Welcome to New America, redesigned for what’s next.

A special message from New America’s CEO and President on our new look.

Read the Note

In Short

ISIS Has a Forgotten History of War on the Water

ISIS Has a Forgotten History of War on the Water_image.jpeg

As ISIS spreads through the
Middle East, analysts painstakingly map its control over each square mile of
land. Yet ISIS’ activity along the coasts of the territories where it is active
and on the rivers that snake their way through Syria and Iraq is a story told
only in fragments. Too often, the long history of such attacks is lost, along
with the stories of those who perished as a result. Previous attacks are
forgotten or told as isolated incidents, instead of recognized as part of a
pattern.

***

A fireball engulfed the vessel against the blue field of the
Mediterranean Sea
followed by a billowing plume of smoke rising from the
burning ship.

So depicted the images released
on July 16, 2015 by ISIS’ Sinai Province, when it claimed to have destroyed the
ship with a missile. The New York Times
reported
the attack as a shock, writing: “The attack on Thursday appeared to be the
first on a naval vessel claimed by Sinai Province.”

Lost in how the New York Times and other media outlets
presented the destruction was the rich history of how terrorist groups have
consistently used coastal spaces as a site of violence in the region.

Only two paragraphs down in the
same Times account, for
instance, the author mentions another unclaimed attack on an Egyptian navy ship
in November 2014, where attackers hijacked the vessel and the Egyptian Air
Force bombed it, killing everyone aboard.

This November 2014 attack, which
merits a mere aside by the New York Times,
is hardly the only act of violence to challenge the notion that ISIS is absent from
Sinai’s coasts. Chris Rawley, a civilian counter-terrorism planner at US
Special Operations Command’s Interagency Task Force and a surface warfare
officer in the United States Navy Reserve, asserts that Islamist militants have
launched at
least five attacks
in Egyptian waters since 2012. These include three RPG
attacks on commercial shipping interests that look eerily similar to July’s
scene of destruction. Al Furqaan
Brigades, a group likely now under ISIS’ affiliate in Sinai, claimed the RPG
attacks Rawley identified.

Going further back, we find an
even more important example of a naval attack by ISIS in the area that failed
to leave a lasting impression. In 2005, Al
Qaeda in Iraq—the group from which ISIS was born—launched
rockets at American naval vessels in the ports of Aqaba and Eilat, the
Jordanian and Israeli port cities that sit on the Gulf of Aqaba the body of
water separating Sinai’s eastern coast from the Arabian Peninsula.

***

“…the film is at turns terrifying
and hilarious.”

So read a Vocativ post in
April on a new ISIS propaganda video purportedly showing a commando unit that
utilizes the Tigris River to stage surprise attacks. “Just looking at the way
they moved, the way they held their weapons, made me laugh,” said James Dever,
a retired Marine Corps sergeant major.

Laughter likely was not the mood
in the Iraqi village of Dhuluiya in early September 2014. where ISIS launched major
attacks
and destroyed
the only remaining bridge using boat-borne IEDs. The battles on the river in
September were not unique. Dhuluiya had faced ISIS attacks from gunboats
in July 2014.

Nor was laughter the mood in
January 2015 when under the cover of fog, ISIS forces crossed the
river Zab in small boats and surprised Kurdish forces at the town of Gwer. In
what was one of the deadliest days for them since the summer of 2014, 24
members of the Kurdish security forces were killed and future efforts for the
Kurds to retake territory were jeopardized. The attack in Gwer was foreshadowed
in June 2014 when ISIS used assaults across the river Zab as part of a complex
double envelopment maneuver
.

It is true most of the war is
taking place on land, where the people who will decide Iraq’s fate through
their political decisions live. But ISIS and the Iraqi insurgents have long
used Iraq’s rivers as zones of combat and lines of communication, so they are
not—by any stretch—a laughing matter.

An overview of battles in Iraq
reveals several instances in which ISIS has attempted to use Iraq’s rivers as
sites of battle. In May 2015, Iraq’s federal police claimed to have bombed
two boats belonging to ISIS trying to enter Tikrit from the al-Mahzm area. In
April, the chairman of the al-Baghdadi district in Anbar province announced
that security forces had destroyed four boats after ISIS attempted to use them
to sneak into district from across the Euphrates River. On February 28,
“Popular Mobilization” forces reportedly sunk
an ISIS boat conducting reconnaissance on the Euphrates River between Jurf
al-Sakhar and Amiriyat al-Fallujah.

Moving further back in time
simply reveals even
more
examples
of ISIS’ attempts to use Iraq’s rivers to
stage attacks, transport weapons and explosives, or enter enemy
territory undetected.

These repeated incidents on
Iraq’s rivers may not be central to ISIS and its predecessors’ war efforts, but
historians and experts recognize their important roles in furthering the
group’s grander strategic aims. In her military history of the surge, for
instance, Kimberly Kagan notes that AQI
“operated almost freely in a pendulum-like arc
south of Baghdad, swinging from the Euphrates to the Tigris.” She identifies
the role of boats in AQI’s operations writing “They traveled southeast along
the Euphrates River, often by boat, from Fallujah to Sadr al Yusufiya” Today’s
Iraqi insurgents continue
to use
the same tactics.

***

“Waterborne terrorist threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the
Navy’s counterterrorism program. No one in the chain of command appears to have
recognized that additional security measures were necessary to protect against
waterborne terrorist threats.”

So wrote the House Armed Services
Committee in its report
on the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.
No evaluation of the role of water combat in the execution of jihadist
violence would be complete without an acknowledgment of this attack, in which Al
Qaeda approached the ship, which sat in a Yemeni port, from the water in a
small craft laden with explosives. The attackers blew a gaping hole in the hull, killing 17
people.

As with the other cases examined here,
the USS Cole was not an isolated incident. According to the charge sheet the
United States filed against Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri accusing him of plotting
the attack, the USS Sullivan was targeted by an explosive-laden boat launched
from Aden’s harbor in January 2000 in an initial version of the plot. The cell,
which was in communication with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s core leadership
continued plotting after the Cole bombing culminating in another attack on the
French supertanker MV Limburg that killed one crew member and wounded twelve
others.

Even earlier, in 1998 the FBI had
received a warning
regarding plotting for a rocket attack on American warships in Yemen. The
warning not only foreshadowed the attack on the USS Cole but also the type of
rocket attack that ISIS conducted 17 years later off the coast of Sinai.

As the United States continues to
commit to fighting ISIS and its affiliates across the Middle East and North
Africa, it must pay attention not just to the group’s activity on land but how
it utilizes coasts and rivers. Failure to do so will cost lives—given the
incidents in which ISIS, its affiliates, and previous jihadist groups have
taken advantage of rivers and coasts, it likely already has.

More About the Authors

ISIS Has a Forgotten History of War on the Water