A Deeper Look at Patron Interests: The Logic of Gulf State Interventions

Patron capacity depends, in part, on the nature of client social networks. But capacity is only one element to the proxy-client relationship; the other is the objectives and goals of the patron. If the patron’s and client’s interests are fundamentally at odds, factors like client cohesion matter little. However, patron goals are themselves influenced by the character of solidarity networks and their transnational ties.

This section describes the logic underlying the interventions of the Gulf states, who were the most important backers of the armed opposition. The respective logics of intervention were strikingly divergent, leading eventually to the development of the two main axes of support: a U.S.-Saudi-Jordanian axis and a Turkish-Qatari axis. This division in turn led to battlefield incoherence that undermined the opposition’s ability to withstand the regime’s onslaught. The logic of intervention was rooted in the intervening power’s geopolitical interests, its domestic concerns, and its prewar ties with Syrian networks.

This section does not discuss Turkey and Jordan, the other key regional backers, but they followed lines similar to the Gulf states: Turkey was closely aligned with Qatar, while Jordan pursued a strategy similar to Saudi Arabia’s. The United States operated within the Saudi-Jordanian axis.

In the beginning, Saudi Arabia adopted an anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary stance toward the Arab Spring in order to prevent the winds of political change from blowing across its borders. The threat to Riyadh came in two forms. The first stemmed from Saudi Arabia’s experience confronting jihadi Salafi networks that emerged from the ashes of the failed 1990s Sahwa movement. In the late 1990’s, a splinter group of ex-Sahwi activists merged with a strand of Albani followers and those from Bin Laden’s network to form a local al-Qaʿeda franchise. Between 2002 and 2006, this outfit waged a low-level insurgency in the kingdom that left more than 200 dead and 500 wounded.¹ Though the group lacked a popular base, it managed to strike vital targets such as U.S. interests and petroleum infrastructure.² At the same time, the rise of al-Qaʿeda in Iraq across the border raised the prospect of a multi-pronged threat to Saudi interests.

The second and more serious threat came from the potential of the pro-democracy movement in Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere spreading to Saudi Arabia and challenging the monarchy’s grip on power. After stamping out the Sahwa in the 1990s, the regime did its best to prevent the movement’s resurgence by rehabilitating key Sahwi leaders on the condition that they limit their critiques to the social arena (such as opposing women’s right to drive) and remain silent on political questions. At the same time, the palace undertook a rapprochement with foreign branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were allowed to return to the kingdom or intensify their activities so long as they were directed internationally.³ These policies bore fruit in the early days of the Arab Spring, as Sahwa and Muslim Brotherhood figures in country almost unanimously boycotted calls by local activists to hold a March 11, 2011 “Day of Anger” protest in solidarity with the revolutions around the region. ⁴

Upon the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Riyadh was faced with a delicate predicament. On the one hand, the regime welcomed any development that might weaken an ally of Iran, its regional rival. On the other, the palace recognized that the rise of al-Qaʿeda was in part blowback from Riyadh’s earlier policy of nurturing the Muslim Brotherhood at home and supporting the jihad in Afghanistan. Moreover, it viewed the pro-democracy sentiments of the uprising with grave concern. For these reasons, Saudi Arabia avoided intervening in Syria during the first year of the conflict. In 2012, it slowly waded into the foray, primarily supporting secular groups and some Brotherhood factions as a means of limiting the strength of Activist Salafist groups. During 2012, though, the Brotherhood began to pull closer to Qatar, and the Saudis started to lose their influence over the group. The election of the Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi as president of Egypt raised the specter of a reinvigorated Sahwa movement within Saudi borders, pushing Riyadh to sharply alter course. By the end of 2012, Saudi Arabia had largely excluded Brotherhood and activist Salafi networks from its patronage—bringing it into direct competition with Qatar.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar has never faced a strong grassroots opposition movement, nor does it share borders with fragile states, reducing the threat of jihadist spillover.⁵ On the contrary, Qatar’s foreign policy is driven by splits and rivalries within Doha’s ruling class—divisions that have been exacerbated by Saudi rulers. The Saudi royal family is tied by kinship to Qatar’s second most powerful tribe, the al-Attiya clan; historically, Riyadh used these links to wield influence over Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, Qatar’s emir from 1972 to 1995, who had married into the al-Attiya family. But Khalifa’s son, Hamid bin Khalifa, was an opponent of Saudi influence and refused to marry into the al-Attiya. In 1995, he led a coup against his father, signaling Doha’s attempt to steer a course independent of Saudi domination. Riyadh in turn retaliated by sponsoring a number of failed coup attempts.⁶

