Implications for Top-Four/Five Voting

Over the last year, the idea of “Final Five Voting” has drawn increasing attention from reformers. Developed by Katherine Gehl and the Institute for Political Innovation, Final Five Voting combines an open top-five nonpartisan primary with a ranked-choice voting general election. Alaska has adopted a top-four version of this model, but since advocates are primarily interested in a top-five model, I will sometimes refer to this model as “top five.” Top five works better than top four because a slate of five candidates creates a more obvious place for one candidate to locate in the middle, or to raise a new issue entirely outside the left-right liberal-conservative spectrum.

Top five, and even top four, is certainly a worthwhile experiment. Though we do not yet know what the Alaska experiment will yield, the existing body of research leads us to a few conclusions about what problems it solves over the existing models, and where it might fall short.

The biggest benefit is that it makes the primary election much less important. In a top-five system, it really no longer even makes sense to think of the first election as a “primary,” since primaries were designed to select party nominees. If multiple candidates are competing on the same party label, it might make sense to think of it more as a preliminary or first-round election. Rather than narrowing the election to just two candidates, allowing four or five candidates to make it to the general election means that more moderate or heterodox candidates who might not advance in a primary election can still compete in the general election; voters will have more choices at the time in which more voters are paying attention; and more candidates will have an incentive to distinguish themselves by the quality of their ideas, rather than simply by being the lesser of two evils.

A top-five primary also reduces the threat of a primary challenge. In a top-five primary, most likely two Democrats and two Republicans could advance to the general election. Instead of losing to a single challenger, now an incumbent would most likely have to lose to two challengers—an even more unlikely outcome. Of course, the threat will still exist, but now there will be multiple pathways to a general election, as opposed to just one path for partisans of both sides.

Whether or not it leads to more moderate candidates actually winning is less certain. Under a top-five system, most general elections will result in both major parties advancing at least two candidates to the ranked-choice general election. Here, the Republicans more palatable to Democrats will have a greater chance of winning on second or third preferences as Democrats are eliminated, and vice versa. However, the outcomes will likely depend on the distribution of underlying preferences. Given this uncertainty, it would be very helpful to generate simulations under a top-three, top-four, and top-five primary with ranked-choice voting, varying candidate positioning, and entry to test the robustness of the assumptions. Experimental surveys in hypothetical elections could generate realistic expectations as to how voters might rank candidates in actual elections.

But before diving in, existing research offers some important points of caution.

First, because voters use party labels as shortcuts, many voters will likely have a hard time distinguishing between more moderate and more extreme candidates running under the same party labels. The research discussed above suggests that this is especially true when voters are evaluating candidates of the opposing party. To most Democrats, all Republicans are the same. To most Republicans, all Democrats are the same. Thus, in a ranked-choice general election, it is not clear how many voters will be able to identify the more moderate opposing party candidate for purposes of ranking. The experience of the California top-two Primary suggests that many partisans will simply not vote for an opposing partisan candidate, regardless of how moderate that candidate actually is.

This, however, is not necessarily a fatal flaw. In a general election, more moderate candidates can make more targeted outreach attempts to crossover voters (and for the first time, they will have an incentive to do so). To help, rules could encourage party factions to more clearly identify and brand themselves in the general election, to signal more clearly to voters. One way to accelerate this would be through fusion balloting. Fusion balloting, used most prominently in New York, gives third parties ballot lines that allow them to endorse major party candidates. Such official ballot endorsements could help voters distinguish better among different types of Democrats and Republicans, and also serve as a stepping stone to build new party organizations.¹

Second, and relatedly, when multiple candidates compete under the same party label, voters typically substitute other shortcuts to help them evaluate candidates. The most common shortcut is name recognition. This benefits incumbents and very well-funded challengers. Another common shortcut is ascriptive identity, such as race, ethnicity, or gender.² In idealized theory, voters look to the qualifications and policies of candidates to decide whom to support. In practice, this complexity overwhelms most voters, who typically lack clear policy preferences, and prefer mental shortcuts such as party brands to guide them. Again, additional parties and endorsements could help voters distinguish between candidates more easily by signaling to voters which candidates more closely share their values in a more crowded field.

Third, turnout in primary elections is consistently very low. This is true regardless of primary type (as discussed above), and regardless of primary calendar timing.³ It is also true whether or not states offer voting by mail or not, though voting by mail may boost primary turnout very slightly.⁴ Again, this is not a fatal flaw for the top-five primary. Indeed, the top-five primary is probably the formulation that best overcomes this problem by making it easier for candidates who do not fit the hyper-partisan mold to emerge. But again, there are ways to encourage more of such candidates to run by creating opportunities for new party labels and organizations that can mobilize voters independently of the two major parties. Fusion balloting, discussed in the previous paragraph, is one such option. Loosening ballot access laws is another option. By making it easier for additional parties to have ballot lines on a general election ballot, and to enjoy the benefits of being a recognized political party, more non-traditional parties can organize to mobilize voters to participate in the primary elections.⁵

Fourth, it is important to recognize that many would-be candidates who do not fit the mold of strong partisan Democrat or strong partisan Republican have been discouraged from seeking office after considering the large personal cost of seeking office and the reality that they will not fit well with either party. Most people who seek public office are social creatures. Adrift from both major parties is lonely place to be. Again, this is an important reason to encourage the formation of new party organizations which can give candidates a campaign support network and a sense of belonging that they would not get from either of the two major parties. Ballot access and fusion balloting would help facilitate this development.

Fifth, the top-five primary is likely to have the greatest impact on statewide elections, such as for senators. These elections attract more media attention and voters learn more about candidates as a result, encouraging voters to learn more about the candidates. The top-five primary may have some effect on House races, but such effect is likely to be marginal.

Overall, the top-five primary is a reform worth pursuing. Its clearest benefit is that it minimizes the importance of the primary election as a winnowing mechanism, and it minimizes the threat of a primary challenge costing an incumbent their seat. These alone are reasons to pursue it. However, in order for the top-five primary to have a maximal impact in breaking apart the hyper-partisan binary, other supporting reforms, such as loosened ballot access laws and fusion balloting should be pursued alongside the top-five primary. For voters, this combination is an easy sell: it will give voters more choices, which voters repeatedly say they want. For elected officials, these reforms will give them more freedom to solve public problems and legislate, and perhaps even establish new factions or parties that would more equally distribute power.

Ultimately, all changes to existing rules are experiments, which have both anticipated and unanticipated consequences. We must approach any reform grounded in realism, drawing on the best available research to anticipate how parties, candidates, and especially voters will behave under new rules. An overly optimistic view divorced from realism will inevitably disappoint. But an overly pessimistic view that suggests nothing can change puts us in a disabling posture of learned helplessness. As always, we must follow the narrow path between the two, and the more we learn about the terrain, the more we can avoid the pitfalls of either side.

Updated on 7/27/21: This report has been updated to reflect that Final Five Voting was developed by Katherine Gehl and the Institute for Political Innovation.