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From Salon to Senate: Cosmetology’s Lobbying Power

The cosmetology lobby helped Empire Beauty build its early empire. In the decades since cosmetology schools became eligible for federal financial aid, they have continued to fight against measures that would provide any oversight and accountability, while working to line their pockets with more taxpayer dollars. In the 1990s, the American Association of Cosmetology Schools (AACS) pushed Congress to expand eligibility for Pell Grants, including increasing the amount of money in each award, so more cosmetology students could access them for even higher tuition.1

A 1993 Education Department Office of Inspector General, or OIG, report found an alarming level of wasted taxpayer dollars on cosmetology programs. Despite the money being poured into these programs, the OIG found, students consistently struggled to succeed.2 For instance, one beauty school the OIG highlighted received over $2.8 million in federal financial aid, over a period of 3.5 years, for about 650 students.3 Only 19 of those students went on to receive their state cosmetology licenses—at a cost to taxpayers of almost $148,000 per license. The OIG suggested that to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars, there should be minimal performance standards for vocational trade schools, such as requirements for licensing exam passage and job placement.4

The report asserted that the increased availability of federal financial aid had led to a significant expansion of cosmetology schools, regardless of whether there was any market need for cosmetologists where the institutions were located. Often, the OIG noted, the supply of cosmetologists leaving the schools routinely exceeded demand. In 1990, for example, 96,000 cosmetologists were trained nationwide, adding to a labor market already supplied with 1.8 million licensed cosmetologists. Of the approximately 1.9 million cosmetologists in the labor market at that time including recent graduates, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that only 597,000 were employed as cosmetologists because the market was completely oversaturated. Yet the OIG estimated the federal government continued to spend $725 million in federal financial aid funds annually to cosmetology students at for-profit schools.5

Though the schools were plagued with problems related to student outcomes, AACS kept pushing against oversight and for more money. The lobbying group urged the U.S. Department of Education, in the 1990s, to rescind “cohort default rates,” the only outcomes-based accountability measure established by the Higher Education Act that protects students and taxpayers.6 The Education Department measures the rates of student loan defaults for every college that participates in the federal student aid programs. Congress requires that schools with large numbers of former students consistently failing to repay their debt be deemed ineligible to participate in the federal student aid programs. In the 1990s, more than 1,000 for-profit colleges lost eligibility for federal aid due to their high cohort default rates.7

AACS, like the broader for-profit college lobby, argued that beauty schools weren’t at fault for high default rates. They couldn’t help it if their students, who came largely from low-income and marginalized backgrounds, weren’t able or willing to make federal loan payments. Seeking to pin responsibility on the borrowers, an AACS representative testified at a 1997 House of Representatives subcommittee hearing that “the sad part is that everyone who takes the time to fully understand the issues involved realizes that the primary factor in determining a student’s predisposition to default are the demographics of the students when they enroll in the school, not the educational quality of the school itself.”8

As a result of industry influence, the 1998 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act weakened the cohort default rate to the point that it was no longer an effective accountability tool.9 The result was predictable: On paper, default rates looked lower because of the short, two-year measurement window that associations like AACS lobbied for. As it turned out, institutions encouraged students to pursue forbearances and deferments when their loans entered the repayment period, but many students went on to default once they exhausted their deferments and forbearances.10

The cosmetology school industry continued to strike at consumer protections for years. The for-profit industry, including cosmetology schools, worked to weaken and even eliminate several other consumer protections during the late 1990s and early 2000s, leading to explosive growth in enrollments in for-profit and career-oriented programs.11

After rapid growth of the for-profit sector, the Obama administration in 2009 attempted the first iteration of the gainful employment rule, which would help the Education Department clamp down on institutions with extremely poor outcomes. Gainful employment rules were finalized in 2014, at which point AACS sued to block them from taking effect, arguing that the rule was unfair to their schools, since “graduates disproportionately underreport their income due to high levels of cash-based and self-employment-based earnings, including tips.”12 A federal judge found merit in the idea that schools should be able to appeal more easily. But by that point, the Trump administration had begun, and Education Secretary Betsy DeVos used AACS’s lawsuit as part of her pretext for rescinding the previous administration’s regulations in 2019.13

Before the rescission of the regulations when defending against the cosmetology association’s lawsuit, the Education Department, under the Trump administration, wrote in a court brief that the cosmetology association provided “no evidence of unreported income being an actual—much less widespread—practice among cosmetology program graduates.”14 Research led by the economist Stephanie Cellini confirms that tax evasion in the cosmetology sector due to unreported tips is minimal, accounting for only about 8 percent more in earnings, and is insufficient to explain the poor performance of many cosmetology programs in comparison to high school.15 Even a cosmetology industry-funded survey found that nearly 90 percent of salons report tips on W-2 forms, ensuring they would appear in federal tax data.16

In 2021, the Education Department, under the Biden administration, revisited gainful employment regulations, adding a minimum earnings requirement. Graduates from career-oriented programs would need to make, on average within their state, at least $1 more than if they had received only their high school diploma and no other education.

