Conclusion

This report has explored existing ideas about military deception, principally through the lens of doctrinal principles of Western military doctrines. It has also investigated the military trends that act as disruptors to force change in the planning, execution, and measurement of military deception operations.

The contents of this report provide foundational knowledge for developing multiple lines of endeavor that could improve the conduct, and outcomes, of future military deception activities. A range of changes and new programs, across the breadth of military endeavors, has been examined in the final chapter of the report. These areas for improvement incorporate personnel training, education, and development; doctrinal and tactical evolution; equipment design and procurement; and strategic and policy issues.

The pace of learning and adaptation that is being witnessed now in Ukraine, from both sides, continues to accelerate. Learning cycles for drone operations and technology are now just a couple of weeks. Ukraine and Russia are locked in an adaptation battle on the ground where tactics change every two to three months. And, more broadly, Russia has developed a learning and adaptation “bloc” with Iran, China, and North Korea, where it shares lessons from the war in a wide variety of subjects. As the most recent Annual Threat Assessment from the U.S. intelligence community describes, “Cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years, reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power globally…Russia has been a catalyst for the evolving ties.”¹

This learning and adaptation cooperation among authoritarian governments is almost certain to include insights about tactical and strategic deception. Indeed, as the report proposes, it is very likely that the combination of cultural predisposition to deception activities and new technologies has opened up a “deception gap” between authoritarian and democratic military institutions. Thus, this is yet another driver to ensure that the best thinking, best technology, and best leadership are applied to evolving the conduct of military deception in American and allied military institutions in the coming years.

We should not deceive ourselves into thinking that change is not needed.