Possible Interventions

The debates and research gaps described previously suggest several directions for philanthropic and nonprofit investment. Rather than fully developed program designs, this section identifies general types of interventions that emerged from the discussion and warrant further exploration. 

These interventions involve nonpartisan activities in which 501(c)(3) organizations can play a role in research, education, training, convening, and building civic infrastructure.

Multiple participants observed that parties have lost the civic presence they once had. For example, local parties no longer sponsor softball teams, help with taxes, or provide spaces where community members encounter one another outside electoral contexts. The megachurch comparison surfaced repeatedly: Institutions that thrive do so by lowering barriers to participation (by providing child care and food and holding meetings at convenient times), inviting people to solve problems together, and building relationships that persist beyond any single event.

Interventions to address parties’ lack of civil presence:

• Develop community spaces: Civic organizations can build physical spaces where residents can gather. These would not be explicitly partisan, but might create the connective tissue that healthy political communities require. This might mean converting vacant spaces, subsidizing meeting facilities, or supporting organizations that provide civic gathering functions.
• Strengthen constituent services: Nonprofits could pilot nonpartisan approaches to help citizens navigate government, such as benefits enrollment, tax assistance, and permit applications. From these pilots, we might learn whether service provision builds civic trust and engagement. 
• Test ways to make civic participation easier: What if meetings offered child care? What if training happened on weekends in accessible locations? What inducements or accommodations actually increase participation from underrepresented groups?

These interventions test whether the participation model has validity—whether people would engage more in civic and political life if barriers were lower and invitations more compelling. They also test whether civic engagement can be rebuilt from nonpartisan foundations or whether it requires an explicitly political structure.

The gathering surfaced broad agreement that the political talent pipeline is broken. Working-class candidates cannot afford to quit jobs and campaign. Young people interested in political careers lack clear pathways. The people who end up in party leadership positions are often those who get “weird expressive benefits” from participation rather than those with broad skills and community roots.

Possible interventions to develop the talent pipeline: 

• Fellowship and scholarship models: Support individuals to pursue political careers without requiring personal wealth. This might look like campaign fellowships (salary replacement during campaigns), public service scholarships, or stipend programs for participation in leadership development. The legal architecture matters: Support before candidacy declaration differs from campaign contributions.
• Leadership training programs: Offer nonpartisan training in skills that political leaders need—organizing, public speaking, coalition-building, policy analysis, campaign management. Some state parties run such programs, but we do not know which ones do and whether they are effective. 
• Document and support pathways to leadership: Research can show how effective political leaders are actually developed, and new programs could open those pathways to people currently excluded. If informal networks matter more than formal programs, interventions might focus on network-building rather than curriculum.

This direction tests whether financial and structural barriers constrain political talent. If talented people exist but cannot access political careers, removing barriers should expand and diversify the candidate pool. If the problem is culture, incentives, or the nature of modern politics, pipeline investments may disappoint.

The U.S. political system has thinned out. There are fewer organized groups or caucuses within parties, and less infrastructure for people who do not fit neatly into existing coalitions. Extremist factions have built organizational capacity, such as the Tea Party networks and issue activist groups on the left and right, while moderate and heterodox factions often lack comparable infrastructure.

Ideas that might encourage new factions: 

• Convene emerging coalitions: Host gatherings where people exploring new political formations can meet potential allies, learn from successful faction-builders, and develop organizational skills. These would be educational rather than explicitly political—that is, teaching about organization-building, not advocating for particular positions.
• Organizational development training: Offer nonpartisan training in how to build and sustain political organizations—membership recruitment, fundraising, internal governance, coalition management. This knowledge exists but is not widely accessible to people trying to build new formations.
• Cross-ideological dialogue: Support conversations across factional lines about shared challenges in political organization. People building organizations on the left and right face similar problems; learning across ideological differences could accelerate organizational development without requiring political agreement.

This direction tests whether faction-building can be supported through educational and convening infrastructure, and whether more factions would produce healthier political competition. The Working Families Party example suggests intentional faction-building is possible; the question is whether that model—or variations of it—can be replicated.

Throughout the gathering, participants raised structural reforms that might create conditions for healthier parties: fusion voting to enable faction accountability, redistricting reform to create competitive elections, and changes to primary systems and nomination calendars. These represent a different theory of change—altering the rules within which parties operate rather than building capacity within existing rules.

Ideas that would prioritize structural reforms leading to healthier parties:

• Research on reform effects: Engage in rigorous study of how different electoral rules affect party behavior, candidate quality, and political competition. This evidence base informs reform debates without advocating for particular positions.
• Voter education: Sponsor nonpartisan education about how electoral systems work, what alternatives exist, and what tradeoffs different systems involve. Informed citizens can make their own judgments about reform.
• Experiential learning: Support opportunities for people to experience alternative systems, such as ranked-choice voting in local organizations, participatory budgeting processes, and deliberative forums. Experience with alternatives may shape preferences in ways that information alone does not.

The gathering did not resolve whether structural reform is a prerequisite to organizational improvement or whether organizational capacity must be built first to win structural reforms. Both tracks may be necessary. This report focuses on organizational and civic interventions that foundations can directly support while acknowledging that structural reform represents important complementary work that other actors—advocacy organizations, political campaigns, reform movements—must pursue.