Table of Contents
- Foreword
- Executive Summary
- 1. Introduction
- 2. A Brief Examination of U.S. Hostage Policy: 1960’s–Today
- 3. Methods, Limitations, and Definitions
- 4. Perceptions of the U.S. Government’s Hostage Recovery Enterprise
- 5. Key Concerns Among Hostage and Unlawful or Wrongful Detainee Families
- 6. Conclusion
- Appendix A: Requests Regarding Mental Health, Physical, and Financial Support for Returning Hostages and Unlawful or Wrongful Detainees
- Appendix B: Hostage Interview Responses
- Appendix C: Unlawful or Wrongful Detainee Interview Responses
Foreword
I am honored to write the foreword to the 2021 edition of Bringing Americans Home. This is a pivotal year for the effort to bring Americans home safely.
Much of the news from the U.S. government is encouraging. This year brought to office the third consecutive president committed to the reforms agreed in 2015. With the Robert Levinson Hostage-Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act now codified into law—enacted under one president and Congress and now being implemented under their successors—the institutions and policies important to bringing Americans home have the stability needed to grow.
Too many Americans remain in prisons and unknown locations, however. Every day that they are gone is a loss for all of us who care about the safety of our fellow citizens. The Biden administration has pledged strong support for their return. Many of the officials involved now lived through the searing failures that gave rise to the 2015 policy, supported that policy, and have pledged to do their best. As the new administration puts in place its policies and people there will be many opportunities to see that the return of Americans is a priority in practice. The James W. Foley Legacy Foundation will have much to say about how well that works, and it will have much to contribute as well.
Two systematic challenges stand out. The first concerns the treatment of Americans held illegitimately by foreign governments. When the 2015 reforms were put in place much of the focus was on Americans held by non-state actors. This made sense. The hostage structures were new, and these Americans and their families needed a voice and partner dedicated to them. The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC), headquartered at the FBI and with representatives from all relevant agencies, put much of its effort into these cases.
Even in the initial mandate of the presidential envoy’s office, however, it was made clear that some Americans detained abroad by governments would receive help from the office. These Americans, just like those being held by nongovernmental groups, were being held illegitimately and often because those detaining them wanted something from the United States. Just as with hostage families, their families needed support within the U.S. government to understand their options and advocate for the safe return of their loved ones. And when these Americans returned home, they needed the same help that former hostages did, with medical care, government documents, and the practical problems of lives interrupted.
From the start, the principals of the department consulted quickly about how to address these situations. Many cases were handled, often very well, through traditional diplomatic channels, while others came to the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA) office. Over time, more cases and conversations followed, and successive administrations learned more about how to do better.
Problems remained. The families and cases often arrived at the office informally, and after months or years. The cases were subject to different rules on information sharing than those of people held by nongovernmental groups, and this made it difficult to cooperate with the families and communities hoping to support their loved ones. There also were relatively few U.S. government resources available automatically to help families and people returning from detention by governments. (Most routinely available U.S. government resources came from the Department of Justice and were available when someone was named as having been the victim of a criminal act such as kidnapping.) The State Department stood up its own, comparable system, which depended on extraordinary interventions from senior officials. This often came long after someone had been detained.
We were learning as we went. I—and I believe my successors, Robert O’Brien and Roger Carstens—felt that after some experience we knew enough to change the rules. The Levinson Act provides an opportunity to do this. As Bringing Americans Home makes clear, some changes to State Department regulations will make it easier to share information and should make available resources that will help families and people returning. We will see in 2022 whether the promise of these changes has been met and that a regular process has replaced improvisation.
A second challenge is that the successes too often are treated as unusual or idiosyncratic. They are in fact a pattern that should be talked about and repeated. Across conflict zones since 2015, in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan at least, we have seen that Americans come home when U.S. negotiators place priority on their return.
There is an interesting point worth emphasizing. The safe return of Americans helps the pursuit of peace. The release of a prisoner, especially a non-combatant journalist, aid worker, or businessperson, is an irreversible, simple step that can be taken early without prejudicing larger issues in the negotiation. It establishes credibility without straining the enterprise.
I saw this around the world years before becoming the hostage envoy. In one instance, the Bosnian peace talks were essentially stopped for days while Serb authorities were asked to release an American journalist. The calculation from the lead international negotiator was simple: If the other side could not order soldiers to release one person it would probably not order the same soldiers to surrender territory. Every negotiator should be asked to evaluate whether he or she can make the same effort and, if not, to explain why not.
Fortunately, there will be a vibrant community making this case, and this is another welcome development evident in this report. The James W. Foley Legacy Foundation, Hostage US, and newer groups bring rich experience to discussions of how Americans and others can come home safely. They have earned their knowledge, often at the cost of terrible tragedy and always from careful study and application to the issues at hand. Families can rely on this community, and—after their years of experience—government officials would be wise to regard them as partners and advisers as well.
The existence of this community, brought together in organizations like the Foley Foundation, means that Americans can rely not just on individuals but on institutions, in government and outside of it. The U.S. administration and Congress, in successive terms, have signaled that they are committed to maintaining what has been gained and to improving further. And the Foley Foundation shows how a community can come together to hold the government to its promises. Together they can help Americans come home to live safely. That is how it should be.
James C. O’Brien
Former Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs