6. Conclusion

This report examined the support provided to American hostages, unlawfully or wrongfully held detainees, and their families through interviews with 42 individuals either personally connected with these cases or who were active and former U.S. officials with experience in dealing with hostage-takings and unlawful or wrongful detentions. One of the major findings of this report, as in the 2020 report, is the durability of the changes made to the hostage recovery enterprise enacted by PPD-30. Six years after the directive’s issuance and two presidential administrations later, the entities and processes created to synchronize the interagency’s efforts to recover U.S. citizens held hostage overseas and to engage with and support their families remain intact and have now been codified into law through the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act.

The importance of this achievement in supporting U.S. hostages and their families cannot be overstated. A review of the U.S. government’s history with hostage-taking shows that until PPD-30, no department or agency within the U.S. government focused specifically on the issue of recovering U.S. citizens held hostage, nor was there an organization dedicated to coordinating the U.S. government’s efforts to recover them. United States citizens detained unlawfully or wrongfully by foreign governments had similarly limited options for support within the U.S. government. While PPD-30 specified that the support systems established within the directive did not apply to those cases, the Levinson Act codified support to unlawfully or wrongfully held detainees through the office of the SPEHA. With the continuation, and now codification into law, of these changes to the hostage recovery enterprise, the families of U.S. citizens held hostage and unlawfully or wrongfully detained will always have organizations to turn to for support within the government, something that did not exist prior to PPD-30 and the Levinson Act.

According to the families of hostages and wrongful or unlawful detainees and their advocates, these innovations in the support to families have generally been effective. Families have reported increased satisfaction in almost every category of question asked by JWFLF in both the 2020 report and this year’s report (Appendix B and Appendix C). Families generally report having access to the hostage recovery enterprise and being mostly satisfied with the responsiveness and communication they have with their points of contact. They generally understand the roles of each agency in the hostage recovery enterprise and mostly feel that their cases are a priority. At the same time, however, information sharing and the declassification of intelligence for sharing with families remains a challenge, as does the U.S. government’s sharing of recovery plans. Families and advocates have also expressed concerns about turnover within the HRFC and SPEHA’s office, and the challenges that brings for continuity and the retention of institutional knowledge.

These issues, taken together, as well as discussions with former and current U.S. officials indicate that while PPD-30 and the Levinson Act have established a measure of support previously unavailable to hostages, continued assessment of the effectiveness of the hostage recovery enterprise is critical. While the Hostage Response Group, HRFC, and SPEHA’s office can be successful when the president and interagency prioritize hostage and unlawful or wrongful detainee recovery, questions remain about their ability to do so in the face of competing demands for national security attention. There are indications that these organizations lack the authority, on their own, to increase the level of priority given to hostage and detainee issues within the interagency. This raises questions about the current construct of the hostage recovery enterprise. Should the HRFC remain housed at the FBI or should it become an independent agency, able to hire its own permanent staff? If the HRFC is tasked with coordinating the U.S. government’s response to hostage-takings, does it need more status within the interagency? Does its director need to be elevated in rank within the U.S. government? How can hostage and detainee issues be given more attention at the National Security Council? How can the Department of Defense and intelligence community better develop intelligence for hostage rescue operations? How do we engage the interagency to find creative solutions to bring unlawful or wrongful detainees home? How do we prioritize the return of our citizens without encouraging future abductions? How does the government best support families throughout the process?

These questions have serious impacts on people’s lives. They are also not questions that disappear as the U.S. government shifts its focus away from the counterterrorism operations that have dominated the past 20 years of U.S. policy. In a shifting geopolitical landscape, hostage-taking and the detention of U.S. citizens by foreign governments will continue to be a tactic employed by those seeking to influence the U.S. government. Hostage-taking’s unique ability to place pressure on democratic governments will ensure that it remains a tool our adversaries will employ, be they near-peer competitors, non-state actors, or somewhere in-between. As such, developing effective policy and institutions dedicated to creatively solving these issues is critical, as is the continued development of partnerships between the U.S. government and the families of its citizens whose lives are so brutally disrupted in an attempt by these actors to gain leverage against the U.S. government.