Table of Contents
- Author’s Note
- Foreword
- Executive Summary
- Introduction
- Former Hostage and Hostage Family Interactions with the U.S. Government
- Former Hostage and Hostage Family Interactions with Non-Governmental Organizations
- Former Detainee and Detainee Family Interactions with the U.S. Government
- Conclusion
- Appendix A: Current Needs and Requests from Former Hostages and Hostage Families
- Appendix B: Demographics of Participants
- Appendix C: Written Survey Responses
- Appendix D: Written Survey Scale
Introduction
On June 24, 2015, President Barack Obama entered the Roosevelt Room of the White House and announced the findings of a review of U.S. policy regarding American hostages held abroad by terrorist groups. The review established a series of reforms. This report presents the first non-governmental review of the impact of these reforms and their implementation. It is the only such review—governmental or non-governmental—conducted since a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) review in 2016.
The reforms established in June 2015 came in the wake of a particularly tragic period for Americans held hostage and their families. In the span of seven months, from August 2014 to February 2015, six U.S. citizens had been killed or died after being taken hostage by terrorist groups, while others who had been kidnapped escaped or were released. The abductions were not the work of a single group, nor confined to a single country. Instead several jihadist terrorist organizations across the Middle East and South Asia had been holding the Americans. The murders of several of the hostages were used as propaganda, creating a global firestorm of attention. Others died during hostage rescue operations or in airstrikes targeting the terrorist organizations.
Underpinning the entire tragic episode were the experiences of the hostages and their families. The families felt that the government, for all its global power, had failed to make the return of their loved ones a priority. Looking at those gathered in the West Wing that Wednesday afternoon, President Obama addressed the government’s failure, saying: “I acknowledged to [the families] in private what I want to say publicly, that it is true that there have been times when our government, regardless of good intentions, has let them down. I promised them that we can do better.”1
President Obama’s announcement that day in June was designed to reshape the way the U.S. government was organized to handle hostage-takings, as well as improve its ability to support the families of U.S. hostages. For the previous ten months, officials conducted an extensive review of the organizations and stakeholders directly engaged in hostage recovery efforts.2 The Hostage Policy Review, coordinated by the White House and informed by recommendations from a team of senior interagency officials, resulted in the creation of Executive Order 13698 “Hostage Recovery Activities” (EO 13698) and Presidential Policy Directive 30 (PPD-30).3 Together, these documents called for a broad reorganization of personnel and intelligence-sharing in federal hostage recovery efforts, creating the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC), Hostage Response Group (HRG), Intelligence Manager for Hostage Affairs, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (S/SPEHA), and designating a Family Engagement Coordinator.4 The executive order also clarified and reiterated the U.S. no-concessions policy, while upholding the priority of bringing hostages home safely.
The executive order further called for a comprehensive review of the U.S. government’s ability to coordinate response efforts to hostage-taking events. In 2016, in compliance with direction from PPD-30,5 the NCTC convened a review team to conduct interviews with former U.S. hostages, families of U.S. hostages, elected officials, and senior government officials to examine U.S. support for hostage families and the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30.6 The NCTC review, published in September 2016, found “significant progress in implementing EO 13698 and PPD-30 in the past twelve months” and that “families and members of the [government] interviewed for this report indicated overall satisfaction with [U.S. government] progress and effort on this issue since June 2015.”7 However, the report also expressed concern for the future of the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30. “In some areas,” the report cautioned, “achievements to date could be eroded or erased without consistent senior policymaker attention.”8
To date, the only examinations thus far of the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30 are the 2016 NCTC review mentioned above and a classified 180-day assessment of the HRFC’s creation conducted by the HRG.9 This new study, sponsored by the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation (JWFLF), represents the first non-governmental systematic review of the effects of EO 13698 and PPD-30 of U.S. nationals taken hostage abroad.
