Project Preparation and Initial Implementation (2005-2012)

Previous attempts by GoPunjab to reform its land administration system were unsuccessful. A lack of best practices, along with inconsistent implementation, failed to drastically improve the legacy system. Change also failed because many rural citizens were familiar and comfortable with the Patwaris—the system was anything but defective for wealthy landowners.¹ The LRMIS project partners consequently learned from these past pilots, prepared for the utilization of appropriate technology, and engaged with key stakeholders during early implementation.

The LRMIS project benefited from the lessons of previous BOR pilots —for example, insights from projects in Kasur District, Lahore District, and Rahim Yar Khan/Gujrat Districts dictated the success of the new system.² The small-scale initiatives informed software development, highlighted the importance of stakeholder and community inclusion, and helped to identify the implications of transitioning from a manual to a digital record system.

First, the 1999-2003 land record computerization pilot in Kasur District illustrated the need for software flexibility.³ Land administration throughout rural Punjab was idiosyncratic; numerous undocumented processes existed and many were not uniformly defined.⁴ Any software system needed to be flexible in its enforcement of administrative rules and regulations, as not all legacy data was recorded with strict compliance.⁵

The small-scale initiatives informed software development, highlighted the importance of stakeholder and community inclusion, and helped to identify the implications of transitioning from a manual to a digital record system.

The Kasur District pilot also indicated the cost of data entry per district.⁶ The complex land records were in poor condition, with many missing crucial information on transactions, landowners, and land itself. Composition of the legacy records in Urdu, a language not widely spoken in Punjab, further contributed to logistical delays.⁷ The 2006 Project Appraisal Document estimated the cost of data entry per district at US $80,000 to $85,000.⁸

Second, the 2001 Lahore District computerization pilot demonstrated the importance of public outreach. Any new project could not absolutely erase Patwar culture. Many landowners were familiar with their local Patwari and made use of the legacy system for years—if not decades. A public education campaign to facilitate cultural change was deemed necessary.⁹

The complex land records were in poor condition, with many missing crucial information on transactions, landowners, and land itself.

The pilot also highlighted the importance of Patwari inclusion in the project. As exclusive caretakers of manual land records and maps, the Patwaris possessed vital knowledge of the legacy system. Yet they were also threatened by the potential loss of power and revenue due to the reforms.¹⁰ The project therefore stressed compromise and co-option of the Patwaris.¹¹

Third, the 2005 Rahim Yar Khan District and Gujrat District pilots continued record computerization. The technological solution developed for these pilots strictly enforced prevailing laws and procedures. As previously noted, however, Patwaris often carried out their own undocumented practices in the field, and both pilots soon stagnated.¹² Poor management under the Punjabi Information Technology Department was an added issue. GoPunjab subsequently assigned future software implementation to the more accomplished Punjab Information and Technology Board (PITB).¹³ These bureaucratic shortcomings suggested potential use of a public-private partnership in relation to software development.

The World Bank financed two key preparation reports in 2005 and 2006. These studies—conducted by a software company and a consultancy firm, respectively—identified information and communication technology (ICT), as well as an appropriate cultural and social approach, for the project. The analyses resulted in a well-designed and continuous dissemination strategy.¹⁴

The LRMIS project was a systemic restructuring of rural Punjabi land administration. The 2007 Financing Agreement allocated US $45 million over a five-year period for two interconnected objectives: 1) to transition from a manual system to a computerized system through the process of digitization; and 2) to transition from the corrupt Patwar system to a transparent and service-based system within newly built Arazi Record Centers (ARCs).¹⁵ Initial ARC construction was planned for 18 districts at the kanungo level, an administrative area roughly encompassing a dozen villages.¹⁶ Yet, this timeline would prove to be too short.

As the agency responsible for all provincial ICT programs, the PITB initially oversaw development of project software. Following analysis and internal project review, the agency selected a competitive approach for software production.¹⁷ Four private firms were selected in 2007 to develop a solution and conduct a pilot within 285 days, which were then evaluated by the PITB.

Based on technical evaluations and User Acceptance Testing, the PITB selected Lahore’s Accountancy Outsourcing Services in 2008 for software development. Early delays related to data entry necessitated a vendor contract extension, and a considerable PITB workload contributed to project neglect. Bureaucratic responsibility for software rollout shifted to the Project Management Unit (PMU)—a subunit of the BOR.¹⁸

The LRMIS project was a systemic restructuring of  rural Punjabi land administration.

