Introduction

September 11, 2020 marks the 19th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Over nearly two decades, the terrorist threat to the United States has changed markedly. The year 2020 marks another moment of substantial change in the threat: Some threats appear to have diminished, while others have grown.

In December 2019, the United States saw its first deadly attack since 9/11 that was coordinated and potentially directed by a foreign terrorist organization, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But in 2020, as of this writing, the United States has seen the fewest jihadist terrorism cases since 2008. The jihadist threat to the U.S. homeland continues to appear relatively limited and mostly homegrown and inspired rather than directed from abroad.

However, in 2020 the United States has continued to face a growing threat from terrorism motivated by ideologies other than jihadism, particularly from individuals with far-right views, but also from individuals motivated by Black nationalism, ideological forms of misogyny, forms of targeted violence that are difficult to categorize politically, and to a lesser extent by far-left views. As a result of this year’s events—the pandemic, a renewed protest wave over police brutality and racism, and the coming presidential election—2020 has entered a particularly pronounced period of social polarization that may result in an escalation in terrorism.

Meanwhile, ISIS, which loomed large in American thought on the terrorist threat five years ago, has largely diminished as a potential national security threat. On October 26, 2019, the United States conducted a raid in Syria that killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s leader and self-proclaimed caliph. The United States and its partners continue to deny territory in Syria and Iraq to ISIS, and have largely cut the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and of returnees to the United States and Europe. Even so, the group remains resilient, and jihadist groups, including ISIS, have persisted after the loss of their leaders in the past. Future events could result in a renewed major ISIS threat, especially because it is far from clear that ISIS’s territorial holdings are essential to whatever potential threat it poses to the United States.

In this environment, the United States continues to wage counterterrorism wars across the Greater Middle East. With 47 airstrikes in Somalia as of September 4, the United States continues to conduct strikes in the country at a high pace; 2019 was the record at 64 operations. In Yemen, the United States has waged a lower-level war, but U.S. covert strikes make it difficult to assess the true number and impact of American strikes. In Pakistan, on the other hand, 2020 marks the second year with no known U.S. drone strikes, suggesting that the drone war may have ended, though its covert nature raises questions about the meaning of such a halt in strikes. The United States also continues its wars in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

This moment should serve as an impetus for a long-overdue public and governmental reassessment of U.S. counterterrorism objectives and methods to see whether they are truly responsive to the threats the United States faces today. The Trump administration’s approach, particularly its intense but misplaced focus on an envisioned Antifa terrorist threat that is not based on data, does not contribute to this reassessment.

This year’s terrorism assessment is divided into three sections, in addition to this introduction. The first section examines the threat inside and to the United States both from jihadists and followers of other ideologies. The second section examines the fate of ISIS and the conduct of the United States’ counterterrorism wars abroad. The concluding section discusses how the trends discussed in the first two sections point towards the need for a long overdue re-examination of American counterterrorism policy.

• For the first time since 9/11, a foreign terrorist organization coordinated a deadly terrorist attack in the United States.
  • On December 6, 2019, Saudi military trainee Mohammed Saeed al-Shamrani killed three sailors at Naval Air Station Pensacola. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed the attack, and the U.S. Department of Justice confirmed that Shamrani was in contact with the group before the attack and was radicalized before he entered the United States.
  • AQAP’s role in the attack should drive a public review process of the attack—one that should expand to review U.S. counterterrorism more broadly—to determine the character and extent of the attacker’s ties to AQAP and whether it illustrates a new organizational threat or evidence that, inevitably, the United States can’t have permanent 100 percent security from such attacks.
• Despite the attack in Pensacola, jihadist activity in the United States in 2020 has remained limited.
  • There have been seven individuals accused of jihadist-terrorism related activity in the United States in 2020 as of September 4, 2020, potentially putting 2020 on track to have among the lowest number of cases in a decade. These cases include two non-lethal attacks inspired jihadist ideology. In the other cases, arrests were made before any act of violence or did not involve the plotting of terror attacks domestically.
• Far-right terrorism in particular, and terrorism inspired by ideologies and movements other than jihadism, continues to pose a challenge for the United States.
  • So far this year, there have been two far-right attacks, killing four people. There has also been one attack in which an individual motivated by ideologically framed misogyny killed one person and one attack in which an individual motivated by far-left views killed one person. In two of these attacks, the alleged perpetrators assert they acted in self-defense.
• The increased social polarization—driven by the confluence of the pandemic, resultant lockdowns, protests of those lockdowns, the killing of George Floyd while he was in the custody of Minneapolis Police, the resultant protests and militarized government response, and the coming 2020 U.S. presidential election—could fuel significant acts of terrorism in the next months.
  • Of the four deadly attacks in 2020, three occurred at or in the vicinity of protests and were closely tied to the growing polarization of the United States in recent years.
  • Beyond the deadly attacks in 2020, a number of non-lethal acts of political violence have occurred in the vicinity of protests and counterprotests.
  • Over the course of 2020, multiple armed protests have raised concerns about potential acts of violence.
• The Trump administration’s intense focus on Antifa is not justified by data.
  • According to New America’s data, no individual inspired by or affiliated with the Antifa movement conducted a deadly attack until the shooting in Portland, Oregon on August 29, 2020.
  • Antifa is a loose movement, not an organization. While individuals who consider themselves part of the movement can commit terrorist violence, there is no overarching organization, and portraying Antifa as a large terrorist organization holds substantial free speech risks.
• ISIS has diminished as an immediate driver of threats to the United States and the West more broadly.
  • On October 26, 2019, the United States killed ISIS’s leader and self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
  • The United States, its partners, and other regional powers continue to deny territory to ISIS in Syria and Iraq, although the United States maintains a military presence in both countries and it is unclear how plans for a potential withdrawal might reshape ISIS’s fortunes.
  • ISIS’s loss of territory along with greater enforcement efforts has essentially cut the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and of returnees back to the United States and Europe, and the organization has not recovered.
  • Even so, ISIS remains resilient as a terrorist organization, and it is not clear that ISIS’s loss of territorial holdings have diminished whatever potential threat it may pose to the United States.
• U.S. counterterrorism warfare continues across the Greater Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa. However, not every counterterrorism war is escalating.
  • The U.S. counterterrorism war in Somalia maintains a steady pace of strikes. In 2020 as of September 4, there have been 47 air or drone strikes, the second highest count on record since the United States began its operations in Somalia in 2003. The number of strikes could still surpass the current peak of 64 operations in 2019 before the year ends.
  • In Pakistan, on the other hand, the United States has not conducted a drone strike in more than two years, suggesting the drone war there may be over.
  • In Yemen, the United States continues to conduct strikes at a low level, but there is evidence of U.S. covert strikes, making it difficult to assess the extent of the counterterrorism campaign.
  • In Libya, the United States has not conducted any strikes in 2020 as of September 4. However, in 2019, New America recorded seven U.S. strikes in Libya.
  • The United States also continues operations and a military presence in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.