Part III: Conclusion

The natural hazards and human vulnerability of the Indo-Pacific region are on the rise, due to climate change, population growth, and rural-to-urban migration into megacities. But even as the number of natural disasters has risen over time, the number of deaths has fallen, which points to an important shift: the countries in the region have improved their coping capacity, and both the national and the global response to disasters have lowered the consequences. This is a good news story: human ingenuity and adaptability have proven equal to the challenge of natural hazards in one of the most disaster-prone parts of the world. It is by no means a given, however, that the countries in the region and the international community will be able to continue to adjust, with environmental change and rising human vulnerability now underway. The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to be a devastating warning about the power of natural hazards in the 21st century—and the need for new approaches to disaster management.

Indeed, in 2015, 187 nations agreed to a new approach called the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. While nations had long cooperated on disaster relief, the Sendai Framework shifted the emphasis from disaster response to disaster risk reduction for the first time in such an international compact. The main principles of the agreement are to improve data and documentation of disaster risks, improve governing capacity for risk reduction, increase global investment in risk reduction and resilience, and improve global response capabilities. All parties to the agreement made voluntary commitments to meeting the principles and targets, and a handful made monetary contributions to help with the adoption of the framework. Five years into the 15 year agreement, however, there is very little progress toward any of the seven targets, including early warning and early action.¹ Although the United States joined the Sendai Framework with several caveats,² it accepted the principles and as of 2018, was the ninth largest donor, albeit at a considerably lower rate than top donors, Sweden, Japan, and Germany (China is not a donor).³ The Trump Administration, however, has consistently proposed cuts to U.S. funding of the United Nations, of which the Sendai Framework is part, as well as cuts to disaster relief funding at the U.S. State Department.

The United States has enduring, vital interests and both trade and strategic relationships in the region, which suggests that the country will continue to respond to requests for humanitarian aid and disaster relief, particularly from allies. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, with unique capacity and capabilities for such missions, should expect more such missions; this has important implications for the Command’s operational tempo, force structure, force posture, and personnel. In addition, the United States could invest more in coping capacity across the region, including the risk reduction and resilience priorities in the Sendai Framework, investments that are largely not military. That would require either expanding Indo-Pacific Command’s ability to engage in such civil affairs missions, or investing more in civilian and non-governmental organizations that can conduct such missions, as these are currently being drained of resources. The sharing of information, including on projected climate change effects and impacts, will be vital to civilian resilience and military relief missions.

The United States has remained the global leader in humanitarian and disaster relief response due to both a national commitment of funds and the high quality and quantity of relevant U.S. military assets and personnel. At the same time, more countries in the region are improving capabilities that are useful in responding to natural disasters, particularly China. Humanitarian and disaster relief can either become one more area of a burgeoning military competition for influence, or it could become a point of collaboration between allies—and even adversaries. Indeed, it could be both—a comparative advantage for the United States and its regional allies and a confidence-building measure between the United States and China. In the current pandemic, it is unclear if the United States will live up to its past generosity and dependability in times of need.

One thing is very clear, however: complacency is a dangerous strategy, when it comes to disaster preparedness in the 21st century. Doing nothing, or nothing differently than the current approach, is an unwise choice, given the way that global climate change will affect the region. Current investments in social, political, economic, and infrastructural resilience will be insufficient to meet new challenges, as will the practice of treating military humanitarian and disaster relief missions as lesser included cases, not something that requires proactive planning. If nothing else, the COVID-19 pandemic has already taught the world that.