Authors: Sharon Burke and Francis Gassert

In the Great China Flood of 1931, one of the worst natural disasters of the 20th century, a staggering two million people drowned, starved to death, or succumbed to disease. Rising waters, the result of heavier than usual snow, rain, and river flooding, displaced an estimated 52 million more. In this century, an earthquake in Sichuan Province, China and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar made 2008 one of the deadliest years for natural disasters. These events inflicted a combined death toll of more than 200,000 in May of that year alone. As this report was finalized, a new natural disaster was taking shape with a global pandemic, which started in Hubei Province, the epicenter of the 1931 floods.

These major disasters reveal important truths about the Pacific region. First, the Pacific remains a region full of natural hazards, from unpredictable earthquakes to extreme seasonal events to novel diseases. At the same time, since the Great Flood of 1931, the population of the region has quadrupled, meaning there are far more vulnerable people. And yet, ten times more people died in the Great China Flood than in all of 2008’s disasters. That illuminates other truths: societies all around the region have improved their resilience to natural disasters and nations all over the world have improved their ability to offer emergency aid. Finally, however, even the most resilient societies will have trouble responding to the most extreme disasters, as the current health crisis illustrates.

These observations are especially important for the United States, the Pacific nation most capable of responding to such catastrophes, in an era when global climate change and human vulnerability are raising disaster risks. Other countries in the area are increasingly able to respond, too, particularly China. By all rights, this rise in catastrophic conditions should prompt more cooperation, but with a growing rivalry between the United States and China, humanitarian and disaster relief may become one more arena for competition. To date, the COVID-19 response has been a case in point. The United States Indo-Pacific Command, as a key player in regional disaster response, must plan for more demands for such missions, whether the Pacific is a competitive or cooperative arena.

As we finalized this report for publication, the World Health Organization declared the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, or the disease it causes, COVID-19, a pandemic. Hundreds of thousands of people are infected, and tens of thousands have already died. Global financial markets are reeling, and the world economy is swiftly contracting toward a deep recession, or worse. Though the world is still in the early months of this outbreak, there are already lessons learned that are consistent with our findings in this report about how to be ready for natural disasters in a changing climate.

First, early warning and early action are critical for limiting the damage of a disaster. In the case of COVID-19, governments that took immediate and decisive steps with clarity of public communication, such as South Korea and Taiwan, appear to have made the most progress in containing the virus early. This is true of all disasters that overwhelm public services. With disease, hospitals reach capacity and must triage, and people panic in the absence of good information. With earthquakes and storms, we see the knock-on effects of loss of water, electricity, and transport, the spread of illness, and even a breakdown in civil order without prompt relief.

Second, while disaster is inevitable, and always has been—it’s a condition of living on this planet—the landscape of risk is rapidly evolving. In the current health crisis, we’ve seen all too well how disease can spread rapidly in a more populated and interconnected world. Although climate change is unlikely to directly affect coronavirus-type diseases, climate and environmental trends will shape the global health landscape in other ways. Habitat loss increases the chance of novel animal-to-human disease transfer, for example. Warmer temperatures extend the range and viability of some disease-carrying species, most notably the mosquito.

Finally, the safety and prosperity of the American people not only depend on disaster management in the United States, but around the world. Had COVID-19 been contained in its early days, its global impact would be much lower, and if it is not contained on a global basis, it will come back. For other disasters, lack of preparedness and resilience will mean more human suffering, and also disruptions in global supply chains and increased state fragility.

It is too early to guess the final toll of COVID-19 on human life. In recent history, epidemics have caused far fewer deaths than other disasters, thanks to advances in modern medicine. We hope that will remain the case with this pandemic, but the first few months suggest this will be an unprecedented global event in modern life.

Disasters have long been a fact of life in the Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the Hawaiian Islands. The region has tempestuous seasons, active tectonic plates, a “ring of fire” of volcanoes, and dramatic topography. These conditions create what can be a violent natural environment. At the same time, the population of the region is fast-growing, with many people moving from rural areas into cities accompanied by, for some, rising incomes. Now climate change is ratcheting up the severity of natural disasters. This high hazard, high vulnerability, high value situation translates to a high risk location. While governments in the region and around the world are getting better at meeting these challenges, extreme events have a history of overwhelming even the best prepared communities, as the current pandemic unfortunately now shows.

Earthquakes and Tsunamis

Historically, the most destructive disasters in the region, counting in both lives lost and dollars spent, have been earthquakes and the tsunamis that sometimes follow. These tend to be unpredictable, sudden onset disasters, which is part of their destructive power. Although climate change does not generally affect earthquakes and tsunamis, it may increase the reach of these events. Sea-level rise, for example, amplifies coastal flooding and tsunamis, even as already large coastal populations in the region continue to grow and put more people in harm’s way.

Tropical Cyclones

After earthquakes and tsunamis, tropical cyclones are the leading cause of disaster deaths in the region. There is considerable variation, with a high frequency of such storms in the Western Pacific Basin, and fewer but more powerful storms in the Northern India Basin. In general, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other scientific experts expect that warmer oceans will fuel larger storms, and there is already, a noticeable trend over the past 30 years toward more big storms.

This increase in extreme storms is of particular concern, as it is the most severe storms that cause the highest numbers of deaths and property damages. At the same time, communities have a hard time building for the least frequent but most extreme events, which means that all the measures that can mitigate damage, such as early warning systems or flood control infrastructure, are likely to be overwhelmed by the biggest events. Investments in resilience are important to reducing the toll from such disasters, but an increase in more severe storms may inescapably mean an increasing demand for humanitarian assistance and relief efforts.

River Floods

The map of Asia shines with blue ribbons of water, including some of the largest rivers in the world. These river basins, combined with intense rainfall in some areas, contribute to frequent seasonal flooding, a costly but not unpredictable disaster that can affect broad land areas. Economic development and the rise of cities have been a mixed blessing, bringing some infrastructure that has mitigated flood risks, and some development that has made them worse. Climate change is certainly exacerbating these seasonal floods, increasing both average and extreme rainfall in some places.

Drought

Drought, a slow moving disaster that covers wide areas, is not simply the absence of water; it is the inability to get enough water at the right time in the right place. For rainfed agriculture, for example, a period without precipitation during critical points of the growing season or a late onset of the monsoon season can be a catastrophe. Climate change is likely to increase this kind of drought across the region, with drier dry seasons and less predictable monsoons. Compounding this trend, in many parts of South and East Asia, water stress is already a significant issue with population growth, economic development, and increased evaporation straining aquifers and reservoirs. While climate change will increase risk for rainfed and subsistence agriculture, other forms of drought risk will depend more on how countries manage their water resources.

The Indo-Pacific region is already experiencing climate change; just how bad the effects will be in the coming decades will depend on the rise or fall of total greenhouse gas emissions. Regardless, a certain amount of change is already locked in due to past and continued greenhouse gas emissions, with significant effects on the severity and patterns of seasonal monsoon storms, changes in river flows due to changes in snowpack and melt, and sea level rise. These effects will have an impact on agriculture, energy, human health, and ecological systems across the region.

The whole Indo-Pacific region is at risk for a range of natural disasters, including health epidemics like the novel coronavirus that exploded in Wuhan, China in December 2019. While this includes American cities, this report does not look at domestic disaster relief. Seven other countries in the region have particularly high disaster risk, a history of U.S. humanitarian and disaster relief missions, and high relative strategic importance for the United States, including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Only one of those seven, India, has significant military capabilities of its own for disaster relief. In addition, about 2.5 million people live along the coastlines of Pacific and Indian Ocean small island states, such as the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and the Maldives. These populations are highly exposed to sea level rise, tsunamis, and storm surge, with limited ability to respond to major disasters. The other important concentration of risk in the region are the megacities, bulging urban nuclei of 10 million or more people. Twenty of the world’s 33 megacities are in the Indo-Pacific region, and more cities meet this threshold every year. These cities expose large numbers of people, in many cases people who are especially vulnerable due to poverty or other disadvantages, to potential breakdowns in city operations when natural hazards strike.

The United States has a history of responding to requests for assistance from countries across the region. Although civilian organizations, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, United Nations agencies, and independent charities, conduct most humanitarian and disaster relief, militaries also play an important part. The U.S. armed forces, in particular, are able to deliver relief at a scale most civilian organizations cannot match, including in austere or insecure environments. This reflects significant capacity for transportation, logistics, operational planning, and emergency medical and engineering support. Between 1991 and 2018, for example, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command conducted 27 humanitarian and disaster relief missions. For these missions, the Command relied most heavily on large cargo aircraft, amphibious ships, and rotary aircraft (i.e., helicopters). More specifically, 20 of the missions required rotary aircraft, 19 required strategic airlift, 18 required a maritime sea-base capability, and 12 required all three. Note that all of this equipment is also important for combat operations, which is what it was built for.

Other countries in the region have some of the same military capabilities, albeit to a lesser degree. These include U.S. allies, particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. Thailand and the Philippines, also U.S. allies, are not as well equipped, but have some capability, as well. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, India started to build up its disaster relief capacity, just as it was expanding its military assets. Today, India’s disaster relief operations can extend beyond the Indo-Pacific region, most recently to Mozambique. In addition to the appropriate force structure, China has shown both the intent and the political will to support global military missions, including for humanitarian purposes. To date, most of its humanitarian and disaster relief efforts have been domestic or located in the region, but the Chinese government has signaled its intent to engage in global missions—including its desire to address the current pandemic. Increasingly competent forces could be a boon to humanitarian response, but only if nations are able to cooperate and coordinate.

