Analysis of Adoption Trends: Strategic Takeaways from History

Considerable scholarly research has sought to explain why certain states adopted initiatives while others did not. The evidence suggests that the diffusion of initiatives depended not just on popular demand but also on specific institutional, political, and demographic conditions.

Many of the political and socioeconomic conditions present at the beginning of the Progressive Era mirrored those of today, making this a particularly ripe moment for direct democracy expansion. Yet there are also critical differences between then and now that may dampen the applicability of the historical lessons to contemporary reform efforts.

One is that the nation is much older. The United States is no longer in the business of admitting new states, nor are states holding constitutional conventions to work out the kinks of their young governments, as many states were doing 100 years ago, which was the sine qua non of initiative and referendum amendments in several cases. Another is that American politics has become nationalized and polarized in such a way that (a) political reforms rarely enjoy broad cross-partisan support in the electorate or legislature and (b) virtually guarantees the swift formation of well-funded and nationally coordinated opposition. Another difference is that third parties, arguably the most influential players in the original I&R movement, both inside and outside government, are effectively inconsequential in U.S. politics today. This final point raises the question of whether changes that promote third-party ballot access and non-spoiler competition should be treated as enabling reforms for I&R enactment in certain states.

Below are 15 lessons from the literature and expert interviews to guide future I&R adoption strategies.

1. Interparty legislative competition creates opportunity. Initiative adoption was more likely in states with narrow legislative majorities¹ or strong third-party representation.² Combined with sustained advocacy pressure, these environments made Progressive Era lawmakers more willing to refer an I&R adoption amendment to the ballot. In the early 2000s, states with surging interparty competition, like Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, introduced several bills to adopt direct democracy.³
2. State political culture matters. Western states were more open to direct democracy due to looser constitutional traditions and grassroots political values.⁴ Modern reformers must also align campaigns with state-specific narratives and self-images.
3. Do no harm. Don’t assume future initiatives will always align with Progressive goals. The same mechanism that advanced women’s suffrage in 1912 also passed anti-LGBTQ measures in 2004. Any campaign to expand them must include safeguards and durable civic infrastructure to prevent successful weaponization by reactionary majorities in government or the electorate.
4. Start small—build up or out. In multiple cases, reformers first succeeded at the municipal level before scaling up.⁵ Most non-initiative states already allow some initiatives at the municipal level or have limited experience with statewide direct democracy (e.g., New Mexico, Maryland, and Illinois). States can leverage these experiences to scale vertically or horizontally. Supportive lawmakers can also build momentum and internal permission structures through advisory questions, where the legislature places a nonbinding question on the ballot for voters to consider. Another intermediate step could include citizens’ assemblies or deliberative “mini publics,” which bring together a representative group of individuals to discuss specific issues facing their community or jurisdiction and send recommendations to policymakers.⁶ A citizens’ assembly that periodically meets and makes recommendations to the state legislature could be authorized without the need to amend the constitution.
5. A modern Direct Legislation League could power national coordination. Recreating a twenty-first-century version of the Progressive Era organizing hub could help build funding and leadership capacity, develop messaging, and coordinate resources across states.⁷
6. Leadership matters, both inside and outside government. Reform was often led by charismatic organizers and sympathetic insiders (e.g., U’Ren, Johnson, Sullivan, and Roosevelt).⁸ Modern efforts need visible champions, ideally from within legislatures and governors’ offices.
7. Strange-bedfellows coalitions win. Many successful campaigns united agrarian reformers, labor unions, and third parties.⁹ Today, cross-partisan, cross-class coalitions will be essential for legitimacy and power-building. Fusion states like New York and Vermont with active and competitive third parties could also play a defining role.
8. Public distrust of government combined with rising economic inequality fuels reform. Direct democracy took hold where legislative capture, corruption, and economic inequality were most salient.¹⁰ Reformers should target states with low trust in and satisfaction with government, possibly related to perceived legislative corruption, and pair I&R adoption with other good governance reform measures.
9. Target states with large gaps between public preferences and policy. Related to number 8 above, empirical evidence shows that initiative states have better alignment between policy and public opinion.¹¹ Identify states blocking popular issues (e.g., paid sick and family leave, higher minimum wage, or marijuana legalization) and make that mismatch a core reform argument.
10. Find a modern, unifying “meta-issue” like gerrymandering or campaign finance reform. Malapportionment was one of the motivating grievances of Progressive Era I&R campaigns.¹² Today, similarly, gerrymandering is recognized by the public, media, and philanthropy as a major problem, entrenching minoritarian rule and undermining citizen trust in democracy. Direct democracy has been proven in states like Michigan and Colorado to deliver redistricting reforms. Initiatives have also advanced reforms to deemphasize money in politics. Public financing and anti-dark money policies present other galvanizing issue opportunities with echoes of Gilded Era-backlash.
11. Use regional comparisons and diffusion effects to build pressure. Many (though not all) studies find evidence of reform diffusion effects in the West.¹³ Proximity to initiative states can create a “why not us?” effect. Use this to generate pressure from the public, media, and lawmakers in neighboring states (e.g., Pennsylvania, which borders Ohio).¹⁴
12. Beware of strong major parties and rigid constitutions. Reform efforts were often blocked in states with entrenched parties, laws that marginalized third parties, or burdensome amendment rules.¹⁵ These are major hurdles that require long-haul organizing or constitutional conventions.
13. Elite support can be contingent and opportunistic. Like Bridges and Kousser, Daniel R. Biggers and Alexander Ross show that support for direct democracy often follows partisan self-interest.¹⁶ Legislators in the minority are more likely to support initiatives as a check on majority power but tend to reverse course once their party gains control. I&R advocacy groups must be prepared to hold pledged candidates and officials accountable regardless of their parties’ standing.
14. Fears of economic/status redistribution to poor and minority groups have long blocked initiative process adoption. Across the country, but especially in the South, elites’ fears of empowering poor and minority voters were significant deterrents.¹⁷ In recent decades, reluctance to embrace initiatives has been rooted in racial politics, as legislatures gerrymandered to reduce Black political influence have resisted alternatives that would give people voice in proportion to the state’s demographics. Modern campaigns must be inclusive from the start and may consider emphasizing policies with broad-based public support and benefits at first.
15. Constitutional conventions or review processes, while risky, may be necessary. More than one-third of successful state adoptions came via constitutional convention, and constitutional review and revision commissions preceded others. Despite nearly unanimous reservations among reformers we interviewed about opening up the “Pandora’s box” of a convention, it should not be reflexively dismissed. Advocates could leverage the threat of convention to push for a review effort inside the legislature. Of the non-initiative states with automatic ballot referrals on conventions, Hawaii is up next in 2028.

Together, these findings help us understand where and why ballot initiatives take root. States with high public dissatisfaction, weak or divided legislatures, less institutional rigidity, and active reform movements have historically provided the most favorable terrain. For today’s reformers, success will depend on mobilizing grassroots energy and on understanding and influencing the strategic incentives of those in power.