Gridlock: Enhancing Disaster Response Efforts Through Data Transparency in the Electric Utility Sector

by Braxton Bridgers

Once contested ground, climate change is on the radar of rising generations as an undeniable fact that will require public action. According to the fifth assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), warming temperatures have already contributed to coastal erosion, droughts, wildfires, and negative impacts to health in North America.¹ Recently, the United States has undertaken its own assessment of the current impacts and future projections of climate change for the country. In 2014, the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) released the third iteration of its National Climate Assessment, a comprehensive analysis of observed changes and future impacts of climate change in the United States. According to USGCRP, the United States is expected to experience an increase in temperature ranging from two to four degrees Fahrenheit over the next few decades.² Moreover, extreme weather events related to climate change—such as droughts and heat waves—are on the rise, creating challenges for the country’s electric infrastructure.

According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), weather-related events are the leading cause of power outages in America.³ As instances of extreme weather events increase, the ability of electric utilities to supply energy to citizens is increasingly at risk of being disrupted, as the nation’s grid is outdated and prone to wear and tear. The U.S. electric grid acts as the backbone of America’s economy, providing the nation’s citizens with the power necessary for ingenuity, progress, and prosperity. Despite the electric grid’s critical role in supporting the U.S. economy, it is one of the nation’s most vulnerable sectors to climate change, as extreme weather conditions exacerbate the degradation of aging electric infrastructure.⁴

Such stress on America’s electric grid will increase the likelihood of Black Sky events, “extraordinary, hazardous event[s] producing power outages of a large, regional scale that last significantly longer than typical weather or operational outages.”⁵ The possibility of an increase in Black Sky events, in tandem with extreme weather, poses increasing risks. Electricity plays an essential role in disaster response efforts, and organizations tasked with protecting citizens during and after disasters will need to ensure that both they and the public can access this resource. Therefore, there is a strong public purpose for ensuring individuals responding to disasters have access to data regarding electric infrastructure. Data provided by electric utilities allow emergency management professionals—local and federal officials, as well as first responders, involved in emergency response efforts—to assess the scope of a disaster and its impact throughout their jurisdiction.⁶ Additionally, utilities provide power to other types of infrastructure that provide vital services to citizens (e.g. telecommunications and transportation infrastructure). By understanding the impact a loss of electricity has on other vital infrastructure, first responders are able to prioritize their response efforts.

Despite the electric grid’s critical role in supporting the U.S. economy, it is one of the nation’s most vulnerable sectors to climate change.

Unfortunately, the current data-sharing landscape between emergency managers and the electric utility sector is limited and does not enable efficient and quality decision making during disasters. The field of emergency management currently lacks the capability to conduct real-time analysis of cross-sector critical infrastructure supported by the electricity sector. This lack of capability makes it difficult to conduct comparative impact assessments at a granular level, which stifles the ability to facilitate efficient and productive use of resources. This is an essential requirement of being able to respond to disasters and will become increasingly important, as the incidence of disasters is expected to increase along with climate change and rising temperatures.

When responding to a disaster, emergency managers require a rapid landscape analysis of the impacted area in order to ensure the safety of as many lives as possible. Private sector entities play an essential role in disaster response efforts by providing data that can illustrate risks within hazardous environments. While electric utilities represent only one of many industries that engage with first responders during a disaster, they are arguably the most important partner in addressing major emergencies, providing energy to assets critical in supporting disaster response operations. Addressing gaps in data and strengthening the manner and platform in which it is shared in this space will enhance current capabilities of responding to disasters. America has considerable climate-related severe weather challenges ahead of itself, and improving data sharing between first responders and electric utilities will only strengthen the nation’s ability to protect its citizens.

This report provides an analysis of data currently shared by electric utilities to parties that conduct disaster response efforts. It identifies electric utility data that can enhance disaster response capabilities. Lastly, with the hopes of facilitating discussions regarding the proliferation of data shared by electric utilities to emergency management officials, specific policies are identified to promote a more effective approach.

