Executive Summary
Sharon Burke researched and conceived of this article, “Strategic Distraction: America, China, and Japan in the 21st Century Competitive Space,” as a participant in the 2017-2018 Sasakawa USA In-Depth Alumni Research Trip to Japan. An earlier version of the report was originally posted in September 2018 on the Commentary and Analysis section of Sasakawa USA’s website; the revised version is also available there. The author thanks Sasakawa USA for its support and Brandon Tensley for his editorial skills.
A defining question of the 21st century is whether a third world war between China and the United States is inevitable, or whether these would-be adversaries can find a way to coexist. At this time, the two countries seem to be on a path that leads to kinetic conflict, just as new technologies are changing what kinetic war even means and the global security landscape is shifting.
The United States is approaching this new era with a credo of “great power competition,” giving pride of place to military lethality. Even as the current U.S. Secretary of Defense points to the importance of “the competitive space” in global affairs and the primacy of non-military power and global partnerships, the United States is concentrating its investments in legacy weapons and confrontational diplomacy. This is a time of strategic distraction for America, embroiled in political divisions at home and regional battles abroad.
China, meanwhile, has been seeking to define the “competitive space” for some time. From information age minerals in Africa to Hollywood’s global cultural power, the Chinese are making strategic investments all over the world. A signature effort, the Belt and Road Initiative, allegedly means trillions of dollars in “win-win” infrastructure improvements for 65 countries, from the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan to the Panama Canal. At the same time, China is pouring money into its military and making increasingly aggressive moves in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
In this inauspicious moment for great power comity, there may be an opportunity for other countries to play a constructive and catalytic role. Japan, in particular, has a part to play. The United States has long pushed Japan to bring more conventional military capability to the bilateral alliance, but the alliance may benefit even more from Japan’s strengths in diplomacy, development, trade, and cultural presence. More to the point, global public opinion polling suggests Japan enjoys a position of trust that China and the United States do not at this time. In playing to its strengths as a security builder, Japan also has an opportunity to improve global readiness for the great security challenges of the later part of this century, such as climate change, which are not all military in nature.