Former Hostage and Hostage Family Interactions with the U.S. Government

This section analyzes the impact of EO 13698 and PPD-30 on U.S. hostages and their families and evaluates their interactions with the U.S. government. It analyzes eleven key thematic areas drawn from EO 13698 and PPD-30 to examine how the perspective of participants in hostage cases varies depending on whether the case was pre or post-PPD-30. All interview responses were analyzed in conjunction with the written survey responses. Of the 22 participants, who were connected to hostage cases,¹ only 13 provided responses to the written² survey questions. Those 13 survey respondents’ answers are analyzed in quantitative form in this section. Even among these thirteen respondents not everyone responded to every question. In particular, survey respondents only responded to questions with which they had relevant experience or insight (for example, former hostages who did not interact with institutions aimed at engagement with families did not respond to questions about such engagement).

Living through a hostage-taking experience or learning of a loved one’s hostage-taking is unquestionably a difficult and traumatic experience. Both pre- and post-PPD-30 family members of loved ones who have not returned home expressed an understandable level of grief and frustration over not having heard from their relative since the day they were taken hostage. They described the day they learned of their relative’s kidnapping and how they urgently reached out and sought help from the U.S. government. However, those with experiences reaching out to the government pre-PPD-30 varied greatly from post-PPD-30 experiences.

One grieving pre-PPD-30 family member recalled:

I remember reaching out to my loved one’s employer, State Department, FBI, and my Senator and Congressman, but no one would help us! I had to pull newspaper articles from a foreign country in a language I didn’t understand. I needed help, my kids were being accosted by reporters, but we were on our own! My [relative’s] captors would call and call, demanding more and more money, which even continued after they murdered him! It's still just so frustrating to this day that my country would not help us!

Other pre-PPD-30 family members shared how they sought help from government officials at the White House and the State Department in an attempt to develop foreign and domestic contacts. To their surprise, some government officials simply told them to “go away.” Others felt lied to or were sent to other agencies as if they were a burden. “No one would help us!” was the cry of several pre-PPD-30 families. “We didn’t know where to turn or what to do. It was very frustrating then and it still is, nobody helped,” one family member shared, while another said: “I felt like they [the U.S. government] just abandoned us!”

The difference between pre- and post-PPD-30 experiences becomes even clearer when concentrating on the agencies and offices who are primarily responsible for hostage related matters, including family engagement with American hostage families. JWFLF asked its participants to describe how helpful the State Department, the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, FBI Victims Assistance, and the HRFC were in dealing with their cases. Pre- and post-PPD-30 families shared strikingly different experiences.

Former Hostages and Hostage Families Interactions with the State Department

When asked whether the State Department was helpful with their case, four out of six pre-PPD-30 survey respondents who interacted with the State Department strongly disagreed. The remaining two respondents somewhat agreed that the State Department was helpful with their case (Figure 3).

A look at the statements provided in the interviews by participants supports the survey’s findings that experiences regarding the State Department’s role improved after the implementation of PPD-30.

Though not universally held, several pre-PPD-30 participants relayed negative experiences with the State Department. One pre-PPD-30 family member shared that the State Department was “useless” and it felt like the State Department “could not wait to get rid of us.” Another pre-PPD-30 family member recalled reaching out to the State Department soon after learning of their loved one’s kidnapping and the individual on the phone said, yawning, “we’ll get back to you.” Other pre-PPD-30 families expressed their frustration and disbelief over the fact that the individual working the regional desk lacked rudimentary knowledge of the region where their loved ones were being held. Other family members expressed that it was impossible to get any information from the State Department and that they had to continually press hard for answers. Meetings at the State Department were kept short, as one pre-PPD-30 family member described. One family member shared an experience where a high-ranking State Department official who made several attempts to end a meeting because they were late to a sporting event.

Pre-PPD-30 families also stated that it was unclear who was handling their case and they made several requests to meet with the Secretary of State, most of which were denied. Some families felt that the Secretary of State was “hands off” and the State Department as a whole was unapproachable.

Other pre-PPD-30 families shared more positive experiences with the Secretary of State and claimed that the Secretary of State’s office did make helpful suggestions to families regarding who they should contact (foreign and/or domestic), helped initiate meetings, and allowed families to meet with the Secretary of State. Some pre-PPD-30 families stated that the State Department, specifically the Secretary of State, became a “serious partner” in the recovery efforts of their relative.

Pre-PPD-30 families responded favorably when the Secretary of State personally reached out to the families and answered their questions and concerns. In one case, the Secretary of State addressed the family’s concern about drone strikes that were being conducted in the region where their loved one was being held. Even though the family member was unable to influence the government’s decision to use drones in the area, they walked away with a deeper understanding of the situation and were satisfied with the opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns. Afterwards, the family expressed their gratitude and stated that the Secretary of State was particularly “proactive,” which brought a sense of comfort to the family.

In contrast, all four post-PPD-30 survey respondents who interacted with the newly created Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs housed in the State Department had a very positive experience and strongly agreed that the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs was helpful with their case (Figure 3).

After the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30, the office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs was established within the State Department and was put in charge of handling all hostage related issues. Since its inception, Jim O’Brien³ who was later succeeded by Robert O’Brien,⁴ filled the position for the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs.⁵ The primary responsibility of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs is to work with the Secretary of State to lead and coordinate diplomatic efforts overseas on hostage related issues.⁶ Additional responsibilities of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs include:

• Supporting hostage recovery efforts
• Working closely with families of American hostages, advising senior leadership of the U.S. government on hostage related issues
• Providing senior representation in strategy meetings with the HRG
• Working closely with the HRFC⁷

Families commented on how helpful the role of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs has been in developing strategy and in interagency relations. Post-PPD-30 families commented that the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs was absolutely essential. Their ability to discuss their case with relevant diplomatic personnel from regions where their loved ones were being held (and in some cases are still being held) was particularly helpful from the perspective of family members. This is also consistent with one family member’s remark: “The Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs would travel to [the regions where the hostage was being held] and discuss my loved one’s case. Staff members arranged meetings for me with the [foreign] ambassador and made numerous attempts to meet with other [foreign] ambassadors to discuss my loved one’s case.”⁸ In addition, families commented on how the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs was always well-informed and managed complicated interactions and relationships with their relative’s captors.

Families also shared how helpful it was when the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs would work with their closest advisors to discuss strategy. One family member commented: “He would engage with our closest advisors, who were experts [in the field and in the region holding our loved one]⁹ and would implement what he learned from their expertise.” Another family member said: “He was very clear about explaining the strategy they were pursuing, especially when I had to play a role in this, through appeals in media, etc.”

Former Hostages and Hostage Families Interactions with the FBI Office for Victim Assistance

JWFLF asked its participants if the FBI Office for Victim Assistance (OVA) was helpful with their or their relative’s case. Established in 2001, the Office for Victim Assistance became the Victim Services Division in 2018 and its victim services specialists were renamed victim services coordinators. Participants were generally positive before the implementation of PPD-30. Five out of six pre-PPD-30 survey respondents either mostly agreed (one respondent) or strongly agreed (four respondents) that OVA was helpful with their case (Figure 3).

However, after the implementation of PPD-30, responses were universally positive with all four post-PPD-30 respondents strongly agreeing that OVA was helpful in dealing with their loved one’s case (Figure 3).

Pre-PPD-30 family members said that their specialist was very “sympathetic,” “compassionate,” “intelligent,” and made “no false claims.” Their specialist would regularly call the family with updates and would keep the family informed throughout the progression of their relative’s case. One family member was particularly touched when their specialist was present when their relative returned home safely from captivity. Even in cases where their relative was tragically killed, families stated that their specialist saw their case through and was dedicated to the very end. They too were especially touched that their specialist was present during the moment their relative’s remains were returned to U.S. soil and expressed gratitude that the specialist attended the burial.

Other pre-PPD-30 hostage families stated that they found it helpful when their specialist inquired about their overall well-being, specifically asking if they were eating and/or sleeping well. The specialists would also check in on the family members after they received a phone call from their relative’s captors but would quickly distance themselves when calls became potential negotiations. Regardless of the strain, family members expressed that they knew their specialist would be there to support them. One family member described OVA as “a lifeline for us” and said that “[they] did everything possible to help my family.” “We felt like we were their only case, even if it wasn’t true,” the family member stated, going on to explain that “they came to the house whenever we needed them. They treated us with kindness, compassion and care. We felt we could trust them and even vent when we needed to.”

Other pre-PPD-30 responses were less positive, including one respondent who strongly disagreed that OVA was helpful. One individual stated: “Victim services really didn’t know how to help. They were kind but not specific in the ways on how they could provide help. It wasn’t until after their [relative’s] murder when Victim’s Assistance offered help with travel to and from Washington, D.C.”

OVA not only interacted with the families of hostages, but with former hostages themselves. The responses of former hostages varied with regard to their interaction with OVA. Some former hostages mostly agreed that their victim specialist was helpful, stating that their specialist was there for them and they felt cared for and listened to; but other former hostages reported fewer positive experiences.

Some former hostages expressed their concern over the FBI retaining their belongings and the lack of options for counseling and housing services. Other former hostages were uneasy about sharing their experience in captivity with a psychiatrist provided by the FBI and would have preferred to speak to a psychiatrist not associated with the U.S. government, a specific recommendation they shared for future cases. Speaking to a therapist or psychiatrist outside of the U.S. government would help former hostages with issues of mistrust that developed and materialized during captivity. Additionally, former hostages felt that pairing a male therapist or psychiatrist with a male former hostage and a female therapist or psychiatrist with a female former hostage would provide a safer and more trusting environment.

The quality of medical care and the ability to choose their own doctors was also a major concern for former hostages. Some expressed concerns about receiving medical care from a doctor provided by the U.S. government and who, according to the former hostages, refused to fully help or treat them. In addition, some medical practices suggested or recommended by the U.S. government were located over an hour away from the former hostage’s residence, making receiving treatment an overwhelming task for the former hostage.

Other former hostages expressed needing assistance with being able to rent an apartment or purchase a car due to ruined credit while they were being held captive. This deep frustration stems from the fact that some of these individuals had very good credit scores before their captivity but now they struggle to qualify for loans to make essential purchases due to low credit scores caused by events outside their control. One hostage suggested it would be nice to be able to get a new social security number or have some way to obtain a new identity in order to have a “fresh start.” Another suggestion was to have the option to receive disability because of their inability to work as a result of the trauma they experienced during their captivity. One former hostage who expressed fear of being targeted in the future, mentioned that it would be helpful to be able to enter into a program, similar to the witness protection program, to avoid continued threats from their previous captors.

Remarks by those participants involved in hostage cases after the implementation of PPD-30 reflected their more positive survey responses. Post-PPD-30 families shared that their victim’s specialist was “very sensitive to their concerns for privacy and responded to emails and voicemails quickly (even when the message was not urgent).” Families also reported that their victim’s specialist contacted financial institutions on their behalf, gave advice on receivership cases, wrote letters on their behalf, provided reimbursement for travel expenses, and assisted in intra-governmental communication and media relations. Additionally, some family members found their specialist “wonderfully understanding and communicative” and appreciated having the option of continuing to work with their specialist after the formation of the HRFC.

Former Hostages and Hostage Families Interactions with the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell

JWFLF also asked participants about their interactions with the HRFC as well as specifically about the HRFC Family Engagement Coordinator. These institutions did not exist before PPD-30, so no quantitative comparison can be made.

Post-PPD-30 respondent reactions to the HRFC were generally positive, with two of four respondents somewhat agreeing, one mostly agreeing, and one strongly agreeing that the HRFC has been helpful with their relative’s case (Figure 3). The interviews with family members supported these positive results regarding the Cell as a whole. Family members commented that the two former heads of the HRFC, Michael McGarrity and Rob Saale, “were outstanding men who were very dedicated to the hostage mission.” Others stated that the HRFC has been “very helpful, consistent, and absolutely essential in coordinating efforts [in their relative’s case].”

A major concern for families was the transition between administrations, where hostage families expected to have to “start from scratch” with the incoming government officials. Instead, as one family member stated, “the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell did a really good job briefing the new administration.” The family also found that the National Security Council and other White House staff members were well-briefed about their relative’s hostage case.

Families also reported: that they “do not have any problems contacting anyone at the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell and have a very good rapport with the Cell. Questions are answered as clearly as they can be, given the sensitivity of the [hostage situation]. They are helpful in arranging meetings and making accommodations for [the family] when we travel to Washington, D.C.” They have also been helpful for families deciding when and how to deal with the media, especially in trying to keep reporters from publicizing hostage cases when families request privacy. Families also shared that the HRFC had been very helpful in connecting them with their Senators and Congressmen and other influential people within the U.S. government.

Responses regarding the Family Engagement Coordinator at the HRFC showed more variability. Responses ranged from strongly disagree (one respondent), neither agree nor disagree (two respondents), and strongly agree (one respondent) (Figure 3). It is not clear to what extent these more mixed reactions reflect the Family Engagement Coordinator’s role or other factors that limited her interaction with families in lieu of other institutions.

Family remarks, however, also showed variability with regards to the Family Engagement Coordinator specifically. One family whose loved one was kidnapped before the creation of the HRFC commented that there was tremendous improvement in terms of communication after the creation of the Cell. They said that Family Engagement Coordinator “is very kind, and very responsive. She's excellent if I send her a text or an email. She's very skilled at scheduling meetings. She helped arrange a meeting at the White House regarding prosecution, powerful and very understanding.” Another family commented how helpful it was when the Family Engagement Coordinator called before disturbing videos released by a terrorist group that showed other hostages held by the same captor as their loved one went public.

One potential reason why half of respondents reported that they neither agreed nor disagreed that the Family Engagement Coordinator was helpful with their loved one’s case could be due to the fact that several families worked more closely with their victims’ specialist or FBI agent rather than the Family Engagement Coordinator. Several families indicated that the HRFC allowed families to continue to work with their original agents or assigned teams (i.e. OVA or their agent at their local Field Office) for cases that occurred before the creation of the HRFC. It is important to remember, for the purposes of this report, that post-PPD-30 cases consisted of four separate cases and three of those cases with five participants occurred both before and after the implementation of PPD-30. Additionally, the Family Engagement Coordinator’s responsibilities include other duties such as engaging with the HRG on a weekly basis (sometimes more). This can reduce the visibility of the Family Engagement Coordinator to families.

After the implementation of PPD-30, U.S. families of hostages perceived that the U.S. government has been more helpful in managing their loved one’s hostage case.

Overall, families specifically shared their need for additional help in knowing what appropriate steps to take in preparing for when their relative returns home. In addition, some family members expressed concerns and reported that their communication with the HRFC was “cut off” since their relative returned home, leaving the families in a challenging situation where they don’t know who to turn to for help. In addition, some former hostages and family members shared that they or their relative are experiencing great difficulty in getting back on their feet. Due to the length of captivity and experience of traumatic events, some former hostages find it difficult to maintain a job, and therefore cannot afford food, basic amenities, or a place to live.

A key theme raised by hostage families and previous governmental reviews was the effectiveness of the government’s explanation of its laws and policies and the extent to which hostage families understood those laws and policies. JWFLF asked about hostage families’ perceptions before and after the directive’s implementation of the extent to which the government as a whole provided effective explanations of law and policy regarding hostage incidents.

Did PPD-30 Increase Understanding of U.S. Laws and Policies?

Survey responses suggest that PPD-30 improved hostage family understanding of the laws and policies surrounding hostage incidents. When asked if the U.S. government provided effective explanations of its laws and policies as they related to hostage incidents, the majority of JWFLF’s pre-PPD-30 respondents disagreed. Of these participants, one respondent strongly disagreed, three respondents mostly disagreed, while one was neutral on the subject (Figure 4).

In contrast, after the implementation of PPD-30, respondents reported having a better understanding of the U.S. government’s stance on hostage incidents. Post-PPD-30 respondents all generally agreed that they were provided an effective explanation of the U.S. government’s hostage policy. Three of four post-PPD-30 respondents mostly agreed, while one somewhat agreed (Figure 4).

The classification of the U.S. government’s overarching policy for responding to hostage-taking incidents prior to the release of EO 13698 and PPD-30 appears to have played a major role in the pre-PPD-30 failure to effectively explain U.S. policy. Prior to PPD-30, the government’s hostage recovery policy, NSPD-12 United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad, written in February 2002, was a classified document.¹⁰ This policy’s classification prevented officials from sharing it during discussions with family members.¹¹ This, in turn, meant that family members did not understand either the government’s capability to respond to a hostage incident, the specifics of their loved one’s case, or to what extent, if any, the government was taking action.

“We heard a lot about the reasons why [the U.S. government’s] hands were tied, that [the government] could not do more than what they were already doing,” one family member shared when discussing the challenges of understanding what actions the government was taking. “Whatever [it was they were doing], we’ll never know,” they said. “It was hard to know how much I understood,” another family member explained, echoing the same concerns, “we relied on information from experts we found through friends and family and meetings we arranged on our own.”

The decision to ensure that PPD-30 was created as an unclassified document ¹² seems to have had an impact on the ability of officials to explain laws and policies as they relate to hostage incidents. One family member shared that, after the release of PPD-30, they were able to have an in-depth discussion with a member of the National Security Council where they discussed a variety of different response options. While the official “rejected” many of the family’s suggested recovery plans, the official was able to provide explanations about why the options were not feasible, helping the family understand what options the government could not pursue. This type of in-depth discussion could likely not have been possible if, like NSPD-12, PPD-30 was an entirely classified document.

From the perspective of families of hostages, the implementation of PPD-30 has increased their general understanding of U.S. government laws and policies as they relate to hostage incidents.

Continued Lack of Clarity Regarding Ransom Payments and Negotiations

Some of the most consequential issues and interactions between hostage families and the government prior to the hostage policy review revolved around negotiations and private payments of ransoms to terrorist organizations. Despite the review and a variety of statements made by U.S. officials, post-PPD-30 families still reported a lack of clarity on the policy regarding negotiations with and private payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations.