Methodology

In order to assess the scope and depth of electric utility data readily available to emergency management professionals during disaster response efforts, an acute analysis of data points presented on power outage maps was conducted. Utilizing a database of electric utility outage maps, curated by crowdsourced energy-information platform OpenEI, a sample was created within the following parameters:

• The database was filtered to present 500 utilities per page, resulting in a selection pool of 3,000 utilities.
• Twenty utilities that provided a link to their respective power outage maps were randomly selected per page, based on the following criteria:
• No repeating occurrences of electric utility power outage maps within the OpenEI database were included in the sample.
• Power outage maps were required to have a legend in order to be selected.
• Outage maps must have been public facing, with no login required.

This study analyzes a randomized sample of 100 electric utility power outage maps⁷ from OpenEI’s database, including outage maps from investor owned utilities, municipal utilities, and cooperative utilities.

The Current Data-Sharing Landscape

When an outage occurs, electric utilities will often relay information regarding the status of the incident to the general public in the form of power outage maps. Power outage maps are web-based geographic information system (GIS) tools that visualize data points regarding power outages within an electric utility’s jurisdiction. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) developed an open-source knowledge sharing platform pertaining to the electricity sector, called Open Energy Information (OpenEI), which provides a database of the over 3,000 utilities in the country, along with links to power outage maps in real time when available.⁸ The OpenEI platform presents a means to assess performance among utilities, especially with respect to how power outage information is relayed to the public and, in turn, to emergency managers.

An analysis of a randomized sample of power outage maps from OpenEI’s database—including outage maps from investor-owned utilities, municipal utilities, and cooperative utilities—reveals commonly occurring data points provided by electric utilities. Each power outage map identified the general geographic vicinity of an outage and an estimate of the number of customers affected (often tiered and color coded). While these two data points were consistent throughout the sample, most maps contained additional data regarding outages, such as a general depiction of the cause of the outage, status of deployment of utility crew members, and whether an outage was planned or unplanned. Often, power outage maps contained the start time of a particular incident. Additionally, the estimated restoration time for an incident—an indicator that emergency managers rely on when deploying resources during a disaster—was a commonly occurring data point within the sample.

However, while these GIS tools provide general updates concerning outages, an analysis of the platforms reveal significant shortcomings, especially in providing the types of information emergency managers need to make decisions during a disaster, such as the location and status of critical infrastructure. In the event of a disaster, emergency managers must swiftly develop command and control capabilities to engage in life saving tasks, such as warning citizens of hazards within a disaster stricken area, or establishing evacuation routes and sheltering capabilities.

Unfortunately, electric utility data that are currently used to depict the environment in which first responders operate inadequately assist with the facilitation of decisions that mitigate the impact of a disaster. Data must be timely, accurate, and assist emergency managers in identifying areas within their jurisdiction that have been significantly impacted by a disaster. Information currently shared by electric utilities falls short of these requirements in three ways: First, data shared are not automated nor provided in real time; second, data are limited and are not shared with regard to the operational requirements of emergency managers; and, third, the types of data shared vary by utility, limiting attempts to create a standardized analysis of power outages. Additionally, not all electric utilities develop power outage maps, and often times smaller utilities, such as municipal and cooperative utilities, relay information through methods that do not allow for automated integration of data into systems used by first responders (e.g., via spreadsheet).

An analysis of the platforms reveal significant shortcomings, especially in providing the types of information emergency managers need to make decisions during a disaster.

