Beyond the Lobbying: Crafting U.S. Policy on Azerbaijan

Headlines like “How
Azerbaijan and Its Lobbyists Spin Congress,” “Inside
Azerbaijan’s Bizarre US Lobbying Push,” and “How Azerbaijan
Built a Stealth Lobbyist” reflect the kind of coverage
Azerbaijan and its lobbying efforts—devised to draw attention away from a
dismal human rights record—have received recently. These efforts
reportedly include expensive
lobbyists in Washington, junkets to Azerbaijan for members
of Congress, and similar trips for state legislators that have given rise
to a bloom
of pro-Azerbaijan resolutions in state houses across middle America.

Stories of such trips to Azerbaijan and its capital, Baku—inevitably
described as replete with posh galas, five star hotels, and high powered
beltway lobbyists—are often
compelling and colorful. They offer a clear and simple explanation for
continued US support for a demonstrably
authoritarian regime that arrests journalists, sharply curbs freedoms of
speech and assembly, commits egregious election fraud, and is wrought with endemic
corruption.

But this explanation does not tell the full story of how
lobbying or US foreign policy work or why a non-democratic regime like
Azerbaijan (which is hardly alone) enjoys U.S. support. Ultimately, lobbying
itself is not the problem, but a symptom of deeper issues stemming from
long-obsolete policy assumptions in the West about Azerbaijan’s strategic value.

Stories of excessive Azerbaijani lobbying confirm
some of our stereotypes about a policy process dominated by money. In some ways,
Azerbaijan—because it is a distant, post-Soviet, and poorly known country in
the U.S.—lends itself to being caricatured as a of a generic, oil-rich
dictatorship eager to peddle influence. And there is definitely some accuracy
to such characterizations. State
legislators who pass pro-Baku resolutions (which have no legal
authority at home but reportedly
get used as propaganda abroad) after returning from caviar-fueled junkets are
clearly being influenced. Similarly, members of Congress who enjoy support or
close relationships with Azerbaijan’s lobbyists are more likely to support Azerbaijan’s
regime and present it as more democratic than it is.

But attributing U.S. policy to Azerbaijan’s lobbying
overlooks the reality that while lobbyists are important and often
powerful, they rarely if ever set foreign policy. Nor do they act independently
of the broader Washington policy community. The most important tool for any
lobbyist is their network of relationships in government. As a rule, lobbyists
do not jeopardize those relationships—especially on behalf of
foreign clients.

The Podesta Group, a prominent lobbying firm with strong
ties to the White House and the Clintons, receives some $50,000-$75,000 per
month from Azerbaijan and is a good example. For the Podesta Group to risk its
relationships over an average sized (by Washington political standards)
retainer would be foolish. The fact that such a respected establishment firm accepted
a contract with Azerbaijan is a signal that Azerbaijan, despite its repressive policies
and the concerns raised by some in the US government, remains in relatively
good standing in Washington.

But if not lobbyists, what explains friendly U.S. policies
towards Azerbaijan? The short answer is familiar: energy. Azerbaijan is about
the 23^rd
largest oil producer in the world and about 33^rd in
international gas
production. Hugging the Caspian Sea’s western coastline, Azerbaijan is seen
as ideally situated to carry hydrocarbons to European markets. But more urgent
is Azerbaijan’s presumed role as an alternative
energy source and corridor, as Europe currently relies heavily on Russian oil
and gas to power its large economy, granting Moscow a near-energy monopoly.

By the mid-2000s, in spite of Russian opposition, Azerbaijan
transformed from a sleepy Eurasian backwater into a booming petro state and centerpiece
in the Western strategy to diversifying European energy supplies. And
conveniently, Azerbaijan had also become a key outpost in the Western quest to
isolate Iran. Studiously secular Azerbaijan had long
sparred with revolutionary Iran over religious extremism, Caspian Sea
borders, and even its very
existence—northern Iran is also known as Azerbaijan, leading
to conflicting claims over territory and identity. Baku became an enthusiastic
player in the West’s Iranian strategy, even forging an unlikely alliance with Israel
and reportedly played host to Western surveillance
efforts in the region.

With this narrative of Azerbaijan as a key non-Russian
conduit for energy to Europe, a Muslim-majority friend to Israel and partner in
fights against terrorism, and a bulwark against Iran’s reach across borders—much
of it woven by Western policymakers themselves—in place, no lobbyist would give
a second thought to taking a contract with Azerbaijan.

But reality in Azerbaijan has changed and Western
policymakers, analysts, and lobbyists need to catch up. Today, it’s easier to
ascribe chummy US-Azerbaijan relations to lobbyists precisely because it’s
grown harder to pinpoint the value of strong ties between Western priorities in
the region and US support for Baku—now that almost every major aspect of
Azerbaijani convergence with Western interests has dissipated. Azerbaijan is no
longer the energy wunderkind it was in the 2000s. Azerbaijani oil production
peaked in 2010, and is on course for steady
decline—just as oil prices stall at unprecedented lows. And while gas
from Shah Deniz II has received international
attention, it will never compensate for the decline in oil production, not
to mention collapsing oil prices. More broadly, Azerbaijan will never be more
than a bit player in the European energy mix.

At the same time, Azerbaijan’s potential as a security
foothold against Russia and Iran has never materialized. While many analysts predicted
the Russian intervention in Ukraine would pull Baku ideologically closer to the
West, due to its own
sensitivities over the Armenian occupation of its territory, the opposite
has happened. Instead, the Azerbaijani
regime saw “Euromaidan” protests that toppled ex-Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovich as the greater threat. Fearing a “color revolution”—an effort fueled
by protest or civil disobedience to oust a government deemed corrupt, abusive,
or undemocratic—Azerbaijan embarked on an unprecedented campaign of domestic
repression against human rights activists, civil society organizations, and
the last vestiges of independent media.

In late 2014, regime power broker Ramiz Mehdiyev issued a 60-page
screed accusing the West of seeking to foment revolution in Azerbaijan,
effectively announcing an Azerbaijani anti-West shift. Azerbaijan is
increasingly aligned with Russia, recently signing a bevy of economic and military
agreements while offering only tepid protests over Crimea’s annexation. Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev even hailed Russian boss Vladimir Putin for “standing up” to
Western pressure.

Azerbaijan-Iran relations have also dramatically improved.
Far from the acrimony that characterized ties a few years ago, Baku now cautiously
embraces Iran. Iranian President Hasan Rouhani made
his first visit to Azerbaijan in November 2014, where the two sides signed
political, cultural, and economic agreements. Azerbaijan’s government even
called Iran a strategic partner
against “Western hatred” of Islam. And over the last year, a steady trickle of Iranian clerics
returned to Azerbaijani mosques after being expelled en masse in 2011-2012. Worryingly,
as the regime cracked down against its Sunni community, it has begun to
increasingly adopt majoritarian
Shia rhetoric—perhaps as a nod to its new friends in
Tehran.

Azerbaijan’s hired guns in the US and Europe are crafting
policy based on dated assumptions. Lobbyists may have failed to appreciate recent
shifts in Azerbaijani foreign policy, but this is largely because U.S. and
Western policymakers are also reading off an outdated playbook. Lobbyists, even
if they are knowingly
misrepresenting the facts, are largely successful because they speak to prevailing
assumptions. When it comes to most things Azerbaijan, a fair cardinal rule is
to always “follow the money.” But in this case, following the money back to
lobbyists can obscure more than it reveals.