This report is based on interviews conducted between April 2018 and August 2018 with former hostages and families of current and former U.S. hostages, including those who have experienced a family member held in captivity both before and after the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30 on June 24, 2015.10 The purpose of this study is to continue the evaluation begun during prior reviews conducted by the NCTC in 2015 and 2016. Specifically, this study will attempt to: (1) Determine, to the extent possible, if the implementation of PPD-30 increased the U.S. government’s coordination efforts, improved engagement with families of hostages, and increased prosecution of hostage-takers of U.S. nationals; (2) Identify what shortcomings exist in the support for families of hostages and former hostages; (3) Identify what non-governmental resources and/or organizations have helped former hostages and their families in addition to U.S. government support; and (4) Identify if U.S. nationals and their families, who are unlawfully or wrongfully detained by a foreign government, receive the same level of support from the government as families of hostages described in EO 13698 and PPD-30.
This report is also the first attempt to examine the potential for expanding EO 13698 and PPD-30’s support to include detainees regarded by the U.S. government as held “unlawfully” or “wrongfully” by foreign governments (but acknowledged by those foreign governments as detained) and the experiences of such detainees and their families.
This report focuses exclusively on the hostages, detainees, and their families’ perspectives. It is important to note that this report does not represent the perspective of all former hostages, detainees, and their families, but only presents the perspectives of those who participated in this study.
Methods and Definitions
This report is based on a series of interviews with 27 individuals personally connected with cases of Americans taken hostage or detained abroad (hereafter referred to as participants). In every case examined here, the hostage or “unlawfully” or “wrongfully” detained person was a U.S. citizen.11 This report distinguishes in its analysis between hostage cases and detainee cases. The differentiation is explained in detail below.
Of these 27 individuals, 22 participants were associated with hostage cases and five participants were associated with detainee cases. These participants were involved in 14 separate hostage cases, and four separate detainee cases, for an overall total of 18 cases. The participants included five former hostages, 14 hostage family members, three hostage family representatives, one former detainee, and four detainee family members (see Figure 1).
Of the 14 hostage cases, 10 cases began and ended prior to the implementation of PPD-30. Within these individual 10 cases, there were 16 participants. Cases that occurred before the implementation of PPD-30 will be referred to as “pre-PPD-30” for the remaining sections of this report. Three of the 14 hostage cases began prior to the implementation of PPD-30 and continued to be active after the directive was in place. Within these three cases, there were five participants. This study includes only one case that began after the implementation of PPD-30 (Figure 2). These combined four cases with six total participants will be referred to as “post-PPD-30” cases for the remaining sections of the report. The difference in timing of the examined hostage cases allows for a comparison of participants’ views before and after the implementation of the June 2015 reforms. For comparison, it is important to note the NCTC’s 2016 report on the implementation of EO 13698 extended invitations to 20 former hostages and families and received responses from only eight families and former hostages. Despite the small number of participants, the sample presented here is a meaningful improvement for the study of the reforms’ implementation and the perspectives of participants in hostage and detainee cases.
The cases represented in this study took place from the mid-1990s to 2018.12 While including specific dates for each case would have a detrimental effect on the anonymity of the participants, it is important to recognize when these events occurred since this has a significant impact on the interactions between family members and the U.S. government. Further detailed analysis on the victim’s occupation, region where they were held, terrorist organization responsible for kidnapping, duration of captivity, and the outcome of each case can be found in Appendix B.
Interview Method
Interviews consisted of a series of questions focused on thematic areas drawn directly from PPD-30 to provide a qualitative understanding of the experiences of hostages, detainees, and their families. Each interview was followed up with a written survey to provide a more in-depth, quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of PPD-30. As part of the written survey, participants were asked to assign a numerical value to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with questions or statements about U.S. government support and interactions. The aggregated results of the written survey, its scale, and the questions asked can be found in Appendices C and D.
JWFLF sought to ensure confidentiality throughout the interview process. In an attempt to prevent bias and protect the identity of the hostage or detainee victim and their families, JWFLF assigned a random six-digit serial number to each case and permanently discarded each participant’s name. Analysis of each case was then carried out using the six-digit serial number. Dates and specific timeframes of kidnapping events were not recorded to ensure the protection of the participant’s identity. However, general timeframes were recorded in order to provide context and a better understanding of how the longevity of kidnapping cases impacts families and their interaction with U.S. government agencies. All interviews and written surveys were confidential and conducted between April 2018 and August 2018.