During a disaster, emergency managers, individuals in charge of leading disaster response efforts, will activate an Emergency Operation Center (EOC)—a command and control facility that functions as the center for disaster response decision making. Depending on the extent of the disaster, an EOC will be activated at either the county or state level.⁹ At the county level, a popular tool utilized by emergency managers to enhance their situational awareness of a significant incident is Web EOC. Web EOC is a crisis management and incident tracking system that allows users to manually input data from power outage maps into a GIS map with various layers of information from other sectors (e.g., the status of hospitals and water treatment facilities).¹⁰ However, the drawbacks of this method are that the data from power outage maps are not automated and therefore are not shared in real time. This lack of automation creates a Common Operational Picture (COP)—a single display of relevant multidimensional information that supports operational decision making—that does not accurately depict a hazardous environment. Furthermore, the data from electric utilities that is incorporated into the COPs of emergency managers do not contribute to comparative impact assessment capabilities, as there is no current method of automatically differentiating between the status of critical and non-critical infrastructure supported by electric utilities.

At the state level, Web EOC is also used to create a COP in tandem with an application that takes data from power outage maps of various utilities operating within affected regions. In 2014, the DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability created an application called the Environment for Analysis of Geo-Located Energy Information (EAGLE-I) system.¹¹ EAGLE-I tackles the issue of state emergency managers having to incorporate multiple outage maps with multiple data points into their jurisdictional COP by collecting data from various outage maps and creating a single GIS map depicting the status of electric infrastructure. While this tool is certainly a step in the right direction toward creating a more comprehensive COP for emergency managers to respond to disasters, EAGLE-I only covers 75 percent of electric utility customers in the United States and only updates every 15 minutes.¹²

Crisis management and incident tracking tools such as Web EOC, as well DOE’s EAGLE-I system, allow for emergency managers to incorporate data currently shared by electric utilities into their COP. However, the underlying issue remains that the data shared by electric utilities are not tailored to the operational requirements of the emergency management community. Power outage maps are used to relay information to customers, with emergency managers collecting publicly available data from these tools in order to enhance their understanding of the environment in which they operate. In order to create a COP that allows emergency managers to make better informed decisions, data regarding critical infrastructure must be incorporated into the standard data-sharing practices of electric utilities. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), critical infrastructure are “assets… considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”¹³ Of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which range from communications to water systems, four are especially important during disaster response: electricity, water, transportation, and communications.

Unfortunately, another issue currently undermining the data-sharing landscape between electric utilities and emergency managers is the absence of an accepted model for analyzing the interdependencies of critical infrastructure, leading to a limited understanding of the environment in which emergency managers operate during disasters. There is a need for cross-sector prioritized lists of critical infrastructures within the emergency management space as well as real-time tracking regarding the impact of such infrastructure during disasters. Take the interdependency between hospitals and water treatment facilities during disaster response for example. Though hospitals are viewed as an extremely important resource due to their function as medical emergency hubs during disaster response, clean water is required to ensure that hospitals continue operations in a sanitary manner, thus mandating that water treatment facilities take priority in terms of power restoration during a disaster. By identifying the interdependencies of critical infrastructure, prioritizing their restoration based on importance, and tracking their power status in real time, electric utilities will have the capability to disseminate actionable data regarding the status of critical infrastructure to emergency managers.

Operational Requirements During Disasters and Mission Driven Data Sharing

Emergency management officials are tasked with deploying assets in an efficient and organized manner to protect citizens before, during, and after a disaster occurs. Therefore, emergency management activities are organized into four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.¹⁴ This report focuses on data sharing during the response phase of emergency management, as this is when EOCs are activated and officials require data to build COPs.

With data being shared without regard to the operational requirements of those responding to disasters, the current data-sharing landscape between emergency management officials and the electric utility sector remains incomprehensive. This deficiency raises the question: What types of missions are often undertaken during disasters and what data is needed to carry out these missions?

Recent literature from the National Information Sharing Council (NISC) regarding information sharing between emergency management officials and the electric utility sector has identified a list of 13 key categories of information required to make decisions when an emergency occurs. Known as Essential Elements of Information (EEIs), these categories of critical information reflect a wide range of knowledge that must be incorporated into the COPs of parties tasked with responding to disasters.¹⁵ The need for information pertaining to critical infrastructure is well documented throughout multiple EEIs, and the NISC has created an EEI solely for the electricity sector. However, a closer analysis of the specific data points outlined under the “Electricity Grid” EEI reveals that such data, when collected and analyzed in a GIS format, would nearly resemble the power outage maps used by electric utilities to convey information to the general public. With regard to the electricity sector, the NISC framework for data sharing focuses on data points that could easily be taken from an electric utility’s power outage map¹⁶ without tailoring the required data to the specific tasks that are undertaken by emergency management officials during an emergency.