The natural hazards and human vulnerability of the Indo-Pacific region are on the rise, due to climate change, population growth, and migration into megacities. This is a vital concern for the United States, given the economic and strategic importance of the region now and in the future. There are three important ways the United States can help prepare for the region’s hazardous future, all consistent with the international Sendai Framework the United States committed to in 2015:

1. Improve the understanding of current and projected hazards and vulnerabilities, including by sharing information with nations in the region. That means incorporating improved early warning technologies and actionable climate change projections into military and other government strategy and planning activities.
2. Invest more in resilient communities, from public health to public works, through civilian missions such as development, aid, trade, and commerce. This, at times, may mean focusing on programs and projects that don’t seem directly related to disaster mitigation or security, such as economic development, child and maternal health, and job creation.
3. Actively anticipate and plan for a future with more frequent or large scale humanitarian and disaster relief missions. That means making sure the right personnel, equipment, training, and partnerships are in place in “blue sky” times before disasters strike, and not just as a lesser-included-case. The tempo of humanitarian and disaster relief will rise in a way that requires a more deliberate approach to planning.

The capacity for humanitarian and disaster relief can be a comparative advantage in the Indo-Pacific that the United States either keeps or cedes to China. Or these missions could become a way for the two nations to cooperate with each other to the benefit of everyone in the region. After all, both American and Chinese military investments are focused on readiness for war when it comes to their relationship with each other, even though neither prefers such a ruinous outcome. Working together to prevent and respond to humanitarian disasters in the area both countries depend on for their prosperity would be an important confidence-building measure. As climate change makes the conditions even more volatile and destructive, building that mutual confidence will become far more useful than moving down the road toward conflict.

This report goes to press as the COVID-19 crisis is ramping up. The World Health Organization has just classified the disease as a pandemic, and financial markets are reeling as it appears the crisis will cause the next global recession—or worse. Though we are still in the midst of this outbreak, it already offers three important lessons:

1. Early warning and early action are essential to limiting the damage of disasters. Governments that took swift and severe steps, such as South Korea and Taiwan, appear to have contained the outbreak in its early days, while most of the world has waited until containment seems all but impossible. This is true of all disasters that overwhelm public services. With disease, hospitals reach capacity and must triage. With earthquakes and storms, we see the knock-on effects of loss of water, electricity, and transport; the spread of illness; and a breakdown in society without prompt relief.
2. Disaster is inevitable, and always has been; it’s a condition of living on this planet. But the landscape of risk is rapidly evolving. Disease spreads more rapidly in a more populated and increasingly interconnected world. Although climate change is unlikely to directly affect coronavirus-type diseases, climate and environmental trends will change the global health and disease landscape in other ways. Habitat loss increases the chance of novel animal-to-human disease transfer, for example. Warmer temperatures extend the range and viability of critical disease-carrying species, most notably the mosquito.
3. The safety and prosperity of the American people depend on disaster management not only in the United States, but also around the world. Had COVID-19 been contained in its early days, its impact would be much lower. For other disasters, there is no contagion, but rather disruptions in global supply chains, state fragility, human suffering, and a moral imperative to act.

It is too early to guess the final toll of COVID-19 on human life. In recent history, epidemics have caused far fewer deaths than other disasters, thanks to advances in modern medicine. We hope that will remain the case, but the first few months suggest this will be an unprecedented global event in modern life.

Heavy snow blanketed central China in the winter of 1930–1931, followed by unusually heavy spring rains and then a record-breaking monsoon season in the summer. By August, the Yangtze, Huai, and other major river systems across the country were flowing over their banks, washing out poorly managed dike systems and inundating over-farmed land and city alike. Conflict throughout the region complicated the distribution of aid. It was one of the worst disasters in recorded history: an estimated 150,000 people drowned, while almost 2 million more succumbed to starvation and disease. The flood displaced or affected 52 million people.¹

Although the Great Central China Flood of 1931 is an extreme example, it is also indicative of enduring disaster risks across the Indo-Pacific region, with its interplay of natural hazards and human vulnerability. Indeed, the epicenter of the Great Flood was Hubei Province, the point of origin of the pandemic unfolding as this report went to press. At the same time, the 1931 flood also serves as a reminder that humanity is not helpless in the face of such dangers: improved governance and infrastructure mean the Chinese heartland is more resilient than it was 100 years ago, and the capacity of both local and global disaster response is greater. While the reports to date indicate that local and national authorities in China made mistakes in how they handled the initial outbreak of COVID-19, the country also rapidly identified the virus, added hospital capacity, and took measures to try to contain the spread of the virus, albeit with less transparency and alacrity than it should have. It is too early to tell how successful the U.S. response will be, but as of early March, the United States was also making many mistakes, especially concerning transparency, alacrity, and consistency of public information.

This lack of governmental and practical preparedness will be increasingly costly. Disaster hazards are rising in a warming climate, and larger, more mobile global populations mean more people are exposed to disasters, which portends a growing need for resilience and response. As the current health crisis suggests, shifting disaster trends will create new challenges and perhaps opportunities that will shape the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region for the United States, its allies, and its competitors

Civilian organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, provide the majority of humanitarian aid and disaster relief, but militaries also have an important role to play. That role is delineated by the United Nations Oslo Guidelines,² which dictate that disaster relief is a non-political, life-saving activity, no matter the social, economic, or political circumstances. Nonetheless, in addition to the tangible benefits these missions deliver in alleviating human suffering, they deliver intangible benefits in building goodwill in allies and adversary nations alike. Furthermore, if climate change continues unabated or surpasses some of the worst possible tipping points, no one country or even a collective of nations is likely to have enough resources to respond to every contingency.

Disaster relief has long been a comparative advantage for the United States, often with the associated geopolitical benefits. This strength reflects, in part, the American national character. The United States has been the single largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world, both as a government and through private donations.³ The U.S. comparative advantage also reflects the capacity and capability of U.S. armed forces, particularly in logistics. Specifically in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States, acting through U.S. Pacific Command (now U.S. Indo-Pacific Command or INDOPACOM), has played a major role⁴ in responding to recent, regional disasters, including the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the East Japan earthquake/tsunami of 2011, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, New Zealand earthquake in 2016, and the cyclone and subsequent flooding in Sri Lanka in 2017. For recipient nations, U.S. demonstration of support in a time of utmost need is often a powerful statement of American commitment and character.

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy describes a new era in America’s national security, one defined by competition with nations and non-state actors that may not share U.S. interests or values. In addition to a strong military and defense of the homeland, the strategy prioritizes economic prosperity and “advancing American influence” as foundational pillars for protecting and promoting the American people and their interests. The United States, according to the document, gains security by remaining a generous nation, engaged with allies, partners, and international institutions, and by acting in the world according to U.S. values. Humanitarian, development, and disaster aid and assistance are important means to realizing these strategic aspirations, both in terms of U.S. self-interest in prosperous and stable markets and trade partners, and of demonstrating U.S. values and commitment to cooperation.

The United States is not alone, however, in recognizing the moral imperatives and strategic value of humanitarian aid and disaster assistance. In particular, China has increasingly engaged in such relief and assistance efforts, alongside extensive development and investment through such programs as the Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, China is supplying Italy—with an escalating number of COVID-19 cases as this report is published—with doctors and medical equipment.⁵ Of course, the virus first emerged in China, likely as a result of animal handling in a market in Wuhan,⁶ so the Chinese government may have a particular interest in the positive response such aid efforts can provoke. In addition to such civil relief efforts, the People’s Liberation Army is increasingly capable of engaging in humanitarian and disaster relief missions, including outside the Indo-Pacific region. Given the cultural, moral, economic, and geopolitical importance of these missions, the upward trend in disasters, and an increasingly competitive U.S.–China relationship, Indo-Pacific Command should expect both rising demand for such humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and increased strategic implications in answering that demand.

Section one of this report examines the natural risk in the region. First, the report looks at historical natural disaster trends, and then what climate change projections suggest about the future. The next section focuses on specific countries and megacities. Section two of the report charts the role of military organizations in disaster response, looking at U.S. military humanitarian and disaster relief missions and capabilities, as well as those of other regional powers. The final section offers observations and conclusions.

Disasters have long been a common feature of life, from the Indian subcontinent to the South Pacific Islands. Ocean currents, continental, arctic, and tropical winds, tectonic plates, dramatic and varied topography, and even the tilt of the Earth all combine to create a complicated and, at times, violent natural environment in the Indo-Pacific region. In recent decades, many countries in the region have improved their disaster management and response, which has lessened the toll of the earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, and floods that can ravage the area. Unfortunately, global climate change has started to change weather patterns in ways that are likely to increase water-, weather-, and climate-related hazards. At the same time, growing populations and social vulnerability mean more people are exposed to natural hazards. Still, disaster risk exposure, or what the United Nations calls “the riskscape,”⁷ will continue to depend on how well communities can absorb and mitigate these changing hazards.

The majority of severe disasters in the Indo-Pacific area fall into two categories: hydro-climatic disasters (floods, droughts, tropical cyclones, and extreme heat) and geophysical disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanoes). Between 1990 and 2017, geophysical hazards, specifically earthquakes and associated tsunamis, were the deadliest and costliest disasters across the region, followed closely by tropical cyclones, a hydro-climatic phenomenon (Figure 2).

Major riverine floods and droughts, which are also hydro-climatic, affected the largest number of people but led to fewer deaths overall. Other types of disasters, such as epidemics and nuclear accidents, have accounted for a relatively small portion of reported disaster impacts in recent decades.⁸ Climate change will have broad effects across the first category of hazards, hydro-climatic disasters.

