Part I: U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance

The U.S. government distinguishes among a number of different programs that fall under the umbrella of security cooperation, including security force assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and security sector assistance.¹ While this terminology may be useful at the technical level, at the policy level, it tends to obscure the broader picture. This section considers programs that provide militiary training, advising, and equipment to allied and partner militaries, using terms like security cooperation and security assistance interchangeably to refer to such programs.²

According to Security Assistance Monitor, in 2019 the United States had 167 security aid programs with 87 recipients with a total of $18.81 billion in funding.³ The United States also had 20 training programs in 137 countries with a total of more than 14,000 trainees. Since 2013, these U.S. training programs have produced more than 485,000 trainees.⁴ Funding for foreign security assistance has more than doubled in the budget since 9/11, reflecting how these programs were ramped up in the context of the Global War on Terror.⁵

Title 22 authorities fall under State Department auspices, while Title 10 authorities are controlled by the Department of Defense (DoD).⁶

For each program, this report includes a short description of what it does, the stated purpose of the program, how the program is authorized, which agencies are involved in implementation of the program, and Fiscal Year 2020 (FY20) funding levels.

The Washington Office on Latin America’s (WOLA) Defense Oversight Research Database provides an up-to-date guide on all authorities and programs through which the United States provides assistance to foreign military, police, or paramilitary forces.⁷

• International Military Education and Training (IMET):
  • Description: IMET provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and security partner countries.⁸ IMET funds training for non-U.S. personnel at U.S. facilities and outside of the United States for professional military education and technical training.⁹
  • Purpose: IMET is intended to strengthen partner forces’ capabilities and enhance interoperability for joint operation, enhance mil-mil relations, provide professional military education, increase understanding and communication between the United States and its security partners, and provide training to foreign personnel around human rights and the importance of democratic values such as the military’s role in a civilian-led government.¹⁰
  • Authorization/Implementation: Authorized by Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. The State Department determines which countries will have IMET programs, but programs are implemented by DoD.¹¹
  • FY20 Funding: $100 million¹²

• International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE):
  • Description: INCLE “provides equipment, training and services to foreign countries for counternarcotics and anti-crime efforts,” including law enforcement training and in limited instances, weaponry to provide defensive arms to aircraft used in counternarcotics operations, although a 15-day congressional notification is required in these instances. INCLE funds may also provide economic development assistance.¹³
  • Purpose: To support country- and global-level law enforcement programs to counteract transnational crime including money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism-related issues. INCLE funds support programs like the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.¹⁴
  • Authorization/Implementation: Authorized by section 481 of the FAA of 1961. Overseen by the State Department.
  • FY20 Funding: $945.35 million¹⁵

• Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (see Part II for more):
  • Description: FMF provides other countries with grants and loans to make government-to-government purchases of U.S-made defense articles and defense-related services via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program (see Part II). FMF also less frequently funds Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) between other countries and private U.S. companies.¹⁶
  • Purpose: FMF is intended to enhance the military capabilities of security partners; promote coalition efforts, especially in counter-terrorism and enhance interoperability; and support the U.S. industrial base.¹⁷
  • Appropriation/Implementation: Authorized by the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. The State Department determines which countries have an FMF program; FMF is implemented by DoD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).¹⁸
  • FY20 Funding: $5,370.9 million¹⁹

• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO):
  • Description: Supports regional stability operations and multilateral peacekeeping that is not funded through the UN.²⁰
  • Purpose: In spite of its name, this program is often used to support East African forces conducting counter-terrorism operations, for example against al-Shabaab in Somalia.²¹
  • Authorization/Implementation: Authorized under section 551 of the FAA.²²
  • FY20 Funding: $291,435 million

• Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related Programs (NADR):
  • Description: NADR provides support for U.S. security assistance efforts to police, military, and civilian government actors.
  • Purpose: NADR provides assistance in four areas: counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, regional stability, and humanitarian assistance. Programs supported by NADR include the Humanitarian Demining Program and the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, which provides CT training to law enforcement agencies in other countries.
  • Authorization/Implementation: Authorized by section 571 of the FAA;²³ overseen by the State Department.²⁴
  • FY20 Funding: $707.15 million²⁵

