Oppose a Dangerous Authoritarian Precedent

Agenda Item 1.5 represents a counterproductive and potentially dangerous step toward greater governmental control of global satellite communications and should be firmly opposed by the U.S. delegation. Advanced by Russia and Iran, the proposal would establish regulatory restrictions that could prohibit satellite transmissions over countries and territories where operators lack authorization from national regulators.

At first glance, preventing unauthorized satellite services may seem uncontroversial. In practice, however, the proposal would significantly expand national control over an inherently global communications infrastructure. It also raises an important question: Is the stated goal of preventing unauthorized radiocommunications the real motivation, or is the proposal a vehicle for authoritarian governments seeking greater control over information flows?

To the extent that Agenda Item 1.5 is intended to limit the operations of foreign satellite providers and restrict access to information, the United States has strong economic, national security, and principled reasons to oppose it.

National spectrum sovereignty is well established under international law, but global satellite constellations complicate its application. Existing International Telecommunication Union (ITU) rules already address unauthorized satellite services. Operators cannot legally offer commercial service in a country without obtaining market access and the necessary approvals from national authorities, such as the FCC in the United States.

Satellite operators already have strong incentives to avoid communicating with unauthorized user terminals. But the measures that Agenda Item 1.5 could require—such as geofencing, coverage exclusions, or forcing satellites to cease transmissions while passing over certain countries—are often impractical and could undermine service that neighboring nations have explicitly authorized.

As the FCC has noted in its preliminary proposals, some of these requirements could also interrupt critical and potentially lifesaving satellite services.⁶⁸ More broadly, the proposal appears to extend concepts analogous to national airspace sovereignty into outer space in ways that are unprecedented, premature and potentially harmful to the continued development of satellite communications.

The proposal also raises potential concerns about space safety. Satellites depend on continuous telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) communications with ground-control facilities. These links allow operators to monitor satellite health, issue commands, avoid collisions, respond to anomalies, and maintain proper orbital positioning. Taken to an extreme, a rule requiring satellites to suspend all transmissions whenever they pass over particular territories could disrupt these critical functions and increase operational risks in an increasingly crowded orbital environment.

The broader implications are even more troubling. Russia and Iran, the proposal’s principal sponsors, maintain some of the world’s most restrictive information-control regimes. While governments have legitimate interests in preventing unauthorized use of satellite equipment within their borders, Agenda Item 1.5 risks turning the ITU into a mechanism for enforcing censorship and restricting access to communications technologies.

Nor would this be the first attempt to use international telecommunications institutions in this way. In 2012, Russia and several allies sought major revisions to the International Telecommunication Regulations that would have expanded governmental control over areas such as data privacy, international telecommunications rates, and internet governance.⁶⁹ Those efforts ultimately failed. Policymakers recognized that such matters were better addressed either by national regulators or by established multi-stakeholder institutions such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the Internet Engineering Task Force.

Agenda Item 1.5 follows a similar pattern and should meet a similar fate.

Iran’s heavily restricted national intranet already limits its citizens’ access to information and outside communications. Neither the United States nor the ITU should facilitate those restrictions, particularly when doing so would conflict with the ITU’s long-standing commitment to open communications.⁷⁰ Article 33 of the ITU Constitution affirms the organization’s commitment to public access to international telecommunications networks.⁷¹

While member states are not obligated to guarantee unrestricted access at all times, they should remain guided by the broader principles embodied in both the ITU framework and the United Nations system, including freedom of expression and access to information through communications networks and media.⁷² The connection between communications technologies and the exercise of those fundamental freedoms is well established.⁷³ The ITU should not adopt regulations that risk undermining them.