This report was finalized just as the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and only a few months in, this event already seems likely to eclipse all other disasters in scale and economic impact, if not in direct loss of life. Epidemics have caused far fewer deaths than other disasters in recent decades, thanks to advances in modern medicine and governments’ ability to contain them, but it is not clear if that pattern will hold with the current pandemic.

All disasters are by definition exceptional, but they are not all created equal: a handful of truly severe events have inflicted the vast majority of damages in the Indo-Pacific area in recent decades. Of reported disaster impacts in the region between 1990–2017 in the region, just five events accounted for nearly two-thirds of disaster-related deaths (Figure 3).

Such extreme events can overwhelm even the best prepared communities and generally mean long recovery times. Japan, for example, is a leader in disaster management, yet the 9.0- magnitude earthquake that hit off the coast of Tōhoku in 2011 and the massive tsunami it generated—estimated at a wave height of 33 feet in places⁹—were too much for even Japan to handle. The tsunami arose too close to shore for warning systems to give many people time to evacuate, overtopped sea walls designed for smaller waves, and destroyed critical infrastructure not designed for such inundation, including the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor.¹⁰ The reaction to the novel coronavirus epidemic unfolding around the world shows the same weakness to the most extreme events on a global basis. When local systems are overwhelmed in this fashion, prompt and practiced relief can make all the difference in reducing loss of life in the immediate aftermath.

Earthquakes and Tsunamis

Historically, the most deadly and costly disasters across the region have been earthquakes and associated tsunamis. The Indo-Pacific region contains several highly active tectonic plate boundaries, forming the western flank of the Ring of Fire, as well as the boundary between the Indian and Eurasian plates. Earthquakes in Pakistan, China, and Tibet have been some of the deadliest disasters in the world. A high coastal population is also exposed to tsunamis that propagate outward from marine and coastal earthquakes. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami alone caused over one-fifth of reported disaster deaths in the region between 1990-2017. The region also has a significant amount of volcanic activity, which is certainly dramatic but more localized in its effects.

Earthquakes are sudden-onset disasters that happen without opportunity for warning. Beyond emergency management and disaster preparedness, the primary way in which regional governments minimize the damage of these events is by ensuring structures are built to absorb or withstand earthquake vibrations. Measures such as building codes and enforcement of standards can be effective at minimizing deaths and injuries, though physical damages to infrastructure can still lead to major economic disruption and losses. Despite Japan’s high level of earthquake preparedness, for example, the 1995 Kobe earthquake was one of the costliest disasters recorded in the region, with an estimated 6,000 deaths. On the other hand, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in China killed some 70,000 people and injured hundreds of thousands, a high human cost attributed in part to buildings that were constructed prior to the adoption of seismic building codes—or the builders who ignored the codes.¹¹

Early warning systems, physical infrastructure, such as sea walls, and other preparedness measures can also reduce the impact of tsunamis. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, there was a concerted effort to improve regional early warning systems, which include NOAA’s Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. These systems are by no means infallible, nor are they always well maintained. Numerous media outlets pointed to the inadequacy of Indonesia’s early warning system after a 2018 tsunami, for example.¹² Even well-maintained systems can be overwhelmed, as was the case in Japan’s 2011 tsunami.

The long lag time in improving existing structures and short-term economic incentives to bypass safety regulations imply that earthquake vulnerability will remain high. Likewise, a worldwide trend toward littoral population growth and development suggests that tsunamis will remain a significant risk for the region.

Although climate change does not generally affect earthquakes and tsunamis, in certain regions, climate change likely increases the risk.¹³ In Nepal, for example, higher temperatures are melting glaciers, which in turn may trigger local seismicity. Sea level rise from melting ice sheets will also increase exposure to tsunamis. Through mid-century, sea level rise is projected to be relatively slow but will accelerate as climate feedback loops intensify.¹⁴ Global sea levels are projected to be 0.2–0.5m (0.6–1.6ft) above year 2000 levels by 2050, but could rise as much as 1–2.5m (3–8ft) by 2100 under a worst-case climate scenario (Figure 4). Nonetheless, the most important factors for these disasters will be a growing risk exposure, given population growth in disaster-prone regions, and the offsetting effect of investments in disaster preparedness and mitigation.

Tropical Cyclones

After earthquakes and tsunamis, tropical cyclones are the leading cause of disaster-related deaths in the Indo-Pacific region. Major cyclonic storms bring three different hazards to affected regions: storm surges (high water levels driven by winds and air pressure that can flood coastal areas); high wind speeds; and flooding due to torrential rainfall. Tropical cyclones tend to have the greatest impact on coastal areas, because of both storm surges and the rapid loss of energy as the storms travel inland. Nonetheless, these storms can still cause significant flooding in inland regions.

Because tropical cyclones only occur under specific conditions, the level of hazard varies widely across the region (Figure 1). The vast majority of storms occur in the Western Pacific Basin, with the Philippines weathering nearly 20 storms per year. On the other hand, though the Northern Indian Basin receives fewer storms, the two deadliest storms since 1990 occurred there (1991 Cyclone Marian affecting Bangladesh and 2008 Cyclone Nargis affecting Myanmar). The shape of the land can also affect the severity of storm hazards. For example, the shallow and triangular shape of the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Bangladesh and low-lying land makes the area particularly prone to widespread flooding from storm surge.¹⁵

New weather satellites and computer models have greatly improved the ability to track and forecast tropical cyclones over the past three decades.¹⁶ Combined with strong disaster preparedness plans and public awareness, early warning can greatly decrease loss of life. Physical measures such as cyclone shelters, coastal embankments, and restoration of coastal forests and mangroves can also reduce the impact of storms.

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other scientific experts generally expect that climate change will increase the severity of tropical cyclones as warmer oceans fuel larger storms.¹⁷ The effects of climate change on tropical cyclones are likely to be most pronounced at the extremes. Recent research suggests that the total number of tropical cyclones is unlikely to increase under a warming climate, but that the number of severe storms is likely to increase.¹⁸ Higher temperatures may also enable a northward shift in storm tracks.¹⁹ Indeed, historical storm data suggest that this may already be occurring. There has been a slight upward trend in the number of major storms between 1980–2018 in the Indian and Pacific basins (Figures 5, 6).

Additionally, warmer temperatures will increase the flood impacts of tropical cyclones. As warmer temperatures increase the amount of moisture in the atmosphere, tropical cyclones are able to produce more precipitation. Sea level rise will also increase baseline exposure to storm surge. Several studies of Hurricane Harvey, which caused record flooding in Texas in 2017, suggest that global warming may have accounted for 15–40 percent more rainfall than would have otherwise occurred.²⁰ Although storm wind speeds often get more attention, flooding and associated damages are the main cause of humanitarian disaster in the wake of such storms.

This increase in extreme storms is of particular concern, as the most severe storms cause the majority of deaths and damages. Furthermore, it is difficult for communities to build for the least frequent but most extreme events. This means that measures to mitigate damage, such as early warning systems or flood control infrastructure, are likely to be overwhelmed by the biggest events. More severe storms in a warming climate may mean an inescapable increase in demand for humanitarian assistance and relief efforts.

River Floods

Floods have been some of the costliest and most widespread disasters in the Indo-Pacific region. Although flooding can occur at any scale, widespread flooding is most likely to occur in the floodplains of major river basins with large catchment areas. Sustained heavy precipitation can also cause widespread flooding where there is insufficient drainage.

Modern flood management often combines infrastructure, such as dams and levees, and non-structural approaches, including restricting development in floodplains and restoring upstream vegetation and wetlands. At the same time, human interventions have also worsened river flooding. Humans have farmed fertile river floodplains for thousands of years, but in the last century growing populations and demand for agricultural land have pushed more and more people onto floodplains. In the past, people dealt with seasonal floods largely by moving; control measures to protect higher farm and population density sometimes prove to be counterproductive. While infrastructure such as embankments can protect people in reclaimed floodplains from seasonal floods, they also confer a false sense of security, given that severe floods can still overtop embankments.

Scientific studies conducted by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and others project that a warming climate will increase flood risk. In general, experts anticipate that global warming will drive greater extremes in weather, with drier dry seasons and wetter wet seasons. More specifically, both average annual precipitation rates and extreme precipitation are projected to increase across the region (Figures 7, 8). Flood models from the World Resources Institute²¹ show increases in river flood risk across many countries in the region, absent additional flood protection (Figure 9). Flood control is typically designed based on historical magnitudes of flooding. Increases in flood magnitude may overwhelm historical infrastructure, and severe flood levels are likely to occur more frequently than previously anticipated.

Importantly, river flooding is largely predictable and within human’s ability to control. For example, China’s Yangtze River is historically flood prone. Channelization and development along the river in the early 20th century increased risk of flooding, leading to a number of historically devastating floods, notably in 1931, 1954, and 1998.²² Following flooding in 1998, new reservoir construction, development restrictions, reforestation, and reconnection of seasonal lakes substantially reduced the risk of flooding on the lower Yangtze. It is likely that countries will continue to invest in flood control, and risk of widespread flooding will decrease over time.

Drought

Although droughts lead to widespread natural disasters in the region, their overall costs and deadliness are usually lower than that of other disasters. Nonetheless, droughts often have the greatest impact on poor populations, and can lead to increased poverty, migration, and insecurity. Drought risk is likely to increase due to greater variation in precipitation, higher temperatures, and increased water demand, although some areas may see decreases in certain types of drought.

Drought is a relative condition, defined by a population’s water use.²³ In other words, drought is not simply the absence of water, but an insufficiency of water at the right time and in the right place. For rain-fed agriculture, for example, a period without precipitation during critical points in the growing season or a late onset of the monsoon season can wither crops. This form of meteorological drought is likely to increase across the region, with drier dry seasons and greater variation in monsoon behavior.²⁴

The unavailability of water for domestic consumption, irrigation, and other uses is called hydrological drought. Its occurrence depends on water storage and usage as much as precipitation, and often develops over a long time period. The impact of climate change on hydrological drought will be varied. Warmer temperatures are likely to increase average annual water supply as well as crop water demand due to higher precipitation and evaporation rates. For areas with large-scale water storage infrastructure, such as much of China, climate change may increase the amount of water available. On the other hand, areas that depend on snowpack for water storage, such as Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin, will likely face increased hydrological drought risk.

In many parts of South and East Asia, water stress is already a significant issue. Major groundwater aquifers under the Ganges River Basin in India and Bangladesh as well as northern China have been significantly depleted over the past several decades.²⁵ Increasing water demand due to population growth, economic development, and increased evaporation is likely to further reduce countries’ abilities to buffer shortfalls. While climate change will increase risk for rainfed and subsistence agriculture, other forms of drought risk will depend more on how countries manage the use of their water resources.

Climate, Health, and Disasters

Climate change will have both direct and indirect effects on human health. Most directly, higher temperatures and increased heat waves are known to increase mortality, especially for elderly populations.²⁶ Although tropical regions are more resilient to extreme heat, lack of air conditioning in less developed parts of the region may limit options for reprieve.

In general, the viability, transmission, and mortality of many diseases are linked to climate conditions. Higher temperatures will increase the habitable range of disease vectors—in particular mosquitos, which can carry malaria, dengue, zika, and encephalitis. Rainfall and flooding also improve conditions for mosquito reproduction, and may increase the severity and frequency of outbreaks. Excessive rainfall and warmer temperatures may also increase transmission of water-borne diseases, such as cholera and common diarrheal diseases. On the other hand, certain diseases, such as influenza, are traditionally associated with cooler weather. The relationship between many diseases and climate, let alone climate change, is not fully understood.²⁷ In the case of the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, for example, current scientific speculation is that warmer weather will not stop the spread of the virus, as is common with influenza.²⁸

Disasters may compound the risk of disease outbreaks by destroying or disabling critical infrastructure. Widespread blackouts, lack of clean water and sewage infrastructure, disruption of healthcare services and flooding in the aftermath of severe storms or other disasters may hasten disease transmission and increase mortality—for example, the severe outbreak of cholera after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Risk of compound disasters, such as coincidence of heat waves and tropical cyclones may also increase.²⁹

Note that the current novel coronavirus outbreak reflects a different facet of disaster risk, one that also interacts with climate change: the increasing exposure of growing populations to natural hazards. It is likely the virus behind COVID-19 migrated from wild animals to humans, in part a reflection of rising human population density and land-use changes in the habitat of these animals.³⁰

Other Hazards

Smaller-scale localized hazards such as landslides and glacial lake outburst floods may also see an increase in frequency with climate change. Though both of these hazards usually only affect small areas, they can be devastating due to their speed of impact.

Landslides are often associated with extreme precipitation and earthquakes. Slopes that are vulnerable to landslides may also be weakened by road construction and removal of vegetation. Increased incidence of extreme precipitation is likely to result in a greater risk of landslides, as saturated soils are less able to bear weight.³¹

Glacial lake outburst floods occur when landslides, avalanches, or earthquakes cause alpine lakes to overtop their terminal banks, releasing lake water downstream. Occurrence of outbursts is likely to increase with glacial melt, which is increasing at a rate unprecedented in recorded history.³² Although the remoteness of glacial lakes means that most at-risk valleys are sparsely populated, they may be a particular concern for montane countries such as Nepal.³³

Rising global temperatures will have widespread effects on the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to increasing disaster risk, climate change will increase stress on both human and ecological systems. Although there is uncertainty about specific impacts and the changes will likely be gradual over the coming decades,³⁴ there is substantial evidence the region is already experiencing climatic change.

The speed and magnitude of change are tied to global greenhouse gas emissions. The majority of modern climate model runs evaluate two future scenarios for greenhouse gases: (1) a low emissions scenario in which global greenhouse gas emissions peak and decline by 2040, limiting warming to around 2–3ºC (4–6ºF) by the end of the century (RCP 4.5), and (2) a business-as-usual scenario allowing global average surface temperatures to increase by 3–6ºC (6–11ºF) by 2100 (RCP 8.5).³⁵ From a global policy perspective, the low emissions scenario corresponds to an aggressive pursuit of the 2015 Paris Agreement,³⁶ in which countries rapidly reduce emissions beyond current voluntary commitments. That does not seem likely at this time, at least as a matter of deliberate policy. Over the next few decades, differences between the scenarios are primarily a matter of magnitude of change. However, dramatic shifts with less predictable consequences, such as the reversal of ocean currents and breakdown of ecological systems, become more likely above 2ºC of temperature increase.³⁷ It is worth noting that despite global commitments to reduce emissions, as of 2019 global greenhouse gas emissions continued to increase. The COVID-19 pandemic appears to be causing a steep decline in emissions, a second order effect of a slowing global economy. How steep and persistent that drop is depends on how long the negative downturn lasts.

In general, the impacts of climate change relate to the physics of higher temperatures and how they affect weather and water. Higher temperatures increase evaporation rates and allow the atmosphere to hold more water, resulting in larger but more infrequent storms. Over much of South and East Asia, the summer monsoon drives seasonal weather patterns, with warm summer air rising over the subcontinent and pulling in moisture from the ocean. In most climate simulations, this monsoonal behavior is projected to become more intense, with drier dry seasons and wetter wet seasons. However, there remains some uncertainty in regional monsoon predictions.³⁸ Decreased winter snow accumulation and increased melt rates will also affect seasonal river flows. Melting of the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets and the expansion of ocean water from higher temperatures will raise sea levels over the coming centuries, or possibly sooner, if certain tipping points occur.

Though socioeconomic trends are likely to remain the main drivers of human security across the rapidly developing Indo-Pacific region, communities will need to adapt to climate change effects on agriculture, energy, health, and ecological systems. In some cases, these changes may exacerbate existing stresses, such as depleting groundwater reservoirs. Box 1 summarizes likely climate-related impacts across the region, excluding disaster risk.

In addition to the high frequency of natural disasters, the Indo-Pacific region is home to around 60 percent of the global population, including the majority of the world's low-income people.⁴⁴ As the region continues to experience rapid population growth and urbanization, the concentration of people at risk will rise, and climate change will compound that risk. In particular, there is likely to be an increase in the number of complex emergencies, or humanitarian crises of such scope and scale (often including internal conflict or violence) that they exceed or disrupt the ability of local civil authorities to respond and require national or international assistance. This will mean an increase in demand for global humanitarian and disaster relief, including from the United States and, in particular, from Indo-Pacific Command, given the region’s population and susceptibility to disasters.

Of the 36 countries in Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, seven have particularly high disaster risk, a history of U.S. humanitarian and disaster relief missions, and high relative strategic importance for the United States. Only one of those seven, India, has significant military capabilities for humanitarian and disaster relief. In addition, megacities (metropolitan areas with a population of more than 10 million) across the region deserve additional focus, given the concentration of risk.

Risk for natural disasters depends on a confluence of factors, mainly the exposure of people and economic assets to hazards and the community, regional, and national capacity to cope with and recover from disasters. Past events can help guide estimates of exposure to hazards, though vulnerability or resilience to these hazards is often estimated indirectly. In particular, low-income populations may have few options to evacuate, absorb, and recover compared to wealthy populations, and that fragility may not be well documented. Robust infrastructure can lessen disaster impacts and reduce the risk of follow-on hazards such as water-borne disease outbreaks. Competent governance also reduces the risks and impacts, but weak governments may lack institutional capacity to rapidly respond, and corruption and inefficiency may hamper recovery efforts.

The extreme population density of megacities makes them especially vulnerable. Globally, urban populations are growing faster than rural populations, and by 2050 it is estimated that 68 percent of the world population will be living in cities. South and East Asia hold the majority of the world’s megacities with 20 of the 33 cities with populations over 10 million. By 2030, six more Asian cities are projected to cross the 10 million threshold: Hyderabad, Ahmadabad, Ho Chi Min City, Chengdu, Nanjing, and Seoul.⁴⁵ Major cities also function as economic hubs regionally and increasingly globally. Disruptions to city functioning can have knock-on effects around the world, as is being demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Assessing risk in megacities is challenging due to the complexity of their topography, infrastructure, governance, and the transitory nature of some of the population. For example, remote sensing and GIS imagery can show the effect of flooding, but understanding urban flooding also requires hydrodynamic analysis of city drainage systems.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, cities across the region stand out due to their size and exposure to natural hazards. For that reason, in the section that follows, we will indicate when one of the most risk-exposed nations also contains a megacity.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s low-lying topography makes it prone to both floods and storms. The majority of the country constitutes the lower floodplains and delta of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers, which swell annually with the summer monsoon. Bangladesh is the most flood-prone country in the region, with over a quarter of its population living in areas that could be inundated by a 50-year flood. Although the Northern Indian Ocean produces substantially fewer tropical storms than the Pacific, two of the deadliest storms in the past several decades devastated Bangladesh. The conical shape of the Bay of Bengal and shallow delta work to amplify the effects of storm surge, while flat inland plains cannot rapidly drain flood waters.

Bangladesh is uniquely exposed to climate change and in particular rising flood risk. Increases in monsoonal precipitation and higher rates of glacial melt in the Himalayan headwaters will likely lead to more frequent and severe flooding. On the other hand, climate change is expected to increase drought risk, especially for rain-fed agriculture. Bangladesh’s topography is not conducive to large-scale reservoir construction, limiting options for capturing and controlling wet season flows. Sea level rise will have an outsized impact on the shallow coastal delta. Although vulnerability to climate change has been decreasing as the country develops, Bangladesh remains one of the most vulnerable countries, with high rates of extreme poverty and high population density.

Since 1991, Bangladesh has been the recipient of only two Indo-Pacific Command humanitarian and disaster relief missions, both in response to severe tropical cyclones. With climate change, demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are likely to increase. India, which borders Bangladesh on three sides, has a particular interest, as widespread disasters may lead to food insecurity, instability, and mass migration.

India

India is the largest country in South Asia and a significant regional power. As a varied territory with a long coastline and a diverse population, India is exposed to all forms of disaster risk. Much of the country is exposed to flooding during the monsoon season—in particular, the highly populated Ganges-Brahmaputra basin. Major earthquakes are less frequent compared to other countries in the region, but are most likely to occur in the northern and eastern provinces. Tropical cyclones are most frequent along India’s eastern coast on the Bay of Bengal.

Like most countries in the region, India will experience significant climate change impacts. Increased monsoonal intensity and glacial melt in the Himalaya mountain range will substantially increase flood risk, while a drier dry season will increase the probability of drought. Extreme heat, such as the record-setting heat wave of June 2019, will also increase in frequency. With a robust developing economy, India’s ability to mitigate disaster impacts is likely to improve. However, high levels of inequality and high population growth mean that many portions of the country remain vulnerable.

Even with India’s high disaster risk, the United States has had only one humanitarian and disaster relief mission in India since 1991, in part due to India’s arms-length relationship with the U.S. military and its increasing domestic relief capacity. As India continues to develop and seeks to assert itself as a leader, it is likely to take on a larger role as a donor rather than a recipient of aid. Nonetheless, disaster risk is likely to remain high in the country, presaging continued demand for military and non-military relief missions.

Indonesia

Indonesia is primarily exposed to geophysical hazards. The large island chain straddles the confluence of the Eurasian, Australian and Philippine tectonic plates and, in the last few decades, has experienced several severe earthquakes and tsunamis, as well as volcanic eruptions and deadly landslides. In particular, in 2004, a major earthquake just off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the tsunami that followed affected every country on the eastern Indian Ocean. Indonesia was hit hardest.

Climate change is likely to have a relatively minimal impact on disaster risk for Indonesia, as it is not exposed to tropical cyclones (tropical cyclones are unable to form along the equator due to lack of rotational Coriolis force) and lacks large river systems that may be prone to flooding. Nonetheless, higher rates of extreme precipitation may lead to more landslides and localized flooding, while high heat and longer dry periods may increase the risk of drought and wildfire. Sea level rise may hasten the sinking of the capital city of Jakarta, a megacity that is already dealing with high rates of land subsidence.

Indonesia has been the second most frequent recipient of the Indo-Pacific Command’s humanitarian and disaster relief missions, all of which have been in response to earthquakes or tsunamis. As the country develops and invests in disaster preparedness, it is likely that the risks of major disaster will decrease. Nonetheless, high coastal populations and the frequency of earthquakes and tsunamis mean that disaster risk will never fully diminish.

Myanmar

Myanmar experiences fewer hazards than many countries in the region, but it’s at high risk for disasters due to the vulnerability of its population. Myanmar is a diverse country on the western side of the Southeast Asian peninsula. The Ayeyarwady River, the country’s main river system, floods on a regular basis. Though few tropical cyclones make landfall in Myanmar, 2008 Cyclone Nargis was one of the deadliest cyclones in recent history. High levels of poverty and initial reticence to accept international aid are thought to have worsened the aftermath of that deadly storm. Although Myanmar is also exposed to earthquakes, landslides, and other hazards, nearly all of the country’s reported recent disaster deaths are due to Nargis. However, it is possible that other disaster impacts have been under-reported.

The government of Myanmar has somewhat reformed and liberalized since 2012 (in part due to criticism of its response to Nargis) triggering the easing of U.S. sanctions and opening the door to development assistance. Yet, the country remains beset with conflict between the Buddhist majority and minority populations, with some 700,000 minority Muslim Rohingya stranded as refugees in neighboring Bangladesh. Climate change is likely to exacerbate these tensions, as an increased frequency of floods, droughts, landslides, and extreme heat may displace populations or otherwise stress institutions. Increases in extreme precipitation may drive a higher risk of localized flooding and landslides, while sea level rise will threaten the fast-growing delta region.

Indo-Pacific Command’s only humanitarian and disaster relief mission in Myanmar since 1991 was in response to Cyclone Nargis. Nonetheless, the relative instability of Myanmar undermines resilience and disaster preparedness in the country and raises the risk level.

Philippines

The Philippines is one of the most hazard-exposed countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Located in the most active storm basin in the world, the Philippine archipelago experiences approximately 20 tropical cyclones each year, with the majority of storms passing over the northern portion of the country. The Philippines is also in a highly active seismic region with regular earthquakes and numerous volcanoes. As of 2010, about 6 percent of the country’s population (5.3 million people) live within 15 feet of sea level and may be exposed to storm surges and tsunamis.⁵⁴ Tropical cyclones have accounted for the vast majority of disaster-related deaths in the country since 1990.

These risks are likely to be most pronounced in the capital, Manila, a megacity on the western coast of the northern main island of Luzon. As of 2018, approximately 13 percent of the Philippines population resides in metropolitan Manila. The city is exposed to five to seven tropical storms each year, while several active faults cross through the metro area.

Climate change is likely to increase disaster risk in the Philippines, primarily due to increased intensity of tropical cyclones. More extreme precipitation coupled with local seismicity may increase landslide hazard. In addition, greater frequency of extreme heat may compound other risks. According to the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation Index, the vulnerability of the Philippines to climate change has been decreasing though it remains relatively high. As of 2015, for example, 8 percent of the population was living on less than $2/day.⁵⁵ Though the Philippines is advancing across a wide variety of development indicators, it is likely that disasters will remain a significant risk for the country.

The Philippines has been the most frequent recipient of Indo-Pacific Command humanitarian and disaster relief missions, accounting for eight missions between 1991–2018. As a U.S. ally, the Philippines is an important partner in the region and will likely call upon the United States for assistance in future disasters.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka has lower exposure to hazards than many other countries in the region, but deals with tropical cyclones, flooding, and landslides. Though the island nation is not at risk for earthquakes, it was one of the countries most affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which was responsible for the overwhelming majority of reported disaster-related deaths in Sri Lanka over the past 30 years.

Climate change is likely to increase these hazards, and Sri Lanka may see higher rates of precipitation, flooding, and extreme heat, as well as more severe storms. In addition, the country is still recovering from a 25-year civil war, which ended in 2009. Nonetheless, Sri Lanka is rapidly developing and has lower rates of poverty than most countries in the region. With continued investment in disaster risk management, Sri Lanka may be able to mitigate the majority of disaster impacts.

Despite its relatively low disaster risk, Sri Lanka has been the recipient of two Indo-Pacific Command humanitarian and disaster relief missions, for the 2004 tsunami and flooding in 2017. Because of its small size, large-scale disasters such as tropical cyclones may affect the entire country, overwhelming internal response capacity and necessitating external assistance.

Vietnam

Forming the eastern flank of mainland Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s extensive coastal population is highly exposed to natural hazards. Over one-third of its population lives within 15 feet of sea level, in the path of tropical cyclones and potential tsunamis. River flooding is also a major hazard, in particular for the Red River delta in the north and the Mekong River delta in the south. Nonetheless, Vietnam has had fewer reported disaster-related deaths than many other countries in the region.

The combination of coastal population, flooding, and tropical cyclones makes Vietnam one of the countries most exposed to climate change. Though absolute precipitation may not change much within Vietnam, flood risk is likely to increase with large upstream river basins. Sea level rise will put pressure on coastal populations while increasing exposure to storm surge. Drought, extreme heat, and heavy precipitation may also increase in frequency. On the other hand, Vietnam is rapidly developing, and ranks higher on a range of development indicators than many of its neighbors.

There has not been a U.S. humanitarian and disaster relief mission in Vietnam over the past 30 years. Nonetheless, managing the impacts and increased natural hazards from climate change will be a significant challenge for the country.

Small Island States

Nowhere is climate change more of an existential threat than for the small island states of the Pacific. There are 12 small island states within Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, as well as the Maldives in the Indian Ocean. Their majority coastal populations are inherently exposed to tsunamis, and support systems can quickly become overwhelmed in disaster absent external support. Islands in northern and western Micronesia, including the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, as well as those in southern Polynesia, such as Fiji and Vanuatu, also experience frequent tropical cyclones.

The most direct climate impacts for small island states will be sea level rise. Coral atolls and reef islands such as Tuvalu and the Maldives may become completely uninhabitable by the end of the century, absent large-scale sea wall engineering. Even for volcanic mounts that rise several hundred feet above sea level, coastal erosion and rising groundwater salinity may still be significant issues. Changes in weather patterns may pose a risk for islands that rely primarily on rainwater for their water supplies. Die-offs of the majority of coral reefs, which are likely with just 1.5–2ºC of warming, will reduce food security from reef fisheries, limit tourism income, and restrict natural shoreline protection. In short, climate change is a slow-moving disaster for these countries.

Although their total population is small relative to that of their mainland neighbors, over 2.5 million people live in these countries, many of whom will become climate refugees in the coming decades.

Other Megacities

In addition to major cities in the high-risk countries profiled above, several other cities stand out due to their outsize economic influence, large populations, and natural hazards. These include Japan’s major urban centers, Tokyo and Osaka, as well as China’s Pearl River Delta cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong; Shanghai; and Taipei.