Hamid bin Khalifa also drifted closer to the U.S. orbit, as epitomized by the official opening of al-Udeid air base in March 2002. In October 2002, reports claimed that domestic opposition to Doha’s growing alliance with the U.S. led to a botched coup attempt led by factions within the royal family. Later in 2009, conservatives led by the Chief of Staff of Qatar’s Armed Forces General Hamid bin ali al-Attiya purportedly launched another failed coup attempt. There are indications that these oppositional ruling class factions were linked to Salafist networks in the country.⁷ Rather than risk confrontation with factions in the ruling elite, Hamid bin Khalifa attempted to placate these groups by making support for the Brotherhood and activist Salafis a core plank of his regime’s foreign policy, while awarding top government posts to figures with Activist sympathies.⁸ The strategy served the additional purpose of agitating Saudi Arabia by supporting its enemies abroad—forcing Riyadh to confront Qatar’s actions on foreign fronts rather than exert pressure on Doha at home.

There was an additional domestic benefit to the al-Thani regime’s support of the Brotherhood: While most Qataris practice Wahhabism, and the ruling al-Thani clan hails from the same Najd region as the Saudi elite, Doha’s embrace of the Brotherhood was in part an attempt to build an alternative form of religious legitimacy that could not be manipulated by Riyadh.⁹

For these reasons, during the Syrian revolution, Qatar was the principal supporter of Brotherhood and activist networks—and occasionally, even Salafist jihadis like Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaʿeda's official branch in Syria. During the first six months of 2012, Qatar and Saudi Arabia attempted to cooperate and channel funds to some of the same groups; however, by the summer of that year Doha’s largesse and historic ties with Islamist actors enabled it to wrest control of Brotherhood and activist networks. By 2013 the countries were in open competition. While Riyadh sought primarily to manage the uprising, hoping (along with the United States) for a Yemen-style solution where Assad would step down via a negotiated settlement that preserved the country’s institutions and key power brokers, Doha carelessly pumped funds to its favored networks.

While the Saudi and Qatari states directly intervened in Syria, the Kuwaiti state took a hands-off approach, ceding the ground to civil society, which quickly became a key fundraising circuit during the revolution. Kuwait’s tradition of parliamentary democracy and freedom of assembly, dating to 1962, created a thriving civil society with robust protections against state surveillance, allowing charities and political parties to channel aid without interference from law enforcement.¹⁰

A key fault line in Kuwaiti society is between the Sunni and Shia urban elite on the one hand, and newly urbanized Sunni tribespeople from the desert regions on the other. These recent tribal arrivals have faced stigmatization—a subset of this population, known as bidun (those without) have yet to be granted citizenship. This divide has led many tribespeople to gravitate toward the Muslim Brotherhood and activist Salafist movements. The urban elite, on the other hand, tend to support loyalist Salafist discourse backed by the ruling Sabah monarchy and Riyadh. ¹¹

The Kuwaiti Salafist scene is split into activist and loyalist currents. The most important loyalist group is the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), which enjoys ties to the Kuwaiti and Saudi states. On the activist side are groups like the Salafist Movement and the al-Umma party. Leading activists include Hakim al-Mutairi, an important Sururi thinker, as well as Shafi al-ʿAjmi and Hajaj al-ʿAjmi; all three would become major fundraising conduits for groups like Ahrar al-Sham during the Syrian revolution. RIHS and other loyalist groups, meanwhile, would largely fall in line with Riyadh and back Saudi-sponsored groups such as the Authenticity and Development Front and Liwa al-Islam.¹²