• Train and Equip Authority (section 1206/section 2282)—availability of these funds expired in late 2017; these authorities have been subsumed by Section 333 (see below):
  • Description: Section 1206/2282 authority provided DoD the authority to provide equipment, training, and transportation to foreign military and security forces to perform counter-terrorism operations or participate in stability operations with U.S. armed forces. Section 1206 train and equip funding was appropriated through the DoD Operations and Maintenance account.²⁶
  • Purpose: From 2005 through 2009, train and equip funds were primarily allocated towards counter-terrorism equipment and training. Starting in FY12, some funds shifted towards cooperation in stability operations with U.S. forces, especially for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
  • Appropriation/Implementation: Temporary authority consistently renewed by Congress since 2005. Implemented by DoD, but the Secretary of State must provide concurrence.²⁷

• Building Partner Capacity (Section 333):
  • Description: Replacing section 1206, section 333 train and equip authorities allow for training and equipping partner country security forces for counter-terrorism operations, counter-transnational crime operations, and other security operations including international coalition operations in the interests of the United States.
  • Authority/Implementation: Authorized under Title 10. Programs require the concurrence of DoD and the State Department.²⁸
  • FY20 Funding: $1,208.729 million

• Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF):
  • Description: The CCIF allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to provide funds to combatant commanders upon request for unforeseen contingencies, prioritizing “activities that would enhance the war fighting capability, readiness, and sustainability of the forces assigned to the commander requesting the funds.” Authorized activities related to foreign forces include joint exercises and military education and training.²⁹
  • Purpose: CCIF is intended to build U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities in partner countries, build interoperability with partner forces, enhance partner countries’ counter-terrorism capabilities, and build mil-mil contacts.³⁰
  • Funding/Implementation: Authorized by Section 166a. Implemented by DoD/combatant commanders.

• Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF):
  • Description: GSCF provides the State and DoD with flexible funding pooled across the agencies to support capacity building for allies and security partners. GSCF “provides train and equip assistance to enhance the capabilities” of partner militaries and security forces and to participate in military operations consistent with U.S. policy objectives.
  • Purpose: Increase U.S. flexibility to respond to security challenges; build partner capacity to confront shared challenges; develop independent security partners.³¹
  • Authority/Implementation: Authorized in the FY12 NDAA; a joint program with DoD managed by the State Department. State transfers appropriations to the GSCF from FMF, INCLE, and peacekeeping operations programs. DoD transfers its share of appropriations to GSCF from the operations and maintenance account. Per the authorizing legislation, DoD can contribute no more than 80 percent of the annual GSCF budget, while the State Department must contribute at least 20 percent.³²

• Section 127E:
  • Description: Formerly known as Section 1208 funding, Section 127E authorizes DoD to support foreign forces, irregular groups, or individuals engaged in supporting counter-terrorism operations conducted by U.S. SOF.³³
  • Purpose: Section 127E funding has reportedly been used to fund classified special operations programs.³⁴

• Section 1202:
  • Description: Section 1202 funding authorizes DoD support to foreign forces, irregular forces, or individuals supporting irregular warfare operations by U.S. SOF.³⁵
  • Purpose: This authority is intended to build capacity to counter U.S. adversaries in “grey zone” conflicts.³⁶

• Joint Combined Exchange Trainings (JCET):
  • Description: JCET authorizes training deployments for U.S. SOF to train alongside the armed forces of partner countries, which typically “resemble joint exercises, with some coursework.”³⁷ JCET has received criticism for human rights abuses allegedly carried out by foreign troops who received training.³⁸
  • Purpose: The main purpose of JCET trainings must be to train U.S. forces, but JCET funds can also cover the expenses incurred by the partner country’s forces as a result of the training.
  • Authorization/Implementation: Authorized by section 322 of Title 10, U.S. Code, as amended.³⁹ Implemented by DoD.
  • FY20 Funding: $59.006 million⁴⁰

There are several country- and region-specific funds authorized under Title 10 as well. Examples of such funds include:⁴¹

• Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)
• Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)
• PKO/African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP)
• Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)

Formerly known as the “NATO Mutual Support Act,” the ACSA statute allows DoD to “acquire logistics support, supplies, and services directly from or provide them to a foreign government or organization.”⁴² ACSAs therefore allow for the transfer of military supplies and logistics support to partner country militaries outside of the security force assistance programs listed above, and instead fall within DoD’s appropriated budget.

