Introduction

Political polarization and hyper-partisanship are pushing America’s two-party system to its brink. The American people and our elected officials have largely separated into two evenly matched partisan camps. The most politically engaged citizens on each side are in an all-out war against each other on the airwaves, the internet, and in the halls of our governing institutions. This constant demonization and othering of the opposing party has created risks for democracy itself. The 2020 election results were rejected by many, and it is possible the same thing will happen in 2024.

Breaking out of the two-party system is possible, though. Across the United States, democracy reformers are exploring systemic electoral reforms like proportional representation that would allow multiple parties to win elections and be represented in Congress. The hope is that this would unlock fluidity and multidimensionality in our politics and allow members of different parties to see each other as more than just opponents or enemies. With multiple parties, we could celebrate our commonalities on some issues while recognizing our disagreements on others. The next election would not feel like the last stand against evil. Instead, it would present opportunities to build new coalitions.

While reform would have clear benefits on many fronts, particularly in overhauling our antiquated and comparatively rare winner-take-all electoral system, it is less clear how proportional representation and multipartyism would affect our governing institutions. Congress has long been organized to accommodate two-party politics. With rising polarization in recent decades, party leaders have increasingly dominated the institution and stifled its underlying pluralism in pursuit of electoral victory. A multiparty system could reverse this tendency and unlock new opportunities for factions to collaborate with one another. On the other hand, the two-party Congress still gets things done, particularly when there’s a crisis or a deadline in front of it. Introducing multiple parties could make coalition-building even more chaotic and difficult than it is under the current system.

The effect of multiple parties is unclear for two reasons. First, multiparty democracy would look different in the United States than it does in Europe (where countries mostly have parliamentary multiparty systems) and Latin America (where many countries have presidential multiparty systems with much stronger presidents). We are the oldest constitutional democracy in the world, and our institutions are distinct from democracies that formed afterward.¹ There is not one obvious example for us to emulate. The unique political culture and history of the United States would likely lead to a distinctly American version of multipartyism that cannot be found elsewhere.

“The unique political culture and history of the United States would likely lead to a distinctly American version of multipartyism that cannot be found elsewhere.”

Second, and more directly relevant, the reform community has not paid nearly enough attention to the possible effects of multipartyism on our governing institutions. Rather, reform work usually focuses on how multipartyism would affect elections and mass politics. But governance cannot be ignored or made a secondary consideration. A multiparty Congress that is more chaotic and dysfunctional could counterbalance the benefits reaped elsewhere. Thus, we think it’s important to 1) think more concretely about what multipartyism would look like in our governing institutions, 2) be honest about the challenges it would face and acknowledge where there’s uncertainty, and 3) consider what complementary reforms might be necessary if multipartyism is going to improve problem-solving capacity.

This paper is an attempt to understand how multipartyism could work in American governing institutions. We focus primarily on the House of Representatives because it is the only institution where multipartyism could be introduced without changing the Constitution. Our exploration of House multipartyism proceeds in five parts.

1. We discuss how polarized two-party politics have created significant difficulties in the House, particularly by centralizing power in the hands of party leaders. We argue that this centralization of power has undercut representation and, as seen in the 118th Congress, exposed contradictions and tensions between our institutions and the country’s underlying pluralism.
2. We consider proportional representation as a reform that could resolve some of the problems our system faces. We first highlight and discuss various electoral benefits that would follow from adopting proportional representation. We then discuss the uncertainty in how proportional representation would affect our governing institutions.
3. We draw from comparative examples and U.S. history to develop expectations for how multipartyism would work in the House. We identify the mid-twentieth century House as one model for more fluid, issue-centric factional bargaining that a multiparty legislature could strive for.
4. We consider complementary institutional reforms that could help the House unlock the benefits of more factional representation while avoiding the chaos and instability it could potentially sow. Specifically, we recommend reforms that would decentralize the House agenda and ensure that majority coalition breakdowns would not render the chamber inoperable.
5. Finally, we look beyond the House and outline a research agenda for assessing how multipartyism would interact with other aspects of the political system to affect governance. Areas for further research include the electoral and the separation-of-powers systems.