As a tool to end a hostage incident, the private payment of ransom in a criminal (i.e. non-terrorist) kidnapping is not illegal.¹³ Questions of legality begin to come into play, however, when a U.S. citizen provides money to a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. government, a transaction that could be interpreted as a violation of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.¹⁴,¹⁵ Although the government continues to maintain its policy of not providing concessions to terrorist groups,¹⁶ the United States has not created separate and specific criminal charges penalizing the private payment of ransoms and has generally not interfered with a family’s decision to provide a private ransom.¹⁷

Prior to the implementation of PPD-30, the question of whether ransom payments were considered material support to designated terrorist groups was left open to interpretation. This created challenges for hostage families seeking to recover their relatives. Pre-PPD-30 families reported not having a clear understanding of the U.S. hostage policy and whether or not they were legally allowed to pay ransoms. In discussions with these families, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI would point to the fact that no family had ever been prosecuted for such activity. One pre-PPD-30 family member described the government’s stance on private payments of ransom as “vague.” “I asked FBI agents if my family would be prosecuted if we paid ransom,” the family member continued, “[but all] they said was ‘we never prosecuted a family for this.’" Multiple families reported receiving this type of ambiguous response during pre-PPD-30 discussions with FBI or DOJ officials. Discussions with other government agencies were often even less helpful and involved overt pressure to prevent families from paying private ransoms. “We heard a lot of ‘we don’t negotiate with terrorists,’” one family member shared. Another family member reported that an official from the National Security Council “threatened us with prosecution if we tried to raise a ransom for [our relative].”

These interactions played an important role in the push to have the government review and change the way it handles hostage-taking incidents.¹⁸ When the review was released, President Obama addressed this concern in his comments. “In particular,” he said, “I want to point out that no family of an American hostage has ever been prosecuted for paying a ransom for the return of their loved ones. The last thing that we should ever do is to add to a family’s pain with threats like that.”¹⁹ The same day, the DOJ released a statement addressing the same concern:

When a U.S. citizen is taken hostage, the Department of Justice’s top priority is the safe return of the hostage. The families who have been affected by hostage-takings have endured extraordinarily difficult circumstances. In light of recent hostage-takings perpetrated by terrorist groups, some families have expressed concerns that their efforts to retrieve their loved one could lead to potential prosecutions under the statute prohibiting the provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. In the face of their loved ones being held captive indefinitely by terrorist groups, families have understandably explored every option to secure their loved ones’ safe recovery.

In these cases, the department has focused on helping the families, consistent with the government’s no-concessions policy, and will continue to focus on exploring all appropriate options. The department does not intend to add to families’ pain in such cases by suggesting that they could face criminal prosecution. Perhaps the best indication of how the department will exercise its prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the material support statute is the department’s past record of prosecuting cases under the statute. The department has never used the material support statute to prosecute a hostage’s family or friends for paying a ransom for the safe return of their loved one.²⁰

These statements were designed to help clarify the government’s stance on private negotiations, but aside from these assurances, the review did not take a firm stance on the legality of the payment of private ransoms.²¹ The DOJ’s statement that it would, in essence, look the other way for families paying private ransoms provided a signal to all the U.S. government’s components and the public that ransom payments would not be considered material support for terrorist organizations. This resolved the most urgent issue experienced by pre-PPD-30 families, namely threats that families would be prosecuted for considering ransom payments.

By not providing a firm stance or limits on what conduct is considered protected from prosecution, however, the policy created additional questions for post-PPD-30 families. Post-PPD-30 families echoed pre-PPD-30 families’ concerns about a variety of issues concerning the payment of private ransoms. Additionally, the issue of what constitutes negotiations with a terrorist organization has also become a topic of concern.

What constitutes a negotiation with a proscribed group? How far does this immunity from prosecution extend? Can friends and acquaintances be in prosecutorial danger for contributing to a ransom fund? Will the government seize funds from public fundraising campaigns? Are third-party intermediaries safe from prosecution associated with communication with individuals either designated as terrorists themselves or associated with groups designated as terrorist organizations? If third party intermediaries are at risk, can they obtain immunity? Therefore, despite an increase in the understanding of U.S. laws and policies after the implementation of PPD-30, there remains a level of confusion over the extent to which the government will allow families to pay private ransoms or negotiate with terrorist organizations designated by the U.S. government.

Despite an increase in the understanding of U.S. laws and policies related to hostage incidents, there remains a level of confusion on the U.S. policy toward private ransoms and negotiations with organizations designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. government, even after the implementation of PPD-30

U.S. Government Coordination, Intelligence Sharing, and Communication

The HRFC was created to serve as the U.S. government’s primary organization and interagency body responsible for directing and coordinating responses to all hostage-taking incidents of U.S. nationals kidnapped abroad.²² The HRFC is responsible for coordinating intelligence and information sharing, which includes declassification of information pertaining to hostage-taking incidents.²³ In addition to creating the HRFC, PPD-30 gave the Director of National Intelligence the authority to establish a new Intelligence Community Issue Manager for Hostage Affairs to help increase interagency coordination.²⁴

Although interactions between hostage families and the officials tasked with identifying and declassifying information are rare, JWFLF asked its participants if they perceived that government officials were well coordinated, i.e. communicating, sharing intelligence, and declassifying information regarding their relative’s case.

As with other measures examined previously, the survey revealed improvement after the implementation of PPD-30, though the subject remained a concern for many. Among pre-PPD-30 respondents, six out of eight indicated that they strongly disagreed that officials were well coordinated regarding their relative’s case. Another one mostly disagreed, and one neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 5).

In contrast, after the implementation of PPD-30, no one strongly disagreed, one respondent mostly disagreed, one respondent somewhat disagreed and two mostly agreed, showing improvement in the perception of U.S. government coordination, intelligence sharing, and declassification to support families as compared to pre-PPD-30 experiences (Figure 5).

Despite the improvement shown in the survey, remarks by family members show that coordination remains an area of concern for many even after PPD-30’s implementation. “The level of completeness of information sharing ebbs and flows, and pockets of siloed information still appear from time-to-time,” as one post-PPD-30 family member stated. Other families reported that they had been misinformed by the HRFC regarding the degree to which the government shared information it had regarding their relative’s case. Families compared this to the information received from their sources (private investigators, NGOs, their relative’s employer, foreign government officials, and/or other U.S. officials) and the discrepancies often led family members to believe that the government continues to withhold information regarding their relative’s case or filter what families perceive as relevant and important information.