According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Such logistics support ‘transfers’ come into play primarily during wartime, combined exercises, training, deployments, contingency operations, humanitarian or foreign disaster relief operations, certain peace operations under the UN Charter, or for unforeseen or exigent circumstances. As a result, ACSA authority is almost always exercised by the Unified Combatant Commands.”⁴³

ACSAs are negotiated on a bilateral basis between the United States and its NATO allies or other security partners. The agreement must be negotiated and signed before a partner may receive U.S. transfers. ACSAs are not intended to be a grant program; rather, they “must primarily benefit the interest of DoD forward deployed commands and forces.” They are not supposed to be a routine source of supply and may not be used when the desired service or materiel is available via U.S. commercial services.⁴⁴ As of the end of FY18, the United States had 118 ACSAs.⁴⁵

The United States provided aerial refueling to Saudi-led coalition aircraft in Yemen under an ACSA, although DoD later said that refueling occurred for at least a year before an ACSA with Saudi Arabia was formally in place.⁴⁶

The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) is the legislative cornerstone of U.S. foreign assistance programs and policies.⁴⁷ Section 502B of the FAA directs that “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”⁴⁸

As part of the annual budget proposal, section 502B directs the Secretary of State to provide Congress with “a full and complete report… regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance.”⁴⁹ Congress can also request reporting from the State Department under 502B. After requesting such reporting, Congress can “adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for such a country.”⁵⁰

The Leahy Law consists of two statutory provisions—one that applies to the State Department (section 620M of the 1961 FAA) and one to the Department of Defense (Section 362, Title 10 of the U.S. Code)—that prohibit funding to units of foreign security forces where there is credible information that implicates the unit in gross violations of human rights (GVHRs).⁵¹

GVHRs include:

• Torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
• Prolonged detention without charges or trial;
• Disappearing persons;
• War crimes;
• Crimes against humanity
• Evidence of acts that may constitute genocide; and,
• “Other flagrant denial of the right of life, liberty, or the security of the person.”⁵²

The Department of State is tasked with vetting a unit and its commander when the unit is designated to receive assistance. The U.S. embassy in the unit’s home country is in charge of initial vetting, while the Department of State typically conducts an additional analysis, using both open source and classified documents.

Exceptions that allow the resumption of assistance to a unit under the DoD statute include:

• If the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State determines that a country is taking remedial steps; or,
• If U.S. assistance is needed to assist in national security or humanitarian emergencies.

1. Recommendation: Reporting Requirements and Hearings on SFA Programs

Congress has periodically written “reporting requirements” into the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and other relevant legislation that require agencies like the State Department and DoD to submit reports to Congress on specified topics. The annual NDAA is considered a “must-pass,” meaning it “provides a vehicle for mandating what committees otherwise seek through informal means.”⁵³ While reporting requirements do not directly alter how security assistance programs are implemented, they can provide Congress and the public with important information on the management and effectiveness of U.S. security cooperation.

Congress can also hold public hearings with public officials to elicit information about the implementation and effectiveness of security assistance programs and to identify and bring public attention to potential issues.⁵⁴ Congress can use hearings, requests for information, and other mechanisms of informal influence to change the public narrative, test political assumptions, and more transparently define the costs and benefits of these programs.⁵⁵

ACSA Reporting Requirements. Congress may include reporting requirements for ACSAs. A recent GAO report found that the DoD’s poor recordkeeping and late notifications from the State Department “have limited the accuracy and timeliness of information provided by Congress on ACSA.”⁵⁶ Management weaknesses mean that DoD has not been able to obtain reimbursement from security partners for “thousands of orders…valued at more than $1 billion as of November 2019.”⁵⁷ The GAO recommended that Congress require DoD to improve oversight and seek payment from foreign partners for overdue orders.

For example, as of September 2019, Saudi Arabia reportedly had not paid back $181 million that it owed for aerial refueling services that facilitated airstrikes in Yemen. Pentagon attorneys told Congress that United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) provision of aerial refueling services for Saudi Arabian aircraft was operating under a provisional ACSA that had not been finalized and therefore Congress had not been notified.⁵⁸ Congress could require detailed reporting on such cases and hold public hearings.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Security Assistance. Several analysts have noted that there is little analytical clarity around whether security assistance is actually effective in achieving its stated goals. In part, this is a question of priorities: Policymakers have associated a number of objectives with security force assistance, from inducement to promote cooperation and interoperability with U.S. forces to building partner capabilities and ability to deal with mutually shared threats. Often these priorities are in tension. Furthermore, the success of these programs is empirically difficult to measure.⁵⁹

Congress could include a requirement for security assistance programs that the relevant agency must clearly lay out what the program is intended to achieve and a set of corresponding metrics of effectiveness. Congress could include funding in each program’s budget that is explicitly earmarked for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E). AM&E should specifically evaluate whether programs and transfers meet their stated goals. This would increase transparency around these programs and give members of Congress the ability to eliminate programs that aren’t working without jeopardizing U.S. policy objectives.