Japan’s major cities are exceptionally exposed to the full range of disaster risks, including major earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical cyclones, and river flooding. A 2015 study by Swiss Re rated the metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, respectively, as the first, fourth, and sixth most disaster-prone cities globally.⁷² At the same time, Japan is often looked to as a leader in disaster management, with sophisticated early warning systems, disaster management plans, and public awareness campaigns, including a national Disaster Prevention Day commemorating the 1923 Tokyo earthquake.

China has the most megacities in the world, though the majority of its disaster-prone cities are located on the south-east coast. China’s Pearl River Delta cities also have significant global economic importance, including the commercial center of Hong Kong and the technology manufacturing hub of Shenzhen. Although these cities are not exposed to earthquakes and have low exposure to tsunamis, both tropical cyclones and river flooding pose significant risks to the delta. Swiss Re ranked the Pearl River Delta cities as a group third after Tokyo and Manila for risk exposure. The next most disaster-prone city in China, Shanghai, is primarily exposed to flooding from the Yangtze River and tropical cyclones. Taipei, on the island of Taiwan, does not qualify as a megacity with a metropolitan population of about 2.7 million. Nonetheless, Taipei rivals regional megacities in potential disaster losses due to its high earthquake risk, frequent tropical cyclones, and economic productivity. Taipei ranks fourth globally in GDP at risk after Tokyo, New York, and Manila on Lloyd’s City Risk Index.⁷³

Although civilian organizations, including United Nations agencies and charities, provide most humanitarian and disaster relief, militaries are unmatched in their ability to rapidly deploy resources and equipment across the world. The United States armed forces, in particular, are able to deliver relief at a scale most civilian organizations cannot match, including in austere or insecure environments. This reflects significant capacity for transportation, logistics, operational planning, and emergency medical and engineering support.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command engages in a relatively high number of humanitarian and disaster relief missions, given the prevalence of natural disasters in the region. Between 1991 and 2018, Indo-Pacific Command conducted 27 such missions, including the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004), the earthquake and tsunami in Japan (2011), and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013).⁷⁴ Eight of the 27 missions were in the Philippines, the single largest recipient of U.S. military humanitarian and disaster relief. Overall, 12 of the missions were in response to earthquakes or tsunamis, 11 were in response to tropical cyclones, and 3 were in response to widespread flooding. In addition, there was one mission in response to the Southern Leyte Landslide in the Philippines, which was caused by heavy rains and a minor earthquake, and one mission to assist Thailand in the rescue of a youth soccer team from a flooded cave.

Of the 10 deadliest disasters in the region in that time period, Indo-Pacific Command launched humanitarian and disaster relief missions to eight.⁷⁵ The U.S. military did not deploy to two of the worst disasters, the 1993 Latur earthquake and the 1999 Odisha/Orissa cyclone, which were both in India, as India did not request such assistance,⁷⁶ although the United States did contribute monetary aid for both disasters.

The United States’ long history of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is an established part of the U.S. national character, in terms of both individual charity as well as formal government assistance to allies, partners, and even adversaries. The U.S. Congress approved the first disaster assistance package in response to the 1912 Caracas earthquake in Venezuela and then the first, albeit limited, military involvement in 1847, allocating two U.S. Navy vessels to carry civilian crews and 8,000 barrels of privately donated food and other goods for famine relief in Ireland.⁸⁵ Military disaster relief missions remained a relative rarity, however, until after World War II, when the U.S. military was vital to rebuilding Europe.

Importantly, the Department of Defense is not the lead agency or authority when it comes to official relief efforts: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 designated the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster relief. This act also gave the president the authority to provide foreign disaster assistance. In 1992, Congress amended the U.S. Code to grant the Department of Defense the authority to provide "transportation, supplies, services, and equipment" worldwide in response to foreign disasters as well as the funds for such missions.⁸⁶ These early missions set a pattern of civilian control, private/public cooperation, and the use of military assets for disaster relief, as well as somewhat inconsistent policy decisions as to where and when to provide disaster and humanitarian aid.

The United States typically initiates military, humanitarian, and disaster relief missions when a country requests international assistance, and that decision requires cooperation between multiple branches of the U.S. government. The U.S. State Department works with the Department of Defense and the recipient country to put in place a visiting forces agreement (if there is not already such an agreement in effect), and this allows the U.S. military to enter the country to conduct humanitarian relief operations. Generally, the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense coordinate with foreign governments, militaries, and non-governmental organizations to actually conduct relief missions.

A strong diplomatic relationship as well as previous military-to-military engagement can facilitate this coordination. The United States holds around 90 military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region each year, including the multinational Rim of the Pacific Exercise, which is the world's largest international maritime warfare exercise, and the Pacific Partnership, the largest annual multinational humanitarian and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in the region.⁸⁷ In addition to improving the response capacity of regional militaries, these humanitarian and disaster relief exercises help build bilateral partnerships and promote regional stability.

Even with its considerable response capacity, the United States rarely operates alone in humanitarian and disaster relief. In addition to domestic partners in affected countries, many other nations in the region are increasing their capacity to deliver disaster relief and response; for the most extreme events, military capacity is especially relevant. Countries expanding their militaries in ways that could enhance their humanitarian and disaster relief capacity include U.S. allies and other regional powers, particularly China and India. This section profiles the humanitarian and disaster response capacity of the U.S. armed forces and other militaries in the region, including China and U.S. allies (Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand).

U.S. Response Capacity

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command can draw on significant resources to respond to disasters; as of 2019 the United States has more than 2,000 aircraft, 200 ships and submarines, and more than 370,000 armed forces personnel, DoD civilians, and contractors operating in the region. The largest concentration of U.S. forces in the region are in Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. territory of Guam, which houses a strategically and logistically significant U.S. military base.⁸⁸

Disaster response often relies on the rapid deployment of relief supplies, search and rescue, and temporary replacement of critical services such as clean water and medical support. A 2011 study from the Naval Postgraduate School found that cargo capacity, personnel transfer, fresh water production, personal support, search and rescue and medical support were standard requests for HADR missions.

In terms of major military assets, in the 27 humanitarian and disaster relief missions it engaged in since 1991, Indo-Pacific Command relied mostly on large cargo aircraft, amphibious ships, and rotary aircraft (i.e., helicopters). More specifically, 20 of the missions required rotary aircraft, 19 required strategic airlift, 18 required a maritime sea-base capability, and 12 required all three. Note that all of this equipment is also important for combat operations, which is the primary mission for which this equipment was built.

In general, the most important military humanitarian and disaster relief assets are large cargo aircraft, such as the C-130, C-17, and C-5. C-130 planes can accommodate a variety of oversized cargo, including utility helicopters and palletized cargo, and are able to airdrop loads of up to 42,000 pounds, as well as land and deliver cargo on unpaved airstrips.⁸⁹ C-17 planes can carry a payload of up to 164,900 pounds and are able to airdrop loads of up to 110,000 pounds, as well as take off and land on small unpaved airfields.⁹⁰ The C-5 is the largest cargo plane in the U.S. inventory and can carry a load up to 281,001 pounds at intercontinental ranges.⁹¹ One C-5 plane can transport, for example, 350 personnel alongside six Apache helicopters or 36 pallets of aid. To put it another way, a C-5 could carry 20 seven-ton African elephants from Los Angeles, California to Washington, D.C. without refueling.⁹² These cargo aircraft enable the United States to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world, at any time.

After cargo aircraft, the most important capability is amphibious assets, or ships that can get relatively close to the shoreline and serve as sea-based platforms for helicopters and other ships or aircraft that can operate inland. These ships allow for rapid response while reducing the burden on local infrastructure (i.e. airfields and ports), often providing the command and control for disaster relief operations.

To give a sense of scale, a Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Destroyer (LHD) is 844 feet long, with large flight and hanger decks that can carry 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters, 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters, 6 AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft, 3 UH-1N Huey helicopters and 4 AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters in conjunction with 3 Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCAC) or 2 Landing Craft Units (LCU).⁹³ These Wasp-class ships can carry 1,800 troops,⁹⁴ are equipped with 50 regular and 16 ICU medical beds,⁹⁵ and travel at speeds exceeding 20 knots.⁹⁶

Australia

In 2011, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) announced its decision to build a three-ship amphibious force with the stated primary purpose of supporting humanitarian and disaster relief missions within the Asia-Pacific region. Australia's HMAS Canberra was commissioned in 2014 and the HMAS Adelaide was commissioned in 2015. Both amphibious assault ships are 757 feet long and capable of carrying more than 1,100 personnel, 100 armored vehicles, and 12 helicopters—six flight deck spots are for medium-lift helicopters, such as the NRH 90 or S70A and four spots are available for heavy-lift helicopters such as the CH 47.⁹⁷ These 27,000-ton ships were designed with the shallowest possible draft to allow the LHDs to operate in shallow waters.⁹⁸ In February 2016, the HMAS Canberra was deployed to its first real-world disaster-relief mission in Fiji after Tropical Cyclone Winston. During Operation Fiji Assist in 2016, the Australian Defense Force sent more than 760 personnel, 30 vehicles, and 2 MRH-90 helicopters on the Canberra to distribute 60 tons of emergency relief and support the rebuilding of critical infrastructure.⁹⁹

China

China’s foreign policy has increasingly focused on extending the country’s political and economic interests beyond its immediate neighborhood. In 2013, for example, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure program with a target of 1 trillion U.S. dollars in investment, involving some 65 countries. The country’s military development has followed suit. According to a 2019 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, China is making a transition from a "defensive, inflexible ground-based force” with a largely domestic focus to a “joint, highly agile, expeditionary” force capable of power projection.¹⁰⁰ These are also the sorts of assets most useful for humanitarian and disaster response missions.