In order to help provide information to assess the effectiveness of PPD-30, it was important to this study to have as large and representative sample of individuals impacted by the directive as possible. To do this, JWFLF actively sought ways to invite as many hostages, detainees, and families as possible. Contacting families is particularly challenging because U.S. hostage cases and detainees held abroad are often not reported in the media, and/or are protected under privacy laws. In order to reach these families, JWFLF contacted the HRFC, the State Department, and non-governmental organizations who work with hostages, detainees, and their families and asked for them to inform the families about the JWFLF hostage survey. It is important to note that while JWFLF requested that these organizations inform their families of the survey, the HRFC, the State Department, and various non-governmental organizations did not endorse the project or encourage families to participate in the survey. It was incumbent upon each individual to contact JWFLF themselves and request to participate in the survey.
Sample Selection and Limitations
Research in hostage-taking and kidnapping is often challenged by several factors that make creating representative samples difficult. First, it is likely that the phenomena of hostage-takings and unlawful or wrongful detentions of U.S. nationals is underreported for a variety of reasons. Stakeholders in such events have incentives not to bring attention to kidnappings, whether it is to protect the well-being of the hostage or detainee, prevent perceptions of instability, or avoid issues with liability, privacy concerns, or the facilitation of ransom payments. These incentives have a significant impact on the reporting of kidnapping events, making open source research challenging. Second, due to the Privacy Act, the U.S. government is restricted in certain ways from revealing information regarding individuals maintained in their records. Due to these limitations, drawing a representative sample from this special population was, and will continue to be, a challenge in hostage-taking and detainee research.
In addition to concerns about sample size, JWFLF was particularly concerned with removing bias from the interviews, which were often emotionally charged. The JWFLF interviewer asked several open-ended questions for the purpose of having the ability to hear and understand what types of challenges the participant faced. This open-ended method was used throughout the interview phase of this study and answers were freely given by each participant. For example, the interviewer would ask: “What was most difficult for you while your loved one was being held,” or “with respect of your greatest need being the return of your loved one, what is your second greatest unmet need?” Each response was then grouped into categories13 created by the JWFLF interviewer and analysis was drawn from the open-ended responses. The JWFLF interviewer used reflective listening techniques14 and did not bait or try to sway specific responses from its participants.
Another challenge that impacted obtaining information for this report was the emotional nature of the interviews. JWFLF consistently put the safety and emotional needs of its participants above gaining information from the participants’ experience. Many families who have experienced the effects of hostage-taking or an unlawful detention find it extremely difficult and are understandably unwilling to further examine their trauma. The interviewer consistently put the well-being of the participant first and formulated a protocol intended to alleviate any additional stress and/or anxiety for the participant. For example, participants were given the opportunity and were strongly encouraged to refrain from answering questions that made them feel uncomfortable. All interviews were completely voluntary. Prior to each interview, participants received and signed a consent form and were given the opportunity to ask any questions or address any concerns. The interviewer discontinued the interview or redirected questions if the participant showed signs of anger, stress, and/or anxiety. It was not the intent of the interviewer for the participants to relive these traumatic events, but to allow each of its participants the opportunity to share their experience and be heard. Where this conflicted with gathering information, the interest of the participant took priority.
Defining Hostages and Detainees
This study recognizes the government’s response to a U.S. national being taken hostage abroad differs greatly from a U.S. national who has been detained by a foreign government. Some of those differences include access to allocated funding and compliance with legislation. These are important factors that drive how the government responds to a hostage or detainee case. Therefore, it is important for the purpose of this report to describe how the U.S. government defines a hostage and a detainee.
