Conclusion: The Possibilities and Limits of Reform

We have laid out reasons both for optimism and caution about how proportional representation and multipartyism would change our institutions. While we believe proportional representation would lessen partisan animosity in the mass public, largely end gerrymandering, and more fairly translate election results into legislative seats, the true effect of having multiple parties in our governing institutions is more difficult to predict.

Based on the experience of other countries, we think it would lead to two-bloc politics in Congress that would be somewhat similar to the dynamics of American congressional politics of the mid-twentieth century. While we are hopeful that some of the new parties would be more willing to break with the left and right blocs than intraparty factions are in the current system, free-roaming parties could also create instability like we saw in the 118th Congress.

If proportional representation is going to transform our governance in a way that improves the status quo, we need to implement changes in our institutions to accommodate it. In this paper, we focused on the House, where change is necessary both to incentivize more fluid coalition-building and to hedge against the chaos and instability that could accompany greater pluralism. Future research should focus on how multipartyism would work in other governing institutions.

This paper contributes to the broader conversation about multiparty democracy in the United States. We highlight several key points.

1. Proportional representation and multipartyism might affect electoral outcomes and governance outcomes in different ways. Arguments that they will make our politics more representative, the electorate more engaged, and lessen the all-or-nothing binary do not necessarily imply that they will make governance any easier.
2. The two-party system has never been able to deliver partisan governance due to the inherent pluralism in a large and diverse nation like the United States. This underlying pluralism is stifled by the binary nature of two-party politics, but it could be unleashed in a multiparty system.
3. The United States would be a presidential multiparty system, which usually have pre-electoral coalitions of left parties and right parties. As such, the new system would have more similarities to the existing system than is commonly acknowledged. We expect a more factionalized two-bloc system centered around presidential politics.
4. The history of the House and experiences in other countries provide some guidance for how a multiparty House could both take advantage of greater pluralism to unlock new policy coalitions and curb its tendency to cause chaos. Decentralization similar to what we had in the mid-twentieth century Congress would allow for more fluid coalition-building.
5. The House is the most obvious fit for multipartyism, but other institutions also matter. The overall impact of multiparty politics on American politics also depends on what happens with the presidency, the Senate, and elsewhere.

Scholars and reformers should consider these points as we continue to debate the merits of transitioning our party system. There are many possible paths that such a reform might take, and none of them will necessarily improve our politics. Comprehensive institutional change is difficult. Uncertainty and unintended consequences lurk around every corner. However, not changing our institutions also entails risk. Escaping bad equilibriums requires imagination, bold ideas, and deep thinking about systematic change.