With such a large share of cosmetology programs expected to fail, AACS and cosmetology schools didn’t waste any time before filing lawsuits to stop the rule from being implemented. In court filings, they argued again that the industry’s reliance on cash payments and tips can result in underreported earnings to the IRS, disadvantaging cosmetology schools when it comes to passing the gainful employment rule’s earnings test.17 That litigation is still pending.

Separately, the cosmetology lobby already won a battle on a May 2023 effort by the Education Department to require programs to align their required education hours with state licensing standards in order to be eligible for federal aid.18 The Biden administration aimed to change Education Department regulations that permit these programs to exceed state requirements by up to 50 percent. For example, if a state has a 1,500-hour requirement for a cosmetology license, a school can set its program length up to 2,250 hours. In justifying the rule change, the Education Department highlighted the fact that institutions like cosmetology schools often offered programs that went well beyond state licensing requirements, which meant that students could burn unnecessarily through their limited eligibility for Pell Grants while accruing federal student loans.

Just like with gainful employment, the beauty industry, along with other for-profit schools, sued the Education Department.19 The judge granted a preliminary injunction, saying the department’s new provision “represents a sea change from 30 years of established practice,” which would result in irreparable harm to institutions.20 The newly finalized rule is paused due to an injunction so institutions can continue offering programs that go well beyond state requirements.21

Citations
  1. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor, Legislative Recommendations for Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act and Related Measures, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, 3.
  2. As cited in testimony in the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government and Oversight: Department of Education Oversight, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1996, 64.
  3. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Department of Education Oversight, 64.
  4. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Department of Education Oversight, 64.
  5. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Department of Education Oversight, 20.
  6. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor, Legislative Recommendations for Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act and Related Measures, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, 4–6.
  7. David Whitman, The GOP Reversal on For-Profit Colleges in the George W. Bush Era (The Century Foundation, June 7, 2018), source.
  8. House of Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce, Hearing on H.R. 6, the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 30.
  9. As described in Stephen Burd, “Cohort Default Rates: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” EdCentral (blog), New America, February 12, 2008, source, “Congress in 1998 made changes to the way the rate is calculated that artificially lowered the rate and made it a much less useful tool for the government to assess the extent of the student-loan default problem. That year, lawmakers extended by three months—to 270 days from 180 days—the length of time before the government declares a delinquent borrower to be in default. Once that happens it takes an additional 90 days for the government to pay the insurance claim. This means that it takes roughly 360 days, basically a full year, for an unpaid loan to officially be counted as going into default. These 360 days do not, however, include the 60 day grace period most borrowers have to make their first payment. In other words, a borrower who decides to never pay back a single penny of a student loan will not be considered in default until roughly 420 days after their first payment is due. Because it takes so long for a loan to go into default, the rate doesn’t capture all the students in a cohort who leave school and go on to default within the next two years.”
  10. Alexandra Hegji and Sylvia Bryan, Cohort Default Rates and the HEA Title IV Eligibility: Background and Analysis (Congressional Research Service, December 12, 2023), source. As described in the timeline of this report, Congress instituted a three-year rate as of 2008 to help prevent easy gaming of the rate. See Michael Itzkowitz, Why the Cohort Default Rate is Insufficient (Third Way, November 7, 2017), source. Even with this change, it still remains easy to game cohort default rates, since institutions can still encourage deferments, forbearances, and income-driven repayment plans. According to Itzkowitz, only 10 institutions out of 5,000 lost access to federal aid under CDR sanctions in 2017.
  11. Shireman, The For-Profit College Story, source.
  12. American Association of Cosmetology Schools v. Elisabeth DeVos in her official capacity as Secretary of Education, Memorandum Opinion, 2017 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, source.
  13. Hensley-Clancy, “Betsy DeVos Just Might Save the Beauty School Industry,” source.
  14. American Association of Cosmetology Schools v. Elizabeth DeVos in her official capacity as Secretary of Education, Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (and Summary Judgment) and in Support of Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 2017 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, source.
  15. Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Kathryn J. Blanchard, Hair and Taxes: Cosmetology Programs, Accountability Policy, and the Problem of Underreported Income (Postsecondary Equity & Economics Research Project, January 2022), source.
  16. Seiler, Cosmetology & Beauty Schools in the U.S., source.
  17. American Association of Cosmetology Schools and Duvall’s School of Cosmetology, LLC v. United States Department of Education and Miguel Cardona in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education, Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint, 2023 United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas Fort Worth Division, source.
  18. Office of Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, Final Regulations, “Financial Responsibility, Administrative Capability, Certification Procedures, Ability to Benefit (ATB),” Federal Register 88, no. 209 (October 31, 2023): 74568, source.
  19. CECU (Career Education Colleges and Universities), “Cortiva Institute of Beauty, Health, and Wellness, and the Coalition for Career Schools v. U.S. Department of Education,” accessed January 27, 2025, source.
  20. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, “Judge Halts Part of Biden Rule Aimed at Cracking Down on Career Programs,” Washington Post, June 21, 2024, source.
  21. Antoinette Flores, U.S. Department of Education Dear Colleague Letter (Gen-24-07), August 23, 2024, source.
From Salon to Senate: Cosmetology’s Lobbying Power

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