarantees allowed Beijing to absorb risks in places like the DRC, where Western investors have historically refused to invest. The West’s absence from the DRC, however, created a strategic chokepoint for access to minerals powering critical technologies—a chokepoint now largely under China’s control.

The scale of this commitment is measurable. Data collected and analyzed by Johns Hopkins’ China–Africa Research Initiative indicate that China’s foreign direct investment in Africa surged 118.8 percent year-over-year to $3.96 billion in 2023, with mining accounting for 22 percent of total Chinese investment in Africa. China Molybdenum alone produced 61,073 metric tons of cobalt in the first half of 2025—a 13 percent increase despite the DRC’s export restrictions. The company’s 2016 acquisition of the Tenke Fungurume mine for $2.65 billion established CMOC as the world’s largest cobalt supplier, demonstrating how Chinese state-backed capital can absorb risks Western investors refuse.

Beijing’s dominance has come at a political cost for Congolese leaders. They increasingly view it as a dependency on China that limits sovereignty and yields diminishing returns for the Congolese people. The 2025 export controls, therefore, are not just a policy pivot; they are a signal that the DRC seeks a new bargain.

With demand for critical minerals surging, the DRC and other mineral-rich African countries now sit at the center of a new geopolitical contest, one that resembles the twentieth century’s oil rivalries. Recognizing this, the United States, under the Trump administration, expended considerable diplomatic capital on mediating peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda earlier this year, while promoting an economic framework (now stalled) between the two sides to unlock billions in mining investment. The subtext is hard to miss. American policymakers view stability in mineral-rich regions as inseparable from securing access to strategic resources, and they are now willing to invest in stabilizing these regions in Africa.

The European Union (EU) is also moving to secure mineral supply chains. The 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act focuses on diversifying the sourcing of critical minerals to meet climate, economic, and defense objectives, just one year after the EU’s 2023 Strategic Partnership Roadmap with the DRC, which was explicitly designed to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains. The EU has extended this strategy to three other mineral-rich African countries—Zambia, Namibia, and Rwanda—by signing memorandums of understanding in 2023 and 2024, as part of the EU’s broader Global Gateway strategy to secure access to critical minerals such as lithium, copper, and tantalum.

In September 2025, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency funded a feasibility study for Metalex Africa Zambia Limited to expand copper and cobalt processing at the Kazozu mine. Meanwhile, the EU recently designated a cobalt processing plant operated by Kobaloni Energy Zambia Limited as a strategic project, which aims to be Africa’s first cobalt sulphate refinery. In Namibia, the EU also pledged $1.5 billion to support the country’s clean energy transition and domestic processing of critical materials, aiming to attract over $23 billion in private investment. After years of limited engagement in Africa’s mining sector, Western governments now treat mineral policy as central to their foreign policy.

One year the U.S.–China trade agreement casts these partnerships in a harsher light. If Washington can secure mineral access by negotiating with Beijing—as it just did—the urgency driving Lobito Corridor investments and Zambian processing projects diminishes. African nations become useful secondary options, not strategic priorities. The question is whether Western commitments to build African processing capacity will survive détente with China.

For the DRC, the Trump–Xi agreement raises uncomfortable questions about the durability of Western partnerships. The quota system can influence prices and encourage engagement, but cannot guarantee transformation if that interest proves to be tactical. If U.S.–China tensions ease through bilateral accommodation, the urgency driving Western investment in African alternatives may subside—leaving nations like the DRC with export restrictions but limited leverage to convert them into processing capacity, technology transfer, and job creation.

Zambia illustrates both the potential and the limits of Western partnership. In June 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka celebrated the Metalex–Terra Metals joint venture—a $97 million investment featuring solar power and community commitments that are often lacking in Chinese projects. Yet its planned capacity of 100,000 metric tons annually (combined copper and cobalt) is modest compared to China Molybdenum’s output from DRC operations alone. Western investment delivers better ESG standards but at roughly one-tenth the Chinese scale. That gap explains why the DRC felt export restrictions were necessary to offset China’s market advantage.

Zimbabwe’s lithium export ban offers both a blueprint and a warning. Harare’s December 2022 restrictions spurred over $1 billion in Chinese processing investments—exactly the value-addition Zimbabwe sought. Yet export discipline had limited market impact; China’s lithium supplies remained ample due to sourcing from countries like Australia and Chile. For the DRC, this illustrates the paradox of resource nationalism: export restrictions can attract investment without generating sustained leverage if buyers maintain alternatives. The DRC’s 70 percent cobalt share provides stronger structural power than Zimbabwe’s lithium position, but China’s diversification into graphite (Mozambique), manganese (South Africa), and lithium (Zimbabwe) suggests Beijing is systematically building resilience against African export discipline.

This points to a collective action problem. Unilateral assertions, such as the DRC’s October quotas, can extract short-term concessions but remain vulnerable when great powers find an accommodation. Only coordinated regional export policies—across the DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other mineral-rich nations—could create supply constraints that force genuine long-term partnerships rather than tactical engagements that evaporate when Washington and Beijing cut deals.

Announcing new policies is easy; delivering on them is harder. The DRC still faces unreliable electric grids, poor infrastructure, and limited port access—fundamental barriers to downstream investment. Ambiguous tax rules, inconsistent enforcement, and corruption further deter investors.

Export bans — even regional ones —will not break historical cycles of resource extraction alone. The DRC, Zambia, and their African counterparts must use this moment of genuine leverage to demand long-term investments in value addition from Western partners. This means moving beyond rhetoric to secure commitments that build domestic processing capacity, technology transfer, and create jobs. Otherwise, these countries risk remaining trapped as raw material exporters despite their policy ambitions.

For African governments to make leaps in the value chain, they must adopt deliberate policy changes. First, they should condition market access on genuine partnership, requiring foreign investors to finance infrastructure like smelters, refineries, and reliable energy grids, as seen in the EU’s strategic project designation of Zambia’s Kobaloni cobalt refinery project. Second, they must build the institutional capacity to enforce these agreements transparently, ensuring that both investors and citizens are protected from corruption and arbitrary policy shifts. Third, they should leverage competition among Western, Chinese, and other partners to negotiate better terms by focusing on long-term, sustainable deals that provide stable revenue and predictable partnerships—rather than short-term arrangements that leave them vulnerable to price volatility and shifting geopolitical priorities.

For the first time in decades, the DRC has genuine leverage. Global industries depend on its minerals. The Tshisekedi government’s quota system and reinvigorated partnerships with the EU and the United States assert control while seeking technology, capital, and credibility. Whether the DRC converts this moment into transformation depends on more than bold gestures—it requires durable institutions, sound governance, and infrastructure investment that make value addition feasible.

The world is watching the DRC. The question is no longer whether others need its cobalt, but whether the DRC can finally turn resource wealth into national strength and long-term prosperity for its own people.