Formal Governance Structures

Taiz has historically had a strong government, both on a governorate and local level. Though local governance has been challenged over the course of the conflict by both the influence of external sponsors and decentralization of power as a result of the war, local government retains much of its independent and locally rooted identity.

This legacy of strong governance has been used as an instrument by the government and its supporters in much of their rhetoric in the battle against the Houthis. Key allies and spokespeople for the government have framed their battle as one to restore the state in response to the Houthis’ takeover, focusing particularly on the restoration of the civilian governance.

This legacy of strong governance has been used as an instrument by the government and its supporters in much of their rhetoric…

On the ground, it has been more complicated, owing to the constellation of armed groups and foreign influence. The three governors who have served since the start of the conflict have all struggled to do their job amidst the insecurity and violence resulting from the ongoing war against the Houthis, but also from the competing armed groups, many of whom operate with relative autonomy de facto running the more lucrative governance roles themselves.

Since the resignation of Governor Shawqi Hayel Saeed in 2015, Taiz has seen three governors: Ali Al-Maamari, Amin Mahmoud, and currently, Governor Nabil Shamsan, all of whom hail from the GPC party.¹ Nonetheless, owing to the city’s divided political affiliations, the rise of party-aligned militias and the wider divides of the conflict, Taiz’s governors ultimately have been forced to maintain consensus among the governorate’s various political and military factions.

Yemenis have tended to view Taiz’s governors within the prism of their ties to outside powers. Maamari, a native of Taiz, had previously distinguished himself as a member of parliament with his acerbic criticism of the Houthis and his resignation from the GPC in support of Yemen’s Arab Spring-inspired uprising in February 2011. Yet, he is often viewed in Yemeni political circles through his cooperation with Islah-affiliated figures in Taiz, and his critics often cast him as an undeclared member of the party (this information is based on interviews with Yemeni MPs and political figures who repeatedly highlighted this relationship). His successor, Amin Mahmoud, a former local government official who had spent most of the past decade in Canada, is viewed by interviewees through the prism of his cordial relations with the UAE, something in contrast with his predecessor, which raised the ire of many local backers of the Islah party.

According to close sources, Amin Mahmoud comes from an affluent family from Saber, and is married to one of the daughters of former Yemeni Vice President Judge Abdulkarim Al-Arashi; this displays how the element of social status is often used in appointing political figures.

Taizi governors found themselves deeply constrained and shaped by the local dynamics of the city. Maamari resigned in protest two years after taking office, complaining of the Central Bank in Aden’s refusal to pay salaries to his employees and claiming that he wasn’t given sufficient resources to carry out his job.² Mahmoud, as local rumor has it, was sacked, not due to issues with his performance, but due to pressure from officials in the Islah party, who viewed him as a threat to their interests due to his perceived close relationship with the UAE. Under all governors, security concerns have meant limited accessibility, with many spending significant time abroad in Riyadh and Cairo or in the temporary capital of Aden.

As with Taiz’s larger political culture, Taiz’s governance structures have been challenged by increasingly hyper-local sources of authority empowered by the war economy and the government’s inability to project its power. Many state institutions across Taiz (including the police and security services, local courts, and public civil institutions) have been defunct since 2015, when Houthi shelling and coalition airstrikes battered the city. According to the Yemen Polling Center, an independent research organization, the role of tribal sheikhs and aqils, or neighborhood leaders,³ has increased in the absence of the state’s ability to provide security, as traditional governance figures have stepped in to fill the vacuum.⁴

As the war went on and the political and security vacuum widened across Yemen, local governing authorities and informal local authority brokers began operating more independently. Local authorities have become more isolated over time from what is happening elsewhere in the country and are more inclined to serve their personal agendas rather than those of the government. Today, they are often assisted in the pursuit of individual, localized ambitions by the foreign backers who make up the coalition. Support from international powers has led to an increase in the number of non-governmental groups exerting influence over local affairs, as well as growing groups of local players.

Four and a half years of intensifying conflict and insecurity at the national level has led to a general collapse in security. Local police forces and entire branches of the judiciary, which once helped to maintain a degree of order, can no longer guarantee a safe environment for local authorities to operate. At the same time, local councils across Yemen have lost much of their funding. In 2015, the internationally recognized government was forced to reduce funding to local councils due to conflict-related declines in oil and gas revenues.⁵ Additionally, the January 2018 budget exclusively allocated funds to pay the salaries of local authorities at the expense of 50 percent of the operating costs for the areas under their control.⁶

In the eyes of many of its backers, the battle for Taiz was about restoring and/or preserving state institutions and preventing the Houthis from consolidating control. Nonetheless, in many regards, the battle to restore the rule of the internationally recognized government has served to weaken formal governance structures even as it has facilitated the government’s return, something that has been fueled, in part, by foreign sponsorship of armed groups in the city. However, foreign sponsorship has not eliminated the relevance and power of local governing parties. Tensions are likely to continue to shape stabilization efforts in the city despite armed groups’ formal integration into the Yemeni armed forces’ chain of command.