Indeed, China already has the force structure to support global humanitarian and disaster relief missions. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as of 2019 the Chinese Navy had more than 300 ships, making it larger than the 290 deployable ships in the U.S. Navy,¹⁰¹ as well as the world's largest coast guard. And while there are many ways to measure the efficacy of a naval force, the sheer number of ships means that China can establish a presence around the Indo-Pacific region.

More specifically, China has two aircraft carriers and two more under development, including what is expected to be the largest non-American carrier ship in the world.¹⁰² Both of the new ships will likely be outfitted with medical and water desalination capabilities, which could make them useful for humanitarian and disaster relief missions. China claims to be working toward a fleet of seven carrier warships by 2025.¹⁰³ Along with the carriers, China has a fleet of seven Type 071 amphibious transport dock ships, which are similar to the U.S. Navy's San Antonio– class (LPD-17) vessels,¹⁰⁴ and it is building three Type 075 amphibious assault ships, similar to the U.S. Navy's America- and Wasp-class assault ships. These ships are important for power projection—and for launching helicopters for humanitarian and disaster relief missions.¹⁰⁵ According to IHS Jane's Fighting Ships, the Type 075 vessel is capable of operating 30 helicopters.¹⁰⁶ As of 2017, China had 22 Soviet Il-76 strategic airlifters, which can carry 53 tons of cargo, as well as three Chinese-built Y-20 heavy transport aircraft.¹⁰⁷ The U.S. Air Force, in comparison, operates nearly 600 C-130 Hercules, C-17 Globemaster and C-5 Galaxy cargo planes.¹⁰⁸

In addition to the appropriate force structure, China has shown both the intent and the political will to support global military missions, including for humanitarian purposes. China's extra-territorial naval deployments began in 2008 with a counter-piracy mission, as well as its deployment of the Peace Ark, a hospital ship with 300 beds and eight operating rooms, to the Gulf of Aden.¹⁰⁹ In January 2010, China sent a 60-person search-and-rescue team and 43 medical staff to Haiti following the 7.0-magnitude earthquake that leveled Port-au-Prince, killing 220,000 Haitians as well as 8 Chinese peacekeepers.¹¹⁰ This deployment generated news coverage, given that China was first on the scene, despite the greater distance and lack of diplomatic relations with Haiti. Prior to Pakistan's catastrophic flood in 2010, which affected more than 18 million people,¹¹¹ Chinese helicopters had never before carried out an international humanitarian and disaster relief mission.¹¹² China deployed four Mi-17 Chinese helicopters in that disaster, alongside its search and rescue personnel and medical teams. Prior to the impending collapse of Libya in 2011, China’s navy and air force conducted their first humanitarian escort mission to evacuate approximately 30,000 Chinese nationals with the Xuzhou missile frigate and four PLAAF Il-76s strategic airlifters.¹¹³ Although the Libya evacuation was not a humanitarian and disaster relief mission per se, it demonstrated China’s growing long-range transportation.

According to Chinese state media, China's largest humanitarian and disaster relief operation was in response to the 2015 Nepal earthquake in which it deployed 1,088 military personnel and police.¹¹⁴ In 2015, the Chinese navy conducted another evacuation of Chinese nationals, this time from Yemen, utilizing a naval frigate. According to China, this was also the first time the PLAN evacuated foreigners from a war zone.¹¹⁵

In July 2019, China published the white paper, China's National Defense in the New Era, outlining a global defense strategy, enumerating China's military contributions in domestic humanitarian and disaster relief missions, and highlighting key foreign disaster assistance missions since Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. According to China, since 2012 it has deployed "950,000 soldiers, 1.41 million militia, 190,000 vehicles and items of equipment, and sortied 26,000 vessels and 820 aircraft," in response to domestic disasters.¹¹⁶ The white paper outlines China's intention to create an expeditionary combat force that can conduct "far seas protection" and "strategic projection" as well as highlights its future intentions for the armed forces to be active participants in global humanitarian and disaster relief missions.¹¹⁷ Goodwill diplomacy through humanitarian and disaster relief has been a stalwart of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. China has a growing capacity to conduct these missions worldwide, so it may well see the same gains.

India

The Indian Ocean is the world’s third largest body of water, with sea routes that connect the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.¹¹⁸ The Indian Ocean's sea lanes transport more than 50 percent of the world's oil shipped by sea, which fuels India’s and China's growing populations and economies. India is the most powerful littoral state in the Indian Ocean and its navy is frequently the first responder to natural disasters in the region.

At the time of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, India had eight amphibious ships, including two 5,600-ton domestically built Magar-class LST and six 1,200-ton Polish-built Polnocyny-class medium LSTs.¹¹⁹ Since 2004, India has worked to increase its military capacity, including disaster management capabilities, by acquiring new larger amphibious ships, tankers, and expanding strategic airlift. In 2007, the Indian navy purchased the USS Trenton, a Landing Platform Dock (LPD) capable of carrying six helicopters along with its four landing crafts and renamed it the INS Jalashwa.¹²⁰ This ship's flight deck can also handle aircraft that take off verticially and can accommodate up to 900 evacuees during a humanitarian and disaster relief operation as well as serve as a hospital ship. The two tankers, the INS Shakti and INS Deepakare, will expand the range of the Indian navy for both humanitarian and disaster relief and military purposes. These tankers are equipped with modern medical facilities and can carry up to 250 passengers.¹²¹ At present, India operates two aircraft carriers—the INS Vikramaditya (44,500 tons) and the INS Vikrant (40,000 tons)—and plans to build a third by 2030.¹²²

When it comes to strategic airlift, the Indian government has a fleet of 17 Soviet IL 76 transport aircraft, 12 C-130Js, and 11 C-17s, making India Boeing's largest international customer for the C-17.¹²³ India's increasing procurement of heavy-lift transport aircraft has expanded India's transoceanic reach. India has also recently received 4 out of the 15 CH-47F Chinook helicopters it has ordered from Boeing. These heavy lift helicopters will provide the Indian armed forces the strategic airlift capability required for complex humanitarian and disaster relief missions. The Chinook can transport 9.6 tons of cargo at high altitude and is particularly well-suited for mountain operations, since it can maneuver through tight mountain ranges as well as operate in all-weather conditions.¹²⁴

India first established its National Disaster Management Authority in 2005, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and has become increasingly engaged in disaster relief missions in the ensuing years. For example, India was the first responder to the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (2007), and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008). In 2019, Indian vessels provided relief well beyond the Indo-Pacific region: in January, an Indian navy ship brought relief supplies to Madagascar following flash floods and in March three Indian ships provided support to the government of Mozambique following Cyclone Idai.¹²⁵

Japan

Japan is constitutionally prohibited from the use of force in settling international disputes, or even maintaining an offensive military. Nonetheless, the country has significant military capacity in its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and in recent years, the SDF has gradually been expanding its missions. In December 2018, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzō Abe announced a ten-year defense well as an update to Japan's two largest Izumo-class destroyers to make them capable of supporting F-35B stealth fighter jets.¹²⁶ The Izumo-class ships (the JS Izumo and the JS Kaga), officially classified as “helicopter destroyers,” were designed to carry up to 28 helicopters.¹²⁷ The JS Izumo accommodates a medical room with 35 makeshift beds and an ICU, as well as a crew of up to 470 personnel.¹²⁸ Japan also has two smaller carriers that can embark up to ten helicopters, including MV-22 Ospreys and CH-47 transport choppers.¹²⁹ Although the primary job of these carriers is anti-submarine warfare, they also serve as command and control for regional humanitarian and disaster relief missions and engage in regular anti-piracy operations off the coast of Djibouti.¹³⁰

In 2011, Japan established its first overseas military base since the end of World War II in Djibouti to support its ongoing counter-piracy mission. Japan announced in 2018 that it intended to increase training efforts with East African nations, focussing on disaster response.¹³¹ That same year, Japan launched its first marine unit since the end of WWII to deter China in the Western Pacific.

On March 11, 2011, the fourth-largest earthquake in recorded history struck off the northern coast of Japan. The 9.0-magnitude quake also generated a tsunami with 30-foot high waves. Twenty thousand people perished in the initial earthquake and tsunami, which traveled as far as six miles inland.¹³² More than 1.4 million households in 14 prefectures had no water and 1.25 million households had no electricity in the wake of the disaster.¹³³ The tidal wave also crashed into the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, already damaged by the temblor, leading to significant releases of radiation into the surrounding community and the evacuation of 177,503 people within a 12-mile radius of the plant. In response, the United States launched Operation Tomodachi, which at its height involved nearly 24,000 American personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 ships in support of its ally. Japan deployed more than 100,000 personnel, 500 planes and helicopters, and 60 ships from its own Self Defense Forces.¹³⁴ Japanese helicopters operated from U.S. aircraft carriers for the first time.¹³⁵ Beyond the military assets dispatched, the United States allocated $35 million in humanitarian aid.¹³⁶ The U.S. government also sent 50 experts from the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to assist Japan with the Fukushima nuclear fallout.¹³⁷ The success of this operation demonstrated the utility of years of combined training and interoperable equipment, as well as America's commitment to Japan. It also demonstrated how a catastrophe of this magnitude can overwhelm even the most capable country.

New Zealand

New Zealand is a major non-NATO ally and part of the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing alliance with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Before New Zealand barred nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships in its exclusive economic zone in 1987, Australia, New Zealand and the United States were part of a mutual security treaty known as ANZUS. In recent years, bilateral ties have strengthened with the signing of the Wellington Declaration and the Washington Declaration, which increased bilateral cooperation and re-established a formal defense agreement.¹³⁸

New Zealand's only formal defense ally within the region is Australia and the two countries have long been the largest and most influential nations in the South Pacific.¹³⁹ The small island states of the region are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, and in February 2018, New Zealand pledged to increase its diplomatic and development aid packages to the region.