Emergency management activities are organized into four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

Researchers have identified specific actions, also referred to as “operational mission requirements,” that are of the utmost importance during the response phase of a disaster. In their systems-based approach to enhancing the interdisciplinary capabilities of stakeholders during large-scale Black Sky events, Joel Thomas and Ellie Graeden illustrate the connection between operational missions and the data required to carry them out. A mission of note that Thomas and Graeden incorporate into their analysis is “the identification and request of resources that need to be deployed.”¹⁷ In order to complete this task, emergency management officials must have an understanding of priorities concerning the restoration of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). An essential data point in recognizing restoration priorities for CIKR, and thus enabling the identification of resources for deployment, is the estimated time of restoration (ETR) of electric power for impacted infrastructure.

The ETR for electric power is a critical piece of information in emergency management, as it allows for parties responding to disasters to obtain a general understanding of the level of impacts throughout a particular jurisdiction. Though power outage maps provide an ETR for customers, this does not include ETR for specific critical infrastructure. Additionally, some electric utilities may provide ETR for critical infrastructure during a disaster, but this behavior is not typical and depends on the strength of the relationship between emergency management officials in an a particular region and electric utilities operating within their jurisdiction.

With ETRs for critical infrastructure, emergency management officials are able to conduct comparative impact assessments and prioritize the deployment of assets to areas that are in greater need of assistance than others. The importance of ETR for critical infrastructure during disaster response efforts cannot be overstated. While it may seem surprising that this data is not readily provided to first responders, there are legitimate concerns that prevent electric utilities from disclosing the status of critical infrastructure.

One of the most pressing concerns regarding the extension of current data sharing practices is the possibility of aggregated data sets containing classified information. In order for emergency managers to receive the ETR for critical infrastructure, electric utilities must first disclose their location. Electric utilities serve the public, but they also provide energy to facilities owned and operated by the federal government. These facilities may be classified, and disclosing their location has serious national security implications because competitors and adversaries may be able to gain access to such sensitive information. Analyzing data in order to ensure the exclusion of information pertaining to classified assets in aggregated data sets supplied to emergency managers requires resources that electric utilities are unlikely to commit to without some form of monetary incentive.

Additionally, electric utilities resist data sharing opportunities, arguing it can put them at a disadvantage with competitors or be used by public officials seeking to hold companies accountable during disasters. In order to facilitate the secure sharing of electric utility data regarding critical infrastructure, data sharing agreements—formal contracts outlining how data shared by one party can be used by another—must be implemented.

Priority service restoration agreements act as an additional barrier preventing electric utility companies from differentiating between critical and non-critical infrastructure in the information provided to first responders. Utilities often prioritize the restoration of customers during a disaster by focusing on restoring power to emergency and public service facilities first. Assets belonging to federal government agencies are also prioritized through priority service restoration agreements. The provision of restoration priorities of federal assets by electric utilities may compromise these facilities, potentially allowing adversaries to exploit such information.

One of the most pressing concerns regarding the extension of current data sharing practices is the possibility of aggregated data sets containing classified information.

What all three aforementioned points of contention share in common are that utilities need to ensure the sensitive data they share with emergency managers is protected and used solely for the purposes of protecting citizens during emergencies. Therefore, the technology, processes, and protocols that will ensure the secure sharing of sensitive data from electric utilities to emergency managers during disaster response efforts must be constructed before a disaster occurs. Implementing a real-time, comprehensive, data-sharing platform for emergency managers and electric utilities will require resources. Once such a platform is created, utilities themselves will have to dedicate resources to aggregating and formatting data for use in disaster response efforts. Thus, monetary incentives must be put in place in order to moderate the financial concerns of utilities regarding data sharing.

