Table of Contents
- Introduction
- I. Democratic Infrastructure: A Theoretical Framework
- II. Political Incentives, Norms, Culture
- III. Structural Conditions for Inclusion and Exclusion
- IV. Effective and Accountable Government
- V. Civic Capacity and Infrastructure
- VI. Resilience to Changing External Conditions
- VII. Conclusion
I. Democratic Infrastructure: A Theoretical Framework
One way we can approach understanding the gap between the current state of American democracy and our aspirations for a more inclusive and responsive democratic polity is by unpacking the kinds of underlying institutional infrastructures—political, economic, and social—needed to facilitate democratic functioning. Sociologist Charles Tilly offers a useful starting point. Democracy, as Tilly notes, is best understood not as a specific institutional form (of, say, elections or party systems or the separation of powers), but rather by a wider set of social, economic, and political institutions that make possible “broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation” between state actors and the public.1 This definition can be further sharpened into several key dimensions that are each interrelated and mutually-dependent.2
First, changes to internal political norms, cultures, and dynamics can undermine the degree to which existing democratic institutions are effective at assuring mutual consultation between constituencies and state actors in broad, equal, and protected ways. Political incentives, norms, culture, and strategies can corrode democratic institutions and practices. Think for example about how contemporary uses of hardball politics,3 identity politics,4 or political polarization place democratic institutions under strain.
Second, democracy requires inclusion—what Tilly understands as breadth and equality. A democracy is not real if only some constituencies are included in political dialogue while other groups—be they racial minorities, women, non-property holders—are not. Similarly, democracy is illusory if it is in practice characterized by systemic hierarchies and equities.5
Third, democracy requires effective, yet accountable, government. The presence of “mutually binding consultation,” as Tilly notes, implies a polity where “state agents have clear, enforceable obligations to deliver benefits” that are responsive to the demands of constituencies.6 On the one hand, this requires sufficient state capacity such that government is able to find solutions to public problems and actually implement them in the first place—which without long-term legitimacy stability is compromised.7 For example, without enforcement capacity, the state cannot assure civil rights, or pursue economic policies that might respond to the demands of the democratic public. But on the other hand, a democratic state must also necessarily be accountable. With greater state capacity comes greater potential for the abuse of state power—and greater conflict over the control of that state power.8 Thus, a key aspect of democratic politics is an infrastructure that enables citizens to contest state actions, by imposing sanctions, procedural requirements, or mechanisms assuring responsiveness9—what Tilly refers to as protection. For example, without voting rights, fair elections, or a separation of powers, or their equivalents, state power is unlikely to be responsive and accountable.
Fourth, mutually consultative democratic politics also require what we might call civic capacity—the ability of individuals and groups to mobilize, organize, and make political claims in the first place. This in turn depends on a range of social, economic, and political conditions. It requires, for example, a public sphere, a media and informational context, in which political claims can be made and debated. It requires a civil society ecosystem in which groups are able to organize effectively with equal opportunity for political influence. And it requires a party system that effectively transmits and helps mediate political claims and conflicts.
Finally, these underlying infrastructural conditions for democratic functioning are not static; rather they must be resilient and adaptive to changing external conditions—for example, as demographics, technology, and economic systems shift over time.
These infrastructures of democratic functioning are closely related to one another, and so the boundaries between these categories is not sharp. The rest of this paper unpacks these five components of democratic functioning. Table 1 summarizes these different lenses. It should also be noted that many trends and dynamics cut across these categories. For example, economic inequality represents a key form of systemic exclusion from political voice and socioeconomic life—while also exacerbating disparities in political power as it manifests in our electoral infrastructure, and shaping the imbalance of power among civil society groups. The goal of this framework is not to neatly divide up the landscape of diagnoses and interventions, but rather to offer a way of entering into the discussion about the current gap between American democratic realities and aspirations, and the kinds of interventions that might be most needed.
Table 1. Summary
| Democratic infrastructure | Key questions | Areas of Potential Concern |
|---|---|---|
| Political incentives, norms, culture | Are these infrastructures robust to political dynamics and incentives within the polity? • How does the system balance majority rule with protecting minority rights? • How does the system maintain legitimacy with those who are out of power? | Polarization, teamsmanship, hardball politics and norm erosion Declining institutional forbearance Identity politics, struggles for recognition, and weaponized racism |
| Structural conditions for inclusion and exclusion | Are particular groups systematically excluded from political voice—e.g., on the basis of race, gender, wealth, location, etc. ? How does political polarization and politics of identity exacerbate problems of racism and exclusion? | Race, racism, white supremacy Gender disparities and misogyny Economic inequality and exclusion Class divide in political leadership Demagoguery, scapegoating, and fearmongering Political violence and terrorism |
| Effective and accountable government | Does government have the capacity to solve public problems? Is government responsive and accountable to the public? Do political institutions translate public debates into political mandates? How can institutional design help achieve these goals? • Separation of powers (e.g. inter-branch checks and balances, federalism, Senate/Electoral College)—and their limits • Electoral structures—and their limits | Political gridlock Shortcomings of government service delivery Civic engagement, and structures for meaningful listening to public will Perceived distortions to concepts of representation and fairness in representation (“one person one vote”) Voting rights, districting, campaign finance Inter-branch checks and balances, federalism, imperial Presidency, judicial activism, decline of Congress |
| Civic capacity and infrastructure | Are groups able to organize effectively to exercise political influence? Are party systems adequately transmitting and mediating political views and conflicts? Does the public sphere and media environment enable debate on fair and equal terms? | Civic engagement and organized civic power (social and labor movements) Strength and health of parties Intra-party conflict, tensions of the two party system Efficacy of mediating/gatekeeping institutions, such as media, parties, etc. Media bias Filter bubbles and politicized misinformation Concentration of media ownership Quality of discourse on social media |
| Resilience to changing external conditions | Does the system have the capacity to evolve as society changes? | Demographic trends Technological change Evolving social norms and culture Geopolitical trends and norms Election interference and sharp power of Russia, China, and other adversaries |
Citations
- Charles Tilly, Democracy (2007), pp. 13-14.
- This framework is informed by a “systems” lens on complex phenomenon like democratic polities.
- See Jack M. Balkin, “Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises,” Quinnipiac Law Review 26 (2008): 579–98; see also Joseph Fishkin and David E. Pozen, “Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball,” Columbia Law Review, 2018, Vo.118, pp.915-82.
- See e.g. Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (2018).
- Tilly, at 14.
- Tilly, at 15
- Tilly, at 58. Juan Linz has classically referred to this condition of political stability as the problem of “efficacy” (the ability of the state to find solutions to public problems) and “effectiveness” (the ability of the state to actually implement those solutions). See Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration (Linz and Alfred Stepan eds., 1978), at 20-22.
- Tilly, at 15-16.
- See Mark Philp, “Delimiting Democratic Accountability,” Political Studies 57 (2009), at 28, 32–35; Andrew Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy,” American Political Science Review 103 (2009)