Other families shared their concerns that information sharing between government agencies and receiving declassified information still remains a serious challenge. Both pre- and post-PPD-30 families reported ongoing challenges in obtaining declassified information connected to their relative’s case. The predominant issue for these families is learning the truth about what happened to their loved one. One family member explained the anxiety this caused: “Our fear is that we may never know the whole truth!” This inevitably prevents family members from receiving any closure while they are left wondering if their relative is still alive; leaving families in a perpetual state of grief.

From the perspective of the families of hostages, there has been an increase in U.S. government coordination in intelligence sharing and communication after the implementation of PPD-30.

Candid Assessments and Recovery Efforts Shared with Hostage Families

A key area of concern that helped prompt the government’s review of hostage policies was the feeling on the part of families that the government was failing to share candid assessments and information regarding recovery efforts with family members.

The survey found substantial improvement in the provision of candid assessments regarding recovery efforts. Pre-PPD-30 families reported having a difficult time gaining access to information concerning the U.S. government’s recovery efforts for their relative. All but two pre-PPD-30 family members responded that no candid assessments were given. One participant declined to answer. The majority of pre-PPD-30 family respondents (six of eight) strongly disagreed that specific candid assessments and plans of hostage recovery efforts were communicated clearly while one neither agreed or disagreed and one specifically declined to answer (Figure 6).²⁵

In contrast, post-PPD-30 families responded more favorably. Although one post-PPD-30 respondent indicated that they mostly disagreed, the remaining three were evenly split between somewhat agreeing, mostly agreeing, and strongly agreeing (Figure 6).

What appeared to be most frustrating for several pre-PPD-30 families was the fact that the location of their relative had been identified and, for an extended period of time, no recovery efforts were made, or at least none that were shared with the families. The most difficult challenge reported by hostage families was knowing that their loved ones were wounded, hurt, and being mistreated and abused. From the perspective of pre-PPD-30 families, the government continued to delay any attempt to recover their loved ones. One family reported that they did not receive any information regarding recovery plans until only after the murder of their loved one. Another family stated that they were, “constantly told that nobody [in the U.S. government] could help [them] due to poor relations with the country holding their loved one.” The family member struggled to understand this insistence on poor relationships when, shortly after the murder of their relative, the U.S. government was able to quickly retrieve their remains.

Post-PPD-30 families continue to advocate for more opportunities to be part of planning and recovery options for their relatives being held hostage. One family member requested that the government should allow, to the extent each family cares to, for families to:

• Be involved in the development of all strategy related to their relative’s recovery efforts
• Have the ability to obtain advance notice of any proposed action
• Have the unrestricted right to veto any proposed action that they feel could harm their loved one

One family member shared their satisfaction with having the opportunity to speak with a high-ranking government official about the complexity of the geopolitical situation and why recovery efforts were particularly challenging in the area where their relative was being held. In addition, this family member was provided the opportunity to provide their own assessments concerning the recovery of their relative. Even though their recommendations were rejected, the family member had a good understanding of why when the government offered an adequate explanation.

The implementation of PPD-30 has increased the U.S. government’s ability to share candid assessments and plans regarding recovery efforts of hostages.

Another key area of concern was the provision of information and the family’s understanding regarding the geopolitical situation as it related to hostage incidents. Here too, families’ experiences appear to have improved following the implementation of PPD-30.

When asked if the U.S. government provided families explanations of the geopolitical situation as they related to hostage incidents, all pre-PPD-30 respondents indicated that they were never briefed. This contrasts with post-PPD-30 respondents who all indicated that they were briefed on the geopolitical situation.

Among the four post-PPD-30 respondents, one strongly agreed, two mostly agreed, and one somewhat agreed that the frequency with which they received periodic briefings on the geopolitical situation where their relative was being held was sufficient (Figure 7).

Overall, families have become more knowledgeable about the geopolitical situation surrounding their relative’s case and they have also demonstrated an awareness of the national security implications of these cases. While this awareness helps them understand some of the challenges associated with recovery options, these families voiced their anger and frustration that their relatives have become political “chess pieces” or “bargaining chips” for terrorist organizations.

PPD-30 has increased the U.S. government’s ability to update families on the geopolitical situation surrounding their loved one’s case.

Following the implementation of PPD-30, there was a substantial increase in the extent to which hostage families reported that they believed that they or their relatives were a priority of the U.S. government.

The majority, (seven of eight) of pre-PPD-30 respondents said that they either strongly disagreed (six) or mostly disagreed (one) that their relative was a priority of the U.S. government. One respondent somewhat agreed that their relative’s case was a priority (Figure 9).

For post-PPD-30 respondents, their view of whether the U.S. government saw their loved one’s case as a priority increased favorably, with two respondents saying they somewhat agreed, two respondents saying they mostly agreed, and one saying they strongly agreed that the U.S. government considered their case a priority (Figure 9).

The comments during interviews make clear the substantial difference in experience. In response to the question about whether the government viewed them or their relative as a priority, one pre-PPD-30 family member simply stated “not at all, not for a single day.”

Pre-PPD-30 family members described a bureaucracy where their cases’ level of priority varied significantly among U.S. government agencies and officials, and one in which it was no one's job to bring their loved one home. One pre-PPD-30 family member indicated that they somewhat agreed because “our Ambassador arranged meetings for our family with the [foreign government’s]²⁶ officials.” On the other hand, one family member lamented over their relative being such a “low priority,” saying that the “U.S. government seemed to tie the hands of the FBI or anyone that wanted to help us. There didn't seem to be anyone within the administration [who saw the] importance of bringing our loved one home.”

A tremendous amount of grief and frustration was shared by pre-PPD-30 families when they discussed how their relative’s return could not have been priority for the U.S. government when no action was taken even after the exact locations of the American hostages were discovered. That the President did not clearly articulate his stance on their relative’s case made it very difficult for some families to believe that it was a priority.

The worst part, as one family member shared, “was that we were led to believe that the U.S. government actually cared and that our loved one was a high priority, when in fact, they were not.” The family said that they trusted that the government was doing all that they could and only later learned that was not the case. This family felt that if the government had been clearer about the prioritization of their relative’s recovery and what was or wasn’t being done to aid in recovery efforts and had not made empty promises, they would have hired someone to privately handle their loved one’s case. Ultimately, the family felt like they wasted valuable time that a private security team could have used to potentially recover their relative because the government gave them the impression their case was being handled. The family felt lied to and they suggested that the government should be honest about their capabilities, helping families better understand the ways they can and cannot help to allow families to make more informed decisions about how to proceed.

Post-PPD-30 families had more positive comments. One family member stated that “it helped when the White House and the National Security Council personally reached out [after another American hostage was released].” This made the family member feel like they were always working behind the scenes and were concerned about recovery their loved one. Another family member responded favorably that they viewed the announcement of a monetary reward for information about their relative’s case as a sign that the U.S. government considered it a priority.

Other post-PPD-30 family members, however, expressed their concern that they were told they were a priority, but did not see the government’s actions as reflecting that priority. The family felt that if their relative’s case was a higher priority, then a high-ranking U.S. official (the President or Secretary of State) would demand the release of their relative. “This would show us that the U.S. government is taking our loved one’s case seriously and making it a priority,” as one family member stated.

Families feel that their loved ones who are being held hostage are a greater priority of the U.S. government since the implementation of PPD-30.

After the well-being and safe return of a family member’s loved one, honesty and transparency in the government’s communication was the most frequently reported issue raised by both pre- and post-PPD-30 families. Families voiced their frustration over:

• Not being able to discern whether or not the government was being completely honest in discussions surrounding its capabilities and limitations in recovery efforts
• The priority level assigned to their relative’s return
• The U.S. government’s willingness to share details about their relative’s case, including the location where they were being held and information regarding the outcome of the case

From the perspective of the family members, this breakdown in honesty and/or transparency sometimes seemed based on the desire of officials to try and shield families from hard truths. Families asserted that they want to be spoken to directly and not placated; to be told hard truths and not how to feel. One family member stated, “the U.S. government should not make assumptions on what I can and cannot handle. Many people shield information about [my loved one] thinking that I cannot handle the truth. I don’t care what it is; I want to know the hard truth about what happened to [my loved one]!”

In other instances, families were unclear on what government officials knew, what they didn’t, and what they were not able to share because of classification concerns. Both pre- and post-PPD-30 families consistently commented that officials need to be clearer on “what they know and what they don't know.”

Hostage families expressed a desire to know as much about their relative’s case as possible and, in large measure, believe that the U.S. government knows many of the details. In some cases, families reported that their interactions left them with the impression that officials knew more than they were sharing. Families also highlighted the fact that the information they received from officials was no more detailed, or timely, than information available in the media. While the families did share an understanding that, in some cases, issues of classification would restrict the government’s ability to share information, they often felt there was a lack of transparency in their interactions.

Ultimately, from the perspective of both pre- and post-PPD-30 families, the importance of honesty and transparency in communication from the government is paramount. These families have consistently expressed a desire to know even hard truths about their loved one’s cases, rather than have their feelings spared, and for government officials to be clearer about what information is known, unknown, or classified.

Both pre- and post-PPD-30 families expressed the need for more honesty and transparency from U.S. government officials.

Several family members shared their concerns over the loss of key personnel during administration turnovers and expressed concerns linked to personnel shortfalls. Their fears were three-fold:

• Whether incoming personnel would be knowledgeable enough about the region where their relatives were or are currently being held, and if not, how much time and effort would it require to bring them up to speed
• Whether incoming personnel would have enough authority and influence to effectively work towards the recovery of their relatives
• Whether these individuals would maintain or increase the priority level of their hostage cases

In the context of hostage related matters, turnover of key personnel most often occurs during the changeover of an administration or through reorganization of personnel within an organization. During an administration changeover, members of the Hostage Recovery Group and the office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, primarily political appointees, see the highest rates of change in personnel. Career government servants, such as personnel from the HRFC and the wider U.S. government hostage enterprise, are less affected. Families fear that during these transitions the primary focus shifts from working on strategy and recovery efforts to briefing and educating the incoming personnel on the specifics and history of each case. During their interviews, several participants emphasized the importance of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs role and position within the State Department. They also voiced their concerns over the vacancy of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs position during the change of administrations.²⁷ One family member shared that during the vacancy of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, they “felt the State Department and Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs office has little capacity and expertise to carry on their duties with the grievous loss of personnel.”

Several other participants expressed their concern that the lowering of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs’ position within the State Department will hamper the diplomatic arm of PPD-30’s interagency restructuring. In addition, family members expressed that they would have liked to have been provided the opportunity to participate in the vetting process of the next Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs. They did, however, express deep appreciation for the current administration’s continuing support of PPD-30.²⁸ The current administration’s appointment of a Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs is an important step in maintaining the durability of U.S. government improvements in hostage-related activities and signals the U.S. government’s enduring commitment to families of those taken hostage.

Participants also expressed concern that the HRFC was making it more difficult to speak to other departments and agencies regarding their hostage case. JWFLF sought out former U.S. government officials and found that, in some cases, support from participating departments and agencies has decreased since the creation of the HRFC. As the organization charged with coordinating the government’s response to the kidnapping of U.S. nationals and the interaction with their families, liaison officers with U.S. government organizations throughout the interagency are crucial to ensuring clear communication and coordinated efforts.

At the beginning and shortly after the creation of the HRFC, the DOD and Joint Personnel Recovery Agency placed representatives within the HRFC to participate in the recovery of U.S. nationals held hostage abroad. Over time, their presence, specifically that of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, has become increasingly limited. This mirrors concerns expressed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s 2016 review of the implementation of PPD-30 that “while most departments and agencies have assigned staff to the HRFC, some staffing gaps and shortfalls remain.”²⁹

Additionally, other participants shared that “the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell acts as a barrier and prevents other agencies from discussing our case with us.” After sharing this concern with former U.S. government officials, one individual commented that the concern is over family members making multiple recorded statements to different agencies, which has the potential to negatively impact future prosecutions. Although the HRFC does not have an issue with family members speaking to other departments or agencies in general, the HRFC’s concern lies over the fact that it is the FBI’s responsibility to investigate these matters and to “collect evidence and conduct forensics in furtherance of a potential prosecution.”³⁰ It is then the HRFC’s responsibility to “coordinate efforts by relevant departments and agencies to ensure that all relevant material and information acquired by the U.S. government in the course of a hostage-taking event is made available for use in the effort to recover the hostage and, where possible and consistent with that goal, is managed in such a way as to allow its use in an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution.”³¹

Therefore, it is imperative that the HRFC manage these interactions in such a way as to provide strong cases for potential prosecution. Increasing communication and coordination between the HRFC, former hostages and/or their families, and other departments and agencies will improve the U.S. government’s efforts in engaging with its families.

In addition, the role of the HRFC and professional staff of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs remain critical for the successful resolution of future hostage-taking incidents involving U.S. citizens. While the number of U.S. citizens kidnapped by terrorist organizations changes over time³² and officials within administrations will have varying degrees of familiarity with resolving hostage issues, maintaining a robust government interagency capability to coordinate responses and retaining institutional knowledge of hostage resolution and family engagement best practices will be critical for success when future hostage crises erupt.

Families of hostages have noted concern over the gradually decreasing seniority of U.S. government officials assigned to the HRFC, which impacts interagency coordination and influences how the government handles hostage matters.

Overall, the government’s briefing and correspondence with hostage families have been more effective following the implementation of PPD-30. This section examines this issue with a focus on three areas:

• The provision of regular briefings by the government
• The explanation of the institutions available to aid hostages and hostage families
• The effectiveness and nature of government correspondence with hostage families

Detailed and Regular Government Briefings

The majority (seven of eight) of pre-PPD-30 respondents reported that they did not receive frequent and accurate briefings from the U.S. government while only one respondent neither agreed nor disagreed that they received such briefings (Figure 10).

After the implementation of PPD-30, respondents reported a substantial increase in the frequency with which they received detailed and accurate information at briefings held by the U.S. government. All post-PPD-30 respondents voiced some form of agreement that they received detailed and accurate information at briefings. Two respondents strongly agreed, one respondent mostly agreed, and one respondent somewhat agreed (Figure 10).

The improvement after the implementation of PPD-30 is mirrored in the results regarding whether the information conveyed in the briefing was conveyed clearly. Among pre-PPD-30 respondents, five strongly disagreed that information was conveyed clearly, one mostly disagreed, and one somewhat agreed (Figure 11). After the implementation of PPD-30, two respondents somewhat agreed, one respondent mostly agreed, and one respondent strongly agreed that information was being communicated clearly during briefings with the U.S. government (Figure 11).

Several pre-PPD-30 participants shared that they were often the ones briefing the U.S. government on their relative’s case. Families described providing videos, emails, or other forms of communication that they received from their relative’s captors with the FBI. Families expressed their frustration over the fact that the FBI very rarely shared new information with them regarding their relative’s case. Again, a similar source of frustration was shared when FBI agents would call the family and ask for updates instead of calling the family to update them on new information pertaining to their case.

After the implementation of PPD-30, information shared at U.S. government briefings was communicated clearly according to hostage families.

In addition to rarely learning anything new at government briefings, pre-PPD-30 families described U.S. officials as being “vague” and “non-committal,” and often deflecting responsibility. In one case, a family member reported receiving misinformation from a high-ranking U.S. government official, and felt that they were purposely sent in the wrong direction.

From the perspective of hostage families, the frequency and accuracy of U.S. government briefings overall have increased since the implementation of PPD-30.

Explanation of U.S. Government Roles

JWFLF asked participants if they had trouble understanding the roles of the individuals with whom they interacted with at meetings with the State Department, the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, OVA, and the HRFC.

In reference to the State Department, one pre-PPD-30 respondent strongly disagreed that they had a clear understanding of the roles of State Department officials, and another mostly disagreed while the remaining respondent neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 12).

After the implementation of PPD-30 and the creation of the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, post-PPD-30 respondents had a more positive response; two strongly agreed and two mostly agreed that they had a good understanding of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs’ role (Figure 12).

When JWFLF asked its participants if they had a good understanding of the roles of officials from FBI’s OVA, two pre-PPD-30 respondents strongly agreed and two mostly agreed that they had a good understanding of their roles whereas one somewhat agreed and one strongly disagreed. Among post-PPD-30 respondents, three strongly agreed that they had a good understanding of the role of OVA, and one mostly agreed, showing a great improvement (Figure 12).

With regard to the HRFC, one post-PPD-30 respondent strongly disagreed and one somewhat disagreed that they understood the individual roles at the HRFC. The remaining two respondents indicated that they somewhat agreed that they had a good understanding of individual roles at the HRFC (Figure 12).

Although family members did not elaborate on why they did not have a good understanding of the HRFC officials’ roles, it is possible family members of these particular cases interacted less with the HRFC and directed more of their interactions to their victim specialist and/or FBI agent. Several post-PPD-30 families indicated that they were given the option to continue to work with the original team they had established with an FBI Field Office and/or victim specialist, meaning these families had few substantive interactions with the HRFC.

Families expressed confusion over roles within U.S. government agencies even after the implementation of PPD-30.

Government Correspondence with Hostage Families

JWFLF asked its participants about the nature of their correspondence with the U.S. government post-PPD-30, specifically asking families:

• If all people on calls/meetings were introduced
• If any requests for meetings were denied
• If requests were denied, whether a reasonable explanation was given or if the call or meeting was rescheduled
• Whether all emails and calls answered within a reasonable amount of time ³³

According to post-PPD-30 respondents, all people on calls and in meetings with the HRFC, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, and Victims Assistance were introduced to them. Additionally, all individual respondents requested to be included on calls or in meetings were also allowed with the exception of one case where the family’s third party intermediary was not allowed in particular meetings with the HRFC. All respondents indicated that no requests for meetings were denied by the HRFC, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, or OVA.

Additionally, JWFLF asked its post-PPD-30 respondents if emails and calls were answered promptly by the HRFC, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, and OVA. Two respondents somewhat disagreed, while one mostly agreed, and one strongly agreed that the HRFC correspondence was prompt (Figure 13).

Among post-PPD-30 respondents, two mostly agreed and two strongly agreed that the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs’ correspondence was prompt. Two mostly agreed and two strongly agreed that FBI OVA’s correspondence was sufficient (Figure 13).

Pre-PPD-30 former hostages and families across the board expressed the importance of being treated with empathy and compassion by government officials, and that these officials should not be too focused on bureaucratic matters. One former hostage mentioned the necessity of having someone who has the ability to connect with hostages and their families, someone with “more of a personal touch” and who can manage “not to be detached.” Ultimately, family members do not want to be “placated” and insist on being “spoken to directly and not told how to feel.” Families do not want the government to “manage” their feelings and stressed how important “tone” is when communicating with a family.

Correspondence between the U.S. government and families of hostages have improved since the implementation of PPD-30.

JWFLF asked its participants if the State Department, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, OVA, or HRFC showed empathy and compassion throughout their interactions. The majority of pre-PPD-30 respondents (five of six) strongly disagreed that the State Department showed empathy and compassion, whereas one respondent (a former hostage themself), strongly agreed (Figure 14). The former hostage complimented the State Department, saying that they “went through the emotions” with them and their family.

After the implementation of PPD-30, all four respondents were unanimous in strongly agreeing that the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs was empathetic and compassionate (Figure 14). Families commonly said that “he was open, honest, and a wonderful addition to our support team.”

Pre-PPD-30 respondents who interacted with OVA shared a variety of responses; with one strongly disagreeing that OVA showed empathy, one somewhat agreeing, and two each mostly and strongly agreeing. One former hostage expressed their frustration over being told to live in a homeless shelter after sharing that they were having a difficult time finding an apartment upon their return. However, another former hostage shared that their victim specialist listened intently and was there for them when the hostage “needed them.” Ultimately, this individual felt that their victim specialist showed them that they “cared.” All four post-PPD-30 respondents strongly agreed that OVA was empathetic and compassionate (Figure 14).

Post-PPD-30 respondents also described the HRFC favorably. Three strongly agreed and one somewhat agreed that the HRFC showed empathy and compassion (Figure 14).

JWFLF also asked its participants if they felt understood and supported by the State Department, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, OVA, and the HRFC. Before the implementation of PPD-30, the majority of pre-PPD-30 respondents (five of six), strongly disagreed, whereas one (again, a former hostage) strongly agreed that they felt understood and supported by the State Department. After the implementation of PPD-30, two respondents mostly agreed and two respondents strongly agreed that they felt understood and supported by the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (Figure 15).

The majority of pre-PPD-30 respondents either somewhat agreed (three) or strongly agreed (two) that they felt understood and supported by OVA. After the implementation of PPD-30, all respondents either mostly agreed (one) or strongly agreed (three) that they felt understood and supported by OVA (Figure 15). Regarding the HRFC, one respondent somewhat disagreed that they felt understood and supported, whereas, three strongly agreed that they felt understood and supported (Figure 15).

After the implementation of PPD-30, former hostages and their families are being treated with more empathy and compassion and generally feel better understood and supported by the U.S. government.

One of the most emotionally charged issues for JWFLF’s participants was the fact that their or their relative’s kidnapper(s) and/or murderer(s) have not been taken into U.S. custody nor have they been brought back to the United States to face prosecution in a federal court for their crimes. PPD-30 states:

The United States shall diligently seek to ensure that hostage-takers of U.S. nationals are arrested, prosecuted, and punished through a due process criminal justice system in the United States or abroad for crimes related to the hostage-taking.³⁴

Several participants reported that they continue to press the government to bring kidnappers associated with their case to justice. In one instance, a former hostage was told that their case had been closed by the FBI due to a lack of evidence. However, the FBI did state that they would reopen the case if new evidence were to surface. Other participants indicated that they have been working closely with the FBI, the HRFC, and the DOJ. Several families commented, however, that they would like to see the DOJ hold their hostage-takers accountable and bring them to justice in federal court.

JWFLF asked its participants:

• Has the kidnapper been arrested or captured?
• Has the kidnapper been prosecuted?
• Has the kidnapper been convicted?
• (If yes to conviction) Has the kidnapper been convicted of crimes related to the hostage-taking?³⁵

Of the 14 hostage cases, there were five cases where kidnappers were arrested or captured. Of the five cases, the kidnappers in two sets of cases overlapped. In only one case was the kidnapper prosecuted. However, there were no cases where kidnappers were convicted, either for unrelated crimes or crimes related to the hostage-taking (Figure 16).

Former hostages and family members of hostage victims want their kidnappers prosecuted and brought to justice.

It is important to note that these findings are not representative of all cases involving the kidnapping of U.S. nationals. While the exact number of prosecutions and convictions are unclear, the U.S. government has been successful in charging and convicting hostage-takers in the past,³⁶ with other cases currently ongoing.³⁷ The relative scarcity of arrests and convictions is likely the result of a variety of factors. Kidnappers and their associates, often fugitives in foreign countries, are difficult to identify, locate, and arrest. In some cases, the United States is able to work with foreign law enforcement, but in others, where civil wars and other conflicts have eroded state authority, the United States lacks viable partners to support arrests and extradition. Even if the kidnappers are found and arrested, U.S. prosecutors face significant evidentiary challenges in acquiring witnesses and physical evidence tying the kidnappers to the abduction or captivity of U.S. nationals. In addition, any information that the government has connecting these individuals to terrorist groups and kidnappings is often classified, creating another barrier to public prosecutions in federal courts.

While conviction in federal courts is often the most satisfying result for families, it is not the only form of justice for hostage-takers. Those who have taken U.S. nationals hostage may be prosecuted and convicted in foreign courts.³⁸ They are sometimes killed in U.S. counterterrorism operations overseas.³⁹ Early research on kidnapping indicates that the suppression of kidnapping organizations through arrests and convictions has an important “discouraging effect” on future kidnappings.⁴⁰ Increased efforts to bring the kidnappers of U.S. nationals to justice are important, not only to support the families of their victims, but also to protect Americans overseas.

Update at 1:21pm, June 25, 2019: This report has been updated to note that the Office for Victim Assistance (OVA) became the Victim Services Division in 2018 and victim services specialists were renamed victim services coordinators.