The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) has one amphibious vessel, the HMNZS Canterbury, which displaces 9,000 tons and can accommodate 250 personnel as well as transport and deploy military vehicles and helicopters. New Zealand, in partnership with Australia, deployed the Canterbury, the Wellington (a Protector-class offshore patrol vessel), a C130, and P3 Orion aircraft in response to Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016.¹⁴⁰ Nine months later, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake off the coast of New Zealand caused massive landslides that stranded about 1,000 tourists in the town of Kaikoura. This time the RNZN deployed the HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Wellington to evacuate their own civilians and tourists. At the request of the New Zealand government, the American destroyer USS Sampson provided humanitarian and disaster relief support by ferrying New Zealand citizens from Kaikoura to the Canterbury, as well as by lifting 11,000 pounds of equipment and supplies from the Canberra to shore with its two embarked MH-60R helicopters.¹⁴¹ It was the first time a U.S. warship had visited New Zealand in more than 30years, demonstrating the utility of disaster diplomacy among allies as well.

This past November, the RNZN acquired an 85-meter used Norwegian dive and hydrographic support vessel.¹⁴² This ship includes a 100-ton salvage crane, a remotely operated vehicle, and a dynamic positioning system that will augment the navy during disaster relief and underwater search and recovery missions. In 2020, the navy will have a new 26,000-ton tanker and replenishment ship, which will expand New Zealand’s and Australia's radius for force projection. This tanker, the Aotearoa, will be winterized with upper-deck heating and an ice-strengthened hull so that it can operate in Antarctica. It will also be able to produce 100 tons of freshwater a day and transport 12 containers of supplies for future humanitarian and disaster relief and security operations.

The Philippines

With a nearly 23,000 mile coastline,¹⁴³ the Philippines weathers nearly 20 storms a year and over the past 27 years the United States military has conducted eight major humanitarian and disaster relief missions to assist its ally during times of distress.¹⁴⁴ The United States and the Philippines have a complex security relationship that goes back to The Spanish-American war and the subsequent legacy of colonialism. Today's security partnership is based on the 1951 Mutual Defense treaty, which established collective security obligations as well as the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.¹⁴⁵ The 2014 Agreement provided U.S. troops greater access to Philippine military bases and enabled the U.S. to build facilities to preposition materiel for future humanitarian and disaster relief missions.¹⁴⁶ As major non-NATO allies, the U.S. and the Philippines conduct several military exercises a year to share tactics and improve interoperability.

In total, the Philippines has two Tarlac-class strategic sealift vessels, the largest ships in the Philippine navy, which are based on the Indonesian navy's Makassar-class landing platform dock.¹⁴⁷ Indonesia delivered the ships in 2016 and 2017. These ships are 123 meters long and have a full load displacement of 11,580 tons¹⁴⁸ and can carry 600 troops, as well as accommodate two helicopters on the flight deck and an additional one in the hangar¹⁴⁹ When it comes to airlift capabilities, the Philippine air force has five C-130s.¹⁵⁰ The Philippines intends to spend $5.6 billion over five years to upgrade its defense capability and will purchase 16 Sikorsky Aircraft’s S-70 Black Hawks.¹⁵¹

South Korea

South Korea has long had to maintain its military's readiness given the risk of conflict with North Korea, which includes not only conventional threats from long-range artillery on the South Korean border, but unconventional threats that range from nuclear weapons to cyber attacks. South Korea fields an army of around 490,000 troops and maintains a 200 vessel navy that is equipped with cruise missiles and anti-submarine rockets.¹⁵² In 2001, then-President Kim Dae-jung gave a speech in which he outlined South Korea's plan to develop a blue-water navy that would be a "strategic mobile fleet that protects state interests in the five big oceans and plays a role of keeping the peace in the world."¹⁵³ This blue-water navy would contribute to regional and overseas emergency relief as well as maritime security missions such as those in the Gulf of Aden.

In 2005, the South Korean Navy (ROKN) commissioned its first amphibious assault ship, the Dokdo, which can carry up to 720 Marines and 15 helicopters.¹⁵⁴ In May 2015, the ROKN launched its second Dokdo-class amphibious assault ship, the Marado, which was adapted to accommodate two V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft instead of just one, and will be fully operational in 2020 following sea trials. In total, the ROKN operates 14 amphibious assault ships as well as a contingent of strategic/tactical transport aircraft, such as the C-130H, C-130J, and CN-235 light transport, which have been deployed to recent disasters including the July 2018 dam accident in Laos, the April 2016 earthquake in Kumamoto, Japan, and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.¹⁵⁵ Since 2004, the Korean military has dispatched personnel and assets to 12 humanitarian and disaster relief missions.¹⁵⁶

Thailand

Thailand is a longtime military ally of the United States and provides the U.S. military with access to key facilities such as Utapao Air Base. Utapao is strategically significant for both military and humanitarian and disaster relief missions because it can receive large aircraft, is near a deep seaport, and has the infrastructure to handle command and control.¹⁵⁷ The U.S. military has previously used Utapao for refueling for both the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2014 Nepal earthquake response due to its central location in southeastern Asia, bordering the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand.¹⁵⁸ For this reason, Thailand is a regional hub for prepositioned emergency supplies for the U.S. military.¹⁵⁹

The Royal Thai Navy currently operates the smallest aircraft carrier in service—the HTMS Chakri Naruebet which is 600 feet long and displaces 11,500 tons.¹⁶⁰ It was built to carry 9 Harrier aircraft and 15 helicopters but since 2006 it has operated no aircraft. Nevertheless, the carrier was used for disaster relief during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and in response to flooding in Thailand in 2010 and 2011.¹⁶¹ In 2011, Thailand acquired the amphibious warship the HTMS Angthong (LPD-791) from Singapore which is about 460 feet long, weighs 7,600 tons, and can accommodate about 390 personnel.¹⁶²

The United States. and Thailand have co-sponsored Cobra Gold, one of the longest-running multinational military exercises, since 1982 with the aim to improve coordination and interoperability between armed forces in the region to enhance maritime security and disaster response.

The natural hazards and human vulnerability of the Indo-Pacific region are on the rise, due to climate change, population growth, and rural-to-urban migration into megacities. But even as the number of natural disasters has risen over time, the number of deaths has fallen, which points to an important shift: the countries in the region have improved their coping capacity, and both the national and the global response to disasters have lowered the consequences. This is a good news story: human ingenuity and adaptability have proven equal to the challenge of natural hazards in one of the most disaster-prone parts of the world. It is by no means a given, however, that the countries in the region and the international community will be able to continue to adjust, with environmental change and rising human vulnerability now underway. The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to be a devastating warning about the power of natural hazards in the 21st century—and the need for new approaches to disaster management.

Indeed, in 2015, 187 nations agreed to a new approach called the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. While nations had long cooperated on disaster relief, the Sendai Framework shifted the emphasis from disaster response to disaster risk reduction for the first time in such an international compact. The main principles of the agreement are to improve data and documentation of disaster risks, improve governing capacity for risk reduction, increase global investment in risk reduction and resilience, and improve global response capabilities. All parties to the agreement made voluntary commitments to meeting the principles and targets, and a handful made monetary contributions to help with the adoption of the framework. Five years into the 15 year agreement, however, there is very little progress toward any of the seven targets, including early warning and early action.¹⁶³ Although the United States joined the Sendai Framework with several caveats,¹⁶⁴ it accepted the principles and as of 2018, was the ninth largest donor, albeit at a considerably lower rate than top donors, Sweden, Japan, and Germany (China is not a donor).¹⁶⁵ The Trump Administration, however, has consistently proposed cuts to U.S. funding of the United Nations, of which the Sendai Framework is part, as well as cuts to disaster relief funding at the U.S. State Department.

The United States has enduring, vital interests and both trade and strategic relationships in the region, which suggests that the country will continue to respond to requests for humanitarian aid and disaster relief, particularly from allies. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, with unique capacity and capabilities for such missions, should expect more such missions; this has important implications for the Command’s operational tempo, force structure, force posture, and personnel. In addition, the United States could invest more in coping capacity across the region, including the risk reduction and resilience priorities in the Sendai Framework, investments that are largely not military. That would require either expanding Indo-Pacific Command’s ability to engage in such civil affairs missions, or investing more in civilian and non-governmental organizations that can conduct such missions, as these are currently being drained of resources. The sharing of information, including on projected climate change effects and impacts, will be vital to civilian resilience and military relief missions.

The United States has remained the global leader in humanitarian and disaster relief response due to both a national commitment of funds and the high quality and quantity of relevant U.S. military assets and personnel. At the same time, more countries in the region are improving capabilities that are useful in responding to natural disasters, particularly China. Humanitarian and disaster relief can either become one more area of a burgeoning military competition for influence, or it could become a point of collaboration between allies—and even adversaries. Indeed, it could be both—a comparative advantage for the United States and its regional allies and a confidence-building measure between the United States and China. In the current pandemic, it is unclear if the United States will live up to its past generosity and dependability in times of need.

One thing is very clear, however: complacency is a dangerous strategy, when it comes to disaster preparedness in the 21st century. Doing nothing, or nothing differently than the current approach, is an unwise choice, given the way that global climate change will affect the region. Current investments in social, political, economic, and infrastructural resilience will be insufficient to meet new challenges, as will the practice of treating military humanitarian and disaster relief missions as lesser included cases, not something that requires proactive planning. If nothing else, the COVID-19 pandemic has already taught the world that.