Table of Contents
Conclusion
Several years after the NATO intervention in 2011, the warring factions in Libya continue to destabilize the country. The internationally recognized government—the GNA—led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, and the opposing forces of the LNA, led by General Haftar, continue to fight for who will rule Libya. Both the LNA and the GNA conduct air/drone/artillery strikes, and are each backed by multiple countries that also launch air and drone strikes. From 2012 through February 5, 2020, 4,349 strikes were conducted, 2,348 of those were by the LNA alone. According to news reports and accounts on social media, at least 1,820 total individuals were killed in these strikes, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 2,440 killed, by the highest estimate. Of these recorded deaths, between 611 and 899 are civilians.
Both the GNA and LNA have international backers that financially support them, provide weapons and armed vehicles, or provide military training. This ever-evolving proxy conflict raises the question of whether the international community needs to address the increasing frequency of proxy forces in conflicts with a policy response. Mercenaries and other paramilitaries are entering the conflict on both sides, calling into question the ruling ability of either the GNA or the LNA. International political influence is embedded in the conflict outside of the civil war that promulgated after Gaddafi’s overthrow. The GNA receives support from Turkey with air and drone strikes, as well as troops, and the United States, which carries out air and drone strikes against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Egypt and the UAE conduct air and drone strikes in support of the LNA or against Islamist militias. France also strikes Islamist militant targets in Libya, yet while it claims to support GNA, its actual support through weapons and strikes is in alignment with the LNA. The air/drone/artillery strikes by seven international belligerents and the GNA and LNA continue to amplify the conflict, since more than half of all strikes have taken place in the last 20 months.
Since 2011, each international belligerent in the conflict has had a strategic interest in Libya and the wider region. France and Egypt have each defended their airstrikes in Libya, citing self-defense in an attempt to protect themselves from armed terrorist groups. This is similar to the United States’ justification made after 9/11 to begin its drone program in Pakistan.1 Egypt’s 42 strikes have resulted in at least 13 and at most 14 civilian deaths, according to local and international sources. France’s five strikes have resulted in a minimum of four and potentially as many as eight civilian deaths. France might also be responsible for seven strikes in 2018, likely conducted with the coordination of the LNA. The United Arab Emirates’ 131 strikes since it entered the conflict in 2016 have reportedly resulted in at least 135 and potentially as many as 185 civilian deaths. Turkey entered the conflict in 2019. It has allegedly conducted strikes unilaterally as well as with the GNA 22 times, resulting in between 10 and 12 civilian deaths.
Haftar’s LNA, while not the internationally recognized government of Libya, has nevertheless been relatively transparent in declaring military actions. Despite the LNA’s transparency, the resultant civilian casualties from their air campaign has drastically increased, setting unprecedented levels of devastation. The LNA accounts for more than half of all strikes, more than one-third of civilian deaths, and one-third of overall deaths. This sharp increase indicates the LNA’s and its affiliates’ willingness to forego civilian protection efforts as it aims to overtake Tripoli.
Reported civilian deaths from airstrikes in Libya have drastically increased since June 2018. In the last 20 months, over 1,800 airstrikes were conducted, accounting for more than half of the number of civilian casualties throughout the course of the entire conflict. The U.S.contribution to these numbers is relatively low, despite the high strike count. Civilian fatality numbers are far less than those of other U.S. interventions, such as Yemen and Pakistan, and are closer to the known civilian recorded fatalities in Somalia.
This increased danger from air/drone/artillery strikes has caused families to flee various cities throughout Libya. Reports by the UN indicate that there are at least 355,672 internally displaced people and 47,079 registered refugees and asylum seekers due to the ongoing conflict across Libya. Refugees and migrants, including children, have to combat exploitation and trafficking, and some factions of the conflict have recruited children.
The economy of Libya is not stable either. Since mid-January 2020, the LNA has blocked oil fields and airport export terminals, forcing the reduction of crude oil to 163,684 barrels per day. Petroleum exports account for over two-thirds of Libya’s exports. This estimated loss in revenue is over USD $1.4 billion , drastically reducing Libya’s growth potential.
Civilian non-combatants have faced the brunt of the danger, from economic instability to airstrikes and artillery shelling to other concerns along the path of escape, such as exploitation and abuse. International intervention attempts have widely failed as multiple Libya Summits have taken place, yielding documents with stipulations of ceasefires and arms embargoes that have fallen through within days of signing, if signed at all. As the international community attempts to broker peace deals though diplomatic interventions, only time will tell if face-to-face interactions with al-Sarraj and Haftar will put forth legitimate options for the citizens of this conflicted state, as well as how much international politics will influence this proxy conflict in the long-term.
Citations
- Peter Bergen and Alyssa Sims, “Airstrikes and Civilian Casualties in Libya: Since the 2011 NATO Intervention,” New America, June 20, 2018. source