Although there are legitimate concerns regarding the dissemination of critical infrastructure data, this information would enhance the response efforts of emergency management officials during a disaster. The following section explores actions that will allow critical infrastructure data to be shared in an efficient and secure manner while also easily integrated into the common operating pictures of officials responding to disasters.

Policy Recommendations

The most pressing concerns surrounding data sharing between emergency managers and electric utilities are the automation and security of data. In order for electric utility data to be easily integrated into the COPs of emergency management officials, a data-sharing mandate that standardizes data shared by electric utilities must be implemented by a regulating body. Furthermore, a system that would allow the safe transferal of electric utility data to first responders must be adopted by both parties. These reforms will have major ramifications for the effectiveness of disaster response operations. Three policy recommendations should be pursued that, when implemented, have the potential to strengthen the efforts of emergency management officials when responding to a disaster:

• Implementation of a data–sharing mandate: Outside of the information disseminated via power outage maps, electric utilities may also share data by engaging in what is known as an Emergency Support Function (ESF), a grouping of individuals and representatives from federal and local governments as well as the private sector.¹⁸ There are 15 emergency support functions in total, with ESF#12 dedicated to the energy sector. While electric utilities participating in ESF#12 may disclose ETR for critical infrastructure, they are not obliged to do so. A nationwide data-sharing mandate should be implemented in order to ensure that emergency managers receive the data required to carry operational missions to completion. The data mandated to be shared should include the following: a list of critical infrastructure serviced by an electric utility (including locations in order to establish an overlay into GIS analysis), the power status of critical infrastructure, and the estimated time of restoration for critical infrastructure serviced by an electric utility. Conditions of aid are the most popular mechanisms used to carry out mandates in the United States,¹⁹ and a mandate regarding the sharing of critical infrastructure data to first responders should be no different. In order to ensure the implementation of a critical infrastructure data sharing mandate, disaster-related aid administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be contingent upon states requiring electric utility companies to share such information during disaster response efforts.
• Adoption of a system that automates data collection and integration: When a disaster occurs, emergency management officials must act quickly to mitigate hazards and ensure the safety of citizens. Therefore, in order for data regarding critical infrastructure to be most useful, it must be rapidly disseminated through a secure channel to EOCs. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has recently developed a platform that automatically collects data from electric utilities and shares it in real time with emergency management officials. Called the Outage Data Initiative (ODI), the program seeks to standardize the sharing of real-time power outage data to first responders²⁰. The data points collected and disseminated under the ODI platform closely resemble those that are published on publicly available power outage maps. However, ODI’s system functions as two streams of data sharing: the public-awareness-use case and the first-responder-distribution-use case. With the implementation of a nationwide data-sharing mandate, electric utilities would be required to share the aforementioned data points pertaining to critical infrastructure, and ODI’s platform provides a secure channel for the dissemination of such sensitive data solely to first responders.
• Monetary incentives for collection and dissemination of data by electric utilities: Implementing a new system such as ODI requires electric utilities to employ resources for its integration within their current operational framework. Utilities would be tasked with disaggregating data in order to provide data germane to disaster response operations. Too much data can overcomplicate a common operational picture, potentially impairing the capabilities of emergency management officials to respond to disasters. To place the full financial burden of providing specific data through a newly implemented platform solely on electric utilities would be impractical and may have a negative impact on resources overall by limiting a utility’s capability of delivering data. Therefore, a monetary incentive should be put in place in order to support data-sharing efforts. Public Utility Commissions (PUC’s)—regulatory bodies that manage the rates and services of public utilities—should be in charge of the initial identification of rates in which electric utilities would be reimbursed. Once rates have been submitted, they should be processed by FEMA, which would then advocate for a budget increase based on submitted rates and use granted funding to support the implementation of a system that can securely relay critical infrastructure data to first responders.

