Conclusion

To understand misinformation, and ultimately counter it, we must better understand its drivers. Failure to do so has left us with a variety of well-intentioned but ultimately localized responses that may serve as useful band-aids, but will not tackle the root of the misinformation problem. Central to the failure of these reactions to misinformation is an over-emphasis on the supply side of the equation, rather than the factors that ensure politicians, pundits, and voters all demand misinformation. We should worry much more about these sociological drivers than misinformation’s power to fool unsuspecting voters or spread via inherently dubious new technology. Looking at these factors, particularly the power of social identity and affective polarization, leads to a more challenging, but ultimately more productive, understanding that the desire for misinformation is deeply embedded in our political culture and our democracy.

“To understand misinformation, and ultimately counter it, we must better understand its drivers.”

Affective polarization, one of the strongest factors for misinformation sharing, is fed—at least in part—by the incentive structure of oppositional politics. Our natural tendency to construct durable identities for ourselves and the increasing tendency for these identities to overlap with and reinforce our political affiliations means we face more motivation to stereotype, denigrate, lie about, and defend ourselves against our perceived enemies in the opposite party.

While we cannot change many facets of our nature, this report has offered strong evidence that we can change the context in which this process occurs. First-past-the-post voting ensures that a win for me is a loss for you, making every election a no-holds barred battle against bitter enemies. If the rules of our democracy encourage our worst impulses and set us in opposition to one another, our identification with our own party will necessarily become intertwined in a hatred for our opponents. Our rhetoric will become more hostile, our elites more unwilling to compromise, our feelings towards each other more stereotyped and negative, and our information less reliable. While reforming the way we vote is not a panacea to solve all these problems—especially as alternate methods are not immune to developing cultures of political hostility—our current institutions only seem to encourage the political and social conditions that lead us to hate and fear those we disagree with.