The project was further delayed by 18 months as the software matured and issues related to both data management and manual record errors were addressed.¹⁹ Shortcomings in collaboration between project members contributed to the setback. Initial project implementation relied significantly upon land administrators within the BOR, but these stakeholders were not technologically adept. Conversely, the many ICT specialists within Pakistan lacked sufficient knowledge regarding property rights.²⁰

The first half of the project was a pivotal learning experience. Creation of the PMU for operational management helped to provide the necessary attention to detail and resources for successful implementation.²¹ Prolonged software tests and revisions allowed the technology to mature. Increasing confidence in the computer system to manage and resolve land administration complexities encouraged greater bureaucratic support and propelled the PMU to initiate operations at scale.

This protracted period also demonstrated the need to monitor initial data quality.²² Data entry and verification began in 2010; the effort expanded to 13 districts by the end of 2011.²³ Project leadership decided to integrate the Patwaris into the process. Patwaris’ knowledge of the legacy system was unique, as many maintained idiosyncratic records and an abundance of undocumented practices existed. This expertise had to be captured, and there was no other source.

As the sole custodians of land records for decades, Patwaris enjoyed substantial power within villages. Patwari responsibilities extended beyond land administration, however, to include keeping weather records, collecting harvest information, reporting crimes, and updating voter registries.²⁴ This diverse revenue stream helped to reduce initial Patwari resistance to the project and its resulting changes regarding administrative power dynamics. Early opposition was also reduced by the Patwaris’ expectation that the project would fail.²⁵

The Patwaris increasingly felt threatened as the project progressed. Data entry work continued and brick-and-mortar expansion began in early 2011. By May, the LRMIS software was operational in a Kasur District land record center.²⁶ Other ARCs opened at the kanungo level in the Lahore, Hafizabad, and Lodhran Districts shortly after.²⁷ Project momentum generated significant Patwari resistance and necessitated broad consultations in 2011 and 2012.²⁸

As the sole custodians of land records for decades, Patwaris enjoyed substantial power within villages.

Though they were pressured politically to cooperate, the Patwaris were compensated financially.²⁹ The project trained them to conduct specific tasks, such as the provision of land records, quality assurance of digital data, and the preparation of supporting documents for the correction of errors.³⁰ They were paid PKR 5,000 (US $43) on average per verified and/or corrected mauza, or revenue estate.³¹

The quality of digitized data was important for the project. Poor data would have damaged public trust in LRMIS. Moreover, abundant errors would have handed the Patwaris an opportunity to publicly criticize the project. Punjabi officials recognized the importance of this process, and CM Sharif received weekly updates on digitization.³² The lengthy double-blind entry process, conducted by increasingly acquiescent Patwaris, ensured ample quality from the start of data entry. Over 90 percent of provincial rural land records were eventually digitized.³³

Legal amendments ultimately removed the Patwaris from a position of power within land administration in 2012. Due to continued political support for the project, over 20 combined changes were made to the 1967 Punjab Land Revenue Act and the 1968 Punjab Land Revenue Rules. The legislation prohibited Patwaris from manually issuing fards, simplified issuance and transactions of land records, and established digital administrative procedures. The official Punjab Land Records Manual was changed accordingly.³⁴

This removal process was not planned at the project’s outset. Leadership initially intended to limit the role of Patwaris in land services, but CM Sharif eventually decided to rescind their duties related to property rights. The chief minister based his decision on past experience, convinced that integration of the Patwaris into the new scheme would result in the continuation of the same harmful practices associated with the legacy system.³⁵

Of note, legal removal of the Patwaris can be particularly important for provincial security. Legislation approved by the provincial assembly in Lahore is a strong signal that GoPunjab genuinely attempted to improve governance and confront rural underdevelopment.³⁶ As a result, grievances that have facilitated terrorist recruitment may diminish over time.

For the first time in over 150 years, the Patwaris are not powerful stakeholders in the land system. While many still engage in surveying, the project removed the land administration responsibilities of 8,000 Patwaris—about a third of the workforce.³⁷ Time and logistical costs to locate a Patwari, as well as transaction times, are significantly reduced. Bribes are no longer commonplace or necessary.³⁸ It is not an exaggeration to assert that the socioeconomic power structure within Punjabi villages has drastically changed—CM Sharif even stated that the project revolutionized rural life.³⁹