The Visa Lottery Is Not Behind the Terrorist Threat

On October 31, 2017 Sayfullo Saipov, an Uzbekistan-born
permanent resident of the United States—who gained residency through the
Diversity Immigrant Visa Program—killed eight people in a terrorist attack in
New York City’s Lower West Side. Following the attack, President Donald Trump called
for the elimination of this visa lottery program that was established by an act
of Congress and signed into law by former President George H. W. Bush in 1990.

On November 13, the White House named
five other terrorists who gained residency in the United States through the visa
lottery or because their parents or spouses gained residency via the lottery in
an effort to justify eliminating the program.

Yet a review of these five cases demonstrates that they do
not illustrate a border-security problem, where terrorists use the lottery to
infiltrate the United States, but instead reflect the diverse challenge of
homegrown radicalization in the United States.

Of the five, four came to the United States during the 1980s
and 1990s when there was far less attention to the threat posed by jihadist
terrorism. One of those was Hesham Hedayet, who killed two people in a 2002
shooting at the El Al counter at LAX Airport in Los Angeles, Calif. Hedayet,
however, entered the United States in 1992, a decade before he conducted the
attack. He entered on a temporary B-2 visa and claimed asylum. The primary
failure – if there was one – of the immigration system in Hedayet’s case revolved
around the slow processing and resolution of Hedayet’s asylum claim, and the
processing system has seen several
reforms since Hedayet came to the United States. (Hedayet’s asylum
application was rejected in 1993.)

It was five years later in 1997 that Hedayet gained
permanent residency as a result of his wife’s successful application to the
visa lottery, which she submitted in 1996.

Given the decade that passed
between Hedayet’s entry and his attack and the five years that passed between
his gaining permanent residency and his attack, viewing his attack as a case of
terrorist infiltration is a mistake. Moreover, the more aggressive enforcement
of immigration law after the 9/11 attacks makes the Hedayet case of limited
value to assessing the threat today.

Similarly, Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook, a Hamas leader, came to the
United States during the 1980s and received a green card in 1990, through the
lottery’s predecessor program according to the Trump administration. He was arrested
in 1995 while trying to enter the United States, six years before the 9/11
attacks, precisely because he had tripped the then-far more limited terrorism
watchlist. He was deported in 1997.

In addition, of the five cases, two arrived as youths and
radicalized in the United States. One, Imran Mandhai, immigrated
to the United States with his parents in 1998 prior to the post-9/11 focus on
jihadist terrorism. He was a teenager when he entered. At the time of his
arrest, officials stated that he had become disillusioned with the United
States shortly after his arrival, suggesting his radicalization occurred inside
the United States.  

The other, Syed Haris Ahmed, came to the United States in
1996 with his family. As Ahmed was born
in 1984, he would have been around 12 years old when he entered. The Department
of Justice, in its press release regarding Ahmed’s being found guilty, notes
that while he was born in Pakistan, he was “raised in Marietta and Dawsonville,
[Georgia].”  In addition, Ahmed’s
co-conspirator, Ehsanul Sadequee, was a United States citizen born
in Fairfax, Virginia, demonstrating that Ahmed’s path from abroad into the
United States was not essential to the plot.

The other name cited
by the Trump administration that might provide support for its effort to
portray the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program as a current border-security issue
is Abdurasul Juraboev, who came to the United States from Uzbekistan via the
visa lottery in 2011.

Little is known about Juraboev’s radicalization and the
extent to which it may have had roots in Uzbekistan. However, the administration
has failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Juraboev radicalized in
Uzbekistan and not the United States. For his part, Saipov, whose attack
triggered the debate over the lottery, entered
the country seven years before his attack. According to New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo, Saipov “radicalized
domestically.”

In contrast to the five cases (plus Saipov) that the
administration found to defend its case, there are 207 cases of American
citizens born in the United States who have been accused of jihadist terrorism
crimes, 49% of the 421 cases since the 9/11 attacks, according to New America’s
research.

There may be good reason to end or adjust the lottery – in
2007 the Government Accountability Office examined the program and warned of
the risk of fraud, but also noted: “We found no documented evidence that DV
immigrants […] posed a terrorist or other threat.” The central threat to the
United States from terrorism is homegrown, inspired by jihadist ideology, and
at times enabled by foreign terrorists via interaction online. It is not a
threat driven by foreign jihadist infiltration. The few names provided by the
Trump administration do not change that fact – and tightening immigration
policy will not make a substantial difference to the current terrorist threat
in the United States.