According to the United Nations, a hostage is defined as a person detained and under the threat of death, injury, or continued detention by an individual or group in order to compel a third party to do (or abstain from doing) any act as an explicit or implicit condition of the person’s release.15 While PPD-30 adopts this general definition, it then goes on to narrow the scope of the directive’s application, excluding16 those individuals whose detention is confirmed by a foreign government.17 In doing so, it implicitly indicates that, for the purposes of the U.S. government, the term “hostage” applies to someone detained abroad by a non-state actor, such as a militant group or terrorist organization, a criminal group, or unknown captors. This report will combine the United Nations’ definition and PPD-30’s refinement of the term’s application as the basis for the definition of the term “hostage.” Additionally, while hostage-takings can refer to a variety of events,18 this report will focus entirely on kidnapping events, and references to “hostage-incidents” throughout this study will refer specifically to kidnapping events and not hostage-barricade incidents.19
The U.S. government has drawn a distinction between those held by state and non-state actors for the purposes of the implementation of PPD-30. This report adopts that same distinction, referring to those individuals whose detention is confirmed by a foreign government as “detainees.” This report will use the term “detainee” to refer to only those individuals detained “unlawfully” or “wrongfully” by a foreign government, as opposed to those individuals incarcerated for legitimate infractions of a foreign government’s criminal code. For the purposes of this report, a U.S. national will be considered “unlawfully” or “wrongfully” detained by a foreign government if they have either:
- Been subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention
- Not been informed at the time of arrest, or thereafter, of the reasons for their arrest and have not been informed of any charges against them
- Not been entitled to a trial within a reasonable timeframe20
Citations
- President Barack Obama, “Remarks on Hostage Negotiation Policy,” The White House, June 24, 2015.
- White House, Report on U.S. Hostage Policy. Washington D.C., June 2015. source
- White House, Report on U.S. Hostage Policy. Washington D.C., June 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Families Press for Changes in Policy on Hostages,” The New York Times, May 29, 2015. source.
- Ibid.
- Exec. Order No. 13,698, 3 C.F.R. § 13698 (2016).
- Ibid.
- The National Counterterrorism Center, Status Report on the Implementation of Executive Order 13698 Hostage Recovery Activities, September 30, 2016.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- In two cases, the hostage or detainee held dual citizenship. JWFLF did not disclose the origin of the individuals with dual citizenship in order to keep their identities confidential.
- Only one of these cases represented in the JWFLF sample occurred in the mid-1990s. The remaining cases occurred after the year 2005.
- Categories include: Family Engagement, Government Response, Recovery Efforts, Justice, and Additional Support.
- Erik Rautalinko, Hans-Olof Lisper, and Bo Ekehammar, “Reflective Listening in Counseling: Effects of Training Time and Evaluator Social Skills,” American Journal of Psychotherapy 61, no. 2 (2007).
- Language from Article 1 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (United Nations, 1979).
- The language in PPD-30 makes clear that “the directive does not apply” in cases where a foreign government “confirms it has detained a U.S. national” and that, in those cases, the Department of State has the lead. However, it also emphasizes that, in dealing with those cases, “the Department of State may draw on the full range of experience and expertise of the HRFC as appropriate” to support the families of these detainees. See section six of this report (Former Detainee and Detainee Family Interactions with the U.S. Government) for a more complete discussion of the extension of the hostage recovery enterprise’s expertise and resources provided to detainees and their families.
- White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Hostage Recovery Activities.
- Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson, and David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes (Santa Barbara, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977): 9; Jerome Corsi, “Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event,” Journal of Conflict Resolutions 25, no. 1 (1981): 51.
- In general, hostage-taking events are conceived of falling into one of two broad categories: kidnapping or hostage-barricade situations. Hostage barricade situations, such as hijackings, often involve the hostage-takers and hostages being surrounded by law enforcement agents, while the abduction of victims during kidnappings results in the location of the hostages being unknown. This study does not include hostage-barricade incidents because of the substantial differences between those situations and kidnappings and the fact that those victims and their families would not interact with the U.S. government’s hostage recovery enterprise. This study also excludes incidents in which a missing person was never proven to have been kidnapped for the same reasons.
- Language from Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966).