For example, the FY16 NDAA added requirements that DoD must establish a monitoring and evaluation framework.⁶⁰ In response, DoD released its Instruction on Monitoring and Evaluation the following year.⁶¹ Some have noted that while these requirements are a good first step, they still fall short of the more stringent requirements placed on U.S. foreign aid.⁶² Additionally, military advising and other forms of operational support are not subjected to the same level of evaluation.⁶³

2. Recommendation: Conditions/Restrictions on Security Assistance

Congress can restrict or place conditions on how U.S. security assistance is used by allies and security partners. Such conditions can discourage allies or security partners from pursuing particular policies. To take one example, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) filed an amendment to the FY21 NDAA that would prohibit Israel from using U.S. security assistance funding to facilitate the annexation of territory in the West Bank.⁶⁴

3. Recommendation: Use Section 502B of the FAA and the Leahy Law to Enforce Human Rights Provisions

The president must make a declaration in order for Section 502B of the FAA to take effect, cutting off aid to a country in the case of human rights violations. However, the executive branch has never complied with this provision.⁶⁵ The Leahy Law was written because section 502B was seen as too expansive and rarely implemented.

However, 502B does provide an expedited route for Congress to request reporting on human rights violations from the State Department. Section 502B(c) authorizes either the House or Senate, or HFAC or SFRC, to request a report laying out a country’s record on human rights, the steps the United States has taken to promote rights in the country, and whether “in the opinion of the Secretary of State… extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continuation of security assistance” for the country.⁶⁶ If Congress does not receive the report within the 30-day window, “no security assistance shall be delivered” to that country until the report is submitted. Once Congress has received the report, Congress can “adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance” for the country.⁶⁷ Congress can write the restrictions in this legislation as broadly or narrowly as it likes. The joint resolution is considered privileged—privileged matters interrupt the normal course of business, and therefore come up through the relevant committees for a floor vote in a more expedited manner. Because it is guaranteed to receive a floor vote, privileged legislation can be useful because it requires members of Congress to go on the record on their position via their vote—this, in turn, means that each member will need to learn about the issue and gives constituents the opportunity to weigh in. Additionally, floor votes tend to generate more media coverage and public awareness of the issue.

Holding a vote on such legislation can be useful even if it fails to pass or is vetoed by the president, by registering Congress’s disapproval and shining light on an issue. For example, in June 2019, Sens. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Todd Young (R-Ind.) introduced a privileged resolution to request such a report on Saudi Arabia after Secretary of State Pompeo declared an emergency in order to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.⁶⁸ The senators hoped to use the legislation to force a vote in accordance with 502B(c).⁶⁹

While other members of Congress have recently introduced similar legislation, Section 502B(c) does not “appear to have been used to any meaningful effect in recent years,” according to Lawfare’s Scott Anderson.⁷⁰ Notably, this may be because 502B(c) “raises constitutional concerns.”⁷¹

Finally, via the appropriations process, Congress can increase funding for Leahy vetting through funding for Diplomacy and Consular Programs (D&CP) funds for the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.⁷²

4. Recommendation: Shift Focus from Equipment to Training

One of the primary goals of U.S. security force assistance is to build partners’ capacity. Yet U.S. security force assistance has tended to emphasize the provision of materiel over training. On the demand side, many partner governments want access to cutting-edge military equipment as a mark of status and prestige.⁷³ At the same time, on the supply side, the military-industrial complex creates incentives for Congress to facilitate weapons sales abroad. However, training may be relatively more effective in professionalizing partner militaries, ensuring that they actually have the technical capability to effectively use the weapons they acquire, and discouraging human rights violations.

In order to shift the relative emphasis in U.S. security force towards training, Congress can appropriate more funding to IMET rather than FMF, and can include line-items in appropriations bills requiring assistance to be non-lethal or focused on training.