Conclusion

The implementation of all three policy proposals will lead to the establishment of an overlay of critical infrastructure in GIS software used by emergency management officials. The identification of critical infrastructure, as well as their status and estimated time of restoration, will provide first responders with a comprehensive common operational picture. Emergency managers will be able to conduct comparative impact assessments at the granular level by identifying communities that are most vulnerable to the damage caused by a natural disaster. Furthermore, EOCs will be able to deploy assets in the most efficient and timely manner through automated real-time data sharing. Such a tool is set to enhance the capabilities of emergency response officials during disaster response operations and create a United States that is well prepared for future natural disasters.

Appendix: Sample of Electric Utility Power Outage Maps

• 4-County Electric Power Assn
• AEP Generating Company
• Adams Electric Cooperative
• Ambit Energy L.P.
• Ameren Energy Marketing
• Appalachian Electric Cooperative
• Appalachian Power Co
• Atlantic City Electric Co
• Austin Energy
• Avista
• Barc
• Beauregard Electric Coop, Inc.
• Big Sandy Rural Electric Cooperative Corp
• Black Hills Power
• Blue Grass Energy Cooperative Corp
• Blue Ridge Energy
• Blue Bonnet Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• Bowie-Cass Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• Brunswick Electric Member Corp
• Bryan Texas Utilities
• CDE
• CenterPoint Energy
• Clark Energy
• Claverack Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• Clay Electric Cooperative
• Cleo Power LLC
• Clinton Utilities Board
• Colorado Springs Utilities
• Columbia Water & Light
• Commonwealth Edison Co
• Concho Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• Consumers Energy Outage Map
• CPS Energy
• Dayton Power & Light Co.
• Decatur Utilities
• Denton Municipal Electric
• Dominion Energy
• DTE Energy
• Duke Energy
• Duquesne Light Co.
• Entergy Arkansas Inc.
• First Energy Corp
• Frontier Power Company
• Georgia Power Co
• Grady Electric Membership Corp
• Grand Valley Power
• Great Lakes Energy
• Green Mountain Power
• Guadalupe Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• Gulf Coast Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• Gulf Power
• Hancock-Wood Electric Cooperative
• Heartland Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• High West Energy, Inc.
• Huntsville Utilities
• Idaho Power Co
• Illinois Rural Electric Cooperative
• Independence Power and Light
• Iowa Association of Electric Cooperatives
• Itasca-Mantrap Co-op Electrical Association
• Jackson Purchase Energy Corporation
• Kansas City Power & Light Co
• Kentucky Utilities Co
• Kootenai Electric Cooperative
• Laurens Electric Cooperative,
• Liberty Utilities
• Lincoln Electric System
• Louisville Gas & Electric Co
• Lubbock Power & Light
• Madison Gas & Electric Co
• Marquette Board of Light and Power
• MidAmerican Energy Co
• National Grid US
• Nebraska Public Power District
• New York State Electric & Gas Corporation
• Norris Public Power District
• Northern Lights
• North Western Electric Cooperative, Inc.
• NV Energy
• Ocala Electric Utility
• Oklahoma Electric Cooperative
• Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co
• Omaha Public Power District
• Oncor
• Orange & Rockland Utilities Inc.
• Orcus Power & Light Cooperative
• Orlando Utilities Commission
• Owensboro Municipal Utilities
• Pacific Gas & Electric Co
• Paducah Power System
• Pascoag Utility District
• Pepco Energy Services
• Provo City Corporation
• Public Service Electric & Gas (PSEG)
• Puget Sound Energy
• Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
• Rock Hill Utilities
• Seattle City Light
• South Dakota Rural Electric Association
• Xcel Energy

Braxton Bridgers is a 2017-18 Millennial Fellow with the Resource Security initiative at New America. He would like to thank Sharon Burke, Reid Cramer, Emily Gallagher, Melody Frierson, Sean Griffin, Jonathon Monken, Joel Thomas, Denice Ross, and Scott Sternfeld. Their guidance and expertise were invaluable in developing his paper.