Appendix: Yemen and the WPR

On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of nine Arab states, with logistical support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, launched an intervention on behalf of the internationally-recognized government of Yemen. The Trump administration notified Congress that “United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, have continued to provide military advice and limited information, logistics, and other support to regional forces combating the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. U.S. forces are present in Saudi Arabia for this purpose.”1

On December 13, 2018, shortly after the murder of journalist Jamal Khasogghi, the Senate voted to adopt S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution to “direct the removal of United States Armed forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.”2 The legislation invoked Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act FY84 and FY85 rather than the WPR.3 The bill specifically noted “This joint resolution shall not affect any military operations directed at Al Qaeda,” and was intended to apply specifically to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition’s operations against the Houthis. S.J.Res. 54 passed the Senate 56-41, but no action was taken in the House before the end of the 115th Congress. Section 1013 expedited procedures only apply in the Senate, so the resolution was not privileged in the House.4

On a parallel track, Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) introduced H.ConRes. 138 in the House in September 2018. This legislation specifically referenced Section 8(c) of the WPR, which the bill language noted “defines the introduction of United States Armed Forces to include ‘the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.”5

Similar legislation regarding U.S. support for the coalition’s war in Yemen had been introduced in Congress from 2015 through 2017, but had not passed.

In January 2019 at the start of the 116th Congress, Rep. Khanna introduced H.J.Res. 37, with identical language to S.J.Res.54. This time, the bill passed the House in February 2019, 248-177. Sen. Sanders introduced a companion bill in the Senate, S.J.Res. 7, which passed with bipartisan support 53-45.6

President Trump vetoed the legislation in April 2019, asserting in his veto message that “this resolution is an unnecessary, dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities, endangering the lives of American citizens and brave service members, both today and in the future.”7 The administration had also expressed disagreement with the legislation over the meaning of hostilities in the WPR. A letter from acting general counsel to the State Department asserted that hostilities are only “a situation in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces,” which is not happening in the campaign against the Houthis.8

Citations
  1. White House Statements & Releases, “Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,” December 7, 2018, source.
  2. S.J.Res.54, 115th Congress (2018), source
  3. Congressional Research Service, Congress and the War in Yemen, p.57
  4. Congressional Research Service, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice, p. 58
  5. H.Con.Res.138, 115th Congress (2018), source.
  6. S.J.Res.7, 116th Congress (2019), source.
  7. Mark Landler and Peter Baker, “Trump Vetoes Measure to Force End to U.S. Involvement in Yemen War,” The New York Times, April 16, 2019, source.
  8. Acting General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Letter to Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, February 27, 2018, source; Scott R. Anderson and Molly E. Reynolds, “Putting the Yemen Resolution in Procedural Context,” Lawfare